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Abstract 
To motivate effort, organizations commonly use budget-based tangible rewards (e.g., gift 
cards, merchandise) in lieu of or in addition to cash rewards and they can distribute tangible 
rewards to employees either directly (employees are given merchandise directly) or indirectly 
(via a redeemable points program). In conjunction with various budget-based financial 
rewards, employees can receive feedback about how they performed relative to other 
employees. However, employees can intentionally misstate their expected performance (i.e., 
create budget slack) when participating in the budgeting process, impairing the usefulness of 
budgets for planning and motivation. This dissertation investigates the effects of different 
types of budget-based rewards (cash, tangible, or redeemable points) on budget slack creation 
and performance, and whether relative performance information [RPI] moderates these 
effects. As predicted, results from an experiment completed by 166 undergraduate students 
show that participants eligible to earn redeemable points create less slack (i.e., set more 
difficult performance budgets) than those eligible for cash or direct tangible rewards. Further, 
RPI provides participants with a descriptive norm that slack creation is socially acceptable, 
resulting in more slack. Although I do not find support for the predicted indirect relationship 
between reward type or RPI on performance via their effects on budget slack, I do find that 
the provision of RPI has a direct positive effect on performance. Finally, supplemental 
analysis shows that those provided with RPI and cash rewards outperform all others. These 
results suggest that firms choosing to provide budget-based tangible rewards and allowing 
employees to participate in the budgeting process should consider using a redeemable points 
system rather than providing rewards directly to eligible employees. Further, before deciding 
whether to provide RPI to employees, firms should weigh the positive direct effects of RPI 
on performance against its negative effects on budget slack creation. Last, if a firm does 
choose to provide employees with RPI because of its positive effects on employee effort, 
firms may be well-advised to offer employees budget-based cash rewards instead of budget-
based tangible rewards or budget-based points rewards. 
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Chapter 1: Introduction 
Organizations often use performance-based tangible rewards such as gift cards, trips, 
and merchandise in addition to, or instead of, cash to motivate and control employee effort 
(Long and Shields 2010; Peltier et al. 2005). Tangible rewards are non-cash incentives that 
are restricted in use but still have a measurable monetary value (Condly et al. 2003; Presslee 
et al. 2013). Two methods of distributing tangible rewards include providing them directly 
(e.g., eligible employees receive merchandise) or providing them indirectly through a 
redeemable-points program where employees earn points that can be used to acquire tangible 
rewards of their choosing. In multi-agent firms, budget-based rewards are often distributed in 
conjunction with feedback about others relative performance as a means to increase 
knowledge sharing and competition among employees (Fisher et al. 2002; Gino and Staats 
2011; Nordstrom et al. 1990). Organizations spend billions of dollars annually on 
performance-based tangible rewards (Incentive Federation 2007; Peltier et al. 2005) and there 
is evidence that individuals think and perform differently when eligible for these rewards 
compared to cash (e.g., Jeffrey 2009; McGraw et al. 2010; Presslee et al. 2013; Shaffer and 
Arkes 2009). However, few studies have examined the motivational properties of tangible 
rewards or the factors, such as relative performance information, that moderate their 
effectiveness.  
Budgets are important tools for organizational planning and control, and employers 
regularly involve employees in the budgeting process in an effort to collect their private 
information and to increase their motivation toward target attainment (Covaleski et al. 2003; 
Shields and Shields 1998). Employers also often reward employees when their performance 
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meets or exceeds these budgets. However, an unintended consequence of offering employees 
budget-based rewards and involving them in the budgeting process is that they have both the 
financial incentive and the opportunity to understate their productive capability (i.e., create 
slack) by setting easily attainable budgets (Dunk and Nouri 1998).1 Given the well-
documented association between budget difficulty and performance, it is important to 
examine the factors that influence employees’ budgeting behavior and slack creation (Luft 
and Shields 2009). Presslee et al. (2013) provide initial evidence that employees think 
differently about cash and redeemable points, and show that these differences can affect their 
risk-based decisions in terms of goal setting, and their performance. I extend their study by 
investigating whether and how the type of budget-based rewards (cash, tangible, or 
redeemable points) affects slack creation and performance. 
In conjunction with budget-based rewards, employees regularly receive information 
about other employees’ performance as a mechanism to improve information exchange and 
motivation (Gino and Staats 2011; Mas and Moretti 2009; Nordstrom et al. 1990; Vidal and 
Nossel 2011). Fisher et al. (2002) find that relative performance information [RPI] about 
others’ budget proposals and performance impacts budgeting behaviour by encouraging less 
slack creation. Moreover, theory suggests that the type of budget-based rewards may impact 
how employees interpret ambiguous RPI. Accordingly, I examine how the provision of RPI in 
                                                     
1 In my study, budget slack has negative implications because it allows participants to earn excess rents and 
could negatively affect planning that relies on budgeted numbers. However, budget slack can also have positive 
implications for an organization and may be necessary in some settings that contain environmental uncertainty 
(see Covaleski et al. (2003) for discussion). For example, Merchant and Manzoni (1989) find that more 
achievable performance targets, or targets containing more slack, lead to improved corporate reporting, resource 
planning, and employee motivation. 
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the form of budget variance (i.e., performance above or below budget) directly affects 
budgeting behaviour as well as its role in moderating the effects of reward type on budgeting.2 
Prior research characterizes budget slack as dishonest reporting in settings when 
employees possess private information and there is limited environmental uncertainty (e.g., 
Church et al. 2012; Hannan et al. 2006). Typically, people derive utility from obeying the 
personal norm of honesty (Evans et al. 2001) and they behave dishonestly only to the extent 
that they can rationalize doing so (Ariely 2012). Compared to cash rewards, tangible rewards 
are viewed as more attractive and generate greater positive affect because they are used more 
for “wants” than for “needs” (Jeffrey 2009, p. 144). Thus, I expect that people pursuing 
tangible rewards will be better able to rationalize their dishonesty because they will anticipate 
experiencing greater positive emotion with respect to receiving the rewards (Vincent et al. 
2012). As a result I predict that individuals pursuing tangible rewards will create more budget 
slack than those pursuing cash rewards. Next, I argue that redeemable points are a medium 
that diminishes the saliency and attractiveness of a financial outcome (Hsee et al. 2003). 
Consequently, I predict redeemable points will reduce people’s ability to rationalize 
dishonesty and will lead to lower slack creation relative to both cash and tangible rewards.  
I also predict that the provision of RPI in the form of budget variances will lead to 
more budget slack because RPI creates a descriptive norm that dishonest reporting is 
acceptable. Further, I predict the personal norms associated with reward type and the 
descriptive norm associated with RPI will interact to affect slack creation. Specifically, the 
effects of reward type on making salient a personal norm of honesty diminishes the effect of 
                                                     
2 Relative performance evaluation (RPE) incorporates RPI in the evaluation and compensation of employees. I 
consider a setting where employees’ evaluation and compensation does not depend on RPI.  
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RPI on budget slack. Thus, I predict RPI will lead to more slack for those pursuing tangible 
rewards than those pursuing either cash rewards or points rewards. 
Regarding performance, I predict that reward type and RPI will indirectly affect 
performance through their effects on budget slack. Budget slack by definition decreases the 
difficulty of budgets and there is extensive empirical support for the positive association 
between budget (goal) difficulty and performance (Bonner and Sprinkle 2002; Waller and 
Chow 1985). Thus, because tangible rewards are predicted to lead to more slack than either 
cash rewards or points rewards, I expect tangible rewards will have a negative indirect effect 
on performance compared to cash rewards and points rewards. I also consider the direct 
effects of reward type and RPI on performance. Because theory and empirical evidence are 
mixed regarding the performance effects of various reward types (e.g., Jeffrey 2009; Presslee 
et al. 2013; Shaffer and Arkes 2009), I explore the direct effects of reward type on 
performance. Finally, I predict that RPI will have a positive direct effect on performance 
because employees are likely to compete against one another by working harder to exceed 
their budget (Mas and Moretti 2009; Tafkov 2013).  
I test my predictions with 166 undergraduate students who participated in a 2 x 3 
between subjects experiment where they completed online concession stand orders using an 
effort-sensitive task. After completing three training periods, participants performed three, 
two-minute rounds of the same task, with minimal task uncertainty. For these three production 
rounds, participants were randomly assigned to one of three reward type conditions (cash 
rewards, tangible rewards, or redeemable points rewards) and one of the two RPI conditions 
(absent or present). Prior to each round, participants budgeted their performance for that 
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round. During each round, participants earned a reward ($1 cash, $1 on a gift card, or 1 point 
redeemable for $1 on a gift card) for each order they completed above budget. After each 
round, participants were provided with RPI on the budget variance (correct orders above 
(below) budget) for the other two members of their work group. Budget slack is calculated as 
the difference between individuals performance in practice round 3 and their budget, and 
performance is calculated as the number of orders correctly completed in each round. 
Results show that those compensated with redeemable points created less budget slack 
than those compensated with either cash or tangible rewards. As predicted, participants 
assigned to the points-based reward condition view the reward as less attractive, have a 
weaker affective response, and thus create less slack. Results also show that the provision of 
RPI leads participants to create more slack by providing them with evidence that dishonest 
reporting is more acceptable. I also find that reward type and RPI interact such that the 
personal norms made salient by reward type influence how participants interpret RPI 
feedback; thus, of those provided RPI, those pursuing tangible rewards create more slack than 
those pursuing cash rewards or points rewards.  Regarding performance, I do not find the 
predicted negative association between budget slack and performance nor do I find a direct 
effect of reward type on performance. However, as predicted, I do find that RPI has a positive 
direct effect on performance and that those pursuing cash and receiving RPI outperform all 
other conditions.  
My findings have implications for theory and practice. First, results suggest that an 
organization’s reward structure can influence employees’ perceptions of social norms and that 
these norms can help control employee behaviour (Tayler and Bloomfield 2011). Specifically, 
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redeemable points rewards lead to the most challenging budgets (least slack), even though the 
monetary value of points is identical to that of cash and tangible rewards. To my knowledge, 
mine is the first study to show how the reward medium influences slack creation and as such 
should be of interest to designers of reward systems responsible for determining the types of 
budget-based rewards to provide employees. Moreover, this finding provides a greater 
theoretical understanding of the factors that influence the difficulty of self-set budgets and 
should be of interest to other researchers interested in budgeting behavior. Second, I extend 
recent research examining the effects of RPI on honesty in reporting (e.g., Church et al. 2012; 
Fisher et al. 2002; Hales et al. 2011; Maas and Van Rinsum 2011) and on performance (e.g., 
Hannan et al. 2012; Tafkov 2013). In terms of budgeting behaviour, I find that provision of 
RPI can lead to more slack by signaling that dishonest reporting is socially acceptable. 
However, I also find that provision of RPI encourages better performance by establishing a 
referent for social comparison, thereby encouraging greater effort. These results suggest firms 
should consider the relative strength of these opposing forces on planning and performance 
when deciding whether to provide employees with RPI. Last, my results suggest that if firms 
choose to provide RPI and desire improved performance, they are well-advised to offer 
employees budget-based cash rewards instead of tangible rewards or points rewards. 
The remainder of this thesis is organized as follows. In Chapter 2, I review economic, 
psychology, and accounting literatures as they relate to budgeting, budget slack and honesty 
in reporting, reward type, and relative performance information. In Chapter 3, I develop my 
predictions regarding the effects of reward type and relative performance information on 
budget slack and performance. In Chapter 4, I present the research design. In Chapter 5, I 
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Chapter 2: Literature Review 
2.1 Introduction  
 In this chapter, I apply economics and psychology theories 1) to examine the effects of 
budget-based incentives on budget slack and performance and 2) to explore the effects of 
reward type and relative performance information [RPI] on employee behaviour. This chapter 
is organized as follows. In Section 2.2, I describe a general budget-based incentive contract 
that provides the scenario for this dissertation. In Section 2.3, I review literature on the 
motivational properties of budgets, on budget-based incentives, and on employee participation 
in the budgeting process. In Section 2.4, I review literature on budget slack and discuss the 
link between budget slack and dishonest reporting. In Sections 2.5 and 2.6, I review literature 
on how employee behaviour is affected by reward type and RPI, respectively. Lastly, I 
conclude in Section 2.7. 
2.2 Budget Scenario 
I consider a budget scenario in which an employee determines his performance 
budget; the employer uses this budget as a benchmark to compensate the employee for his or 
her actual performance (i.e., a participative budget-based incentive contract).3 Specifically, I 
employ a slack-inducing incentive contract in which an employee maintains private 
                                                     
3 Demski and Feltham (1978) argue that a budget-based incentive contract has three features. First, in the 
contract, employee compensation is, in part, a function of observable outcomes that are controllable by the 
employee. Second, the contract outlines a budget or standard that partitions possible outcomes into favourable or 
unfavourable. Finally, the contract contains a compensation function consisting of two sub-functions, one for 
each outcome.  
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information about his performance capabilities and receives a piece-rate bonus for each unit 
of performance in excess of his self-set budget (see equation 1):4  
  Subordinates’ Compensation = S  if  X ≤ B 
  Subordinates’ Compensation = S + A (X – B) if  X > B  (1)
  
 where: 
  S = salary (base pay) 
X = actual performance 
  B = self-set budgeted production 
  A = compensation per unit of production over budget 
 
2.3 Budgets, Budget-Based Incentives, and Participation in the Budgeting Process 
Budgets are an important tool used for organizational planning and control. For 
planning purposes, employers use budgets to communicate the intended use of firm resources, 
to coordinate activities of the organization, and to uncover potential logistical issues or 
bottlenecks (Garrison et al. 2012; Merchant and Van der Stede 2003). For example, Davila 
and Foster (2005) analyze data from 78 startup companies and find that many of these 
companies adopt operating and cash budgets for planning purposes and that early adoption is 
positively associated with company growth. For control purposes, employers use the targets 
contained within budgets to motivate employee effort and to evaluate employee performance. 
In their 2010 survey, Libby and Lindsay find that approximately 80% of employers use 
budgets for control purposes such as performance evaluation, and 95% of them plan to 
                                                     
4 A budget-linear incentive contract provides no remuneration for performance below the budget target but 
provides a linear piece-rate for performance exceeding the budget target (see equation 1). A budget-fixed 
incentive contract provides no remuneration for performance below the budget target but provides a fixed bonus 
for performance meeting or exceeding the budget target (i.e., the A(X-B) term in equation 1 is replaced with a 
fixed dollar amount). 
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continue using budgets as a control mechanism.5  
In this section, I apply Goal Theory to describe how budget targets can have a 
considerable effect on employee effort. Then, I discuss how incentive contracts that tie 
employee compensation to the achievement of budget targets can enhance employees’ budget 
commitment and effort. Last, I explain how employee participation in the budgeting process 
can improve both organizational planning and control. 
2.3.1 Budget Targets as Personal Goals 
The targets contained within performance budgets can encourage employees to set 
personal performance goals (Fisher et al. 2003; Kenis 1979). According to Goal Theory, 
personal goals represent cognitive images of desired future outcomes, and these images are 
the primary determinant of the level of effort an individual will exert (Locke and Latham 
1990). Moreover, a well-established finding is that difficult and specific goals motivate 
greater effort towards goal attainment, until people reach the limits of their ability (Locke et 
al. 1981; Locke and Latham 1991; Mento et al. 1987).6 Personal goals positively affect effort 
by directing peoples’ attention towards goal-relevant activities and by increasing the duration 
and intensity of their effort towards goal attainment (Locke and Latham 2002).7 Thus, budget 
targets influence employee effort by encouraging employees to set personal goals when they 
                                                     
5 Libby and Lindsay’s (2010) finding that budgets are regularly used for motivation purposes conflicts with 
Sivabalan et al.’s (2009) conclusion that budgets are used more for planning and control purposes (excluding 
performance evaluation) than for motivation purposes. 
6 Although Atkinson (1958) claims that the relationship between goal difficulty and performance reflects an 
inverse-U, Latham and Locke (2002) describe the relationship as concave. 
7 Personal goals can also increase performance on cognitive tasks by increasing the use of task-relevant 
knowledge and by improving strategy (Locke and Latham 2002). My dissertation examines performance on an 
effort-intensive task (i.e., low cognitive-demanding task). Thus, these features of personal goals are outside of 
the scope of this study. 
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otherwise would not or by encouraging them to set higher personal goals than they otherwise 
would (Latham and Locke 1991).  
Central to the positive relationship between budget difficulty and employee effort is 
their acceptance of, and commitment to, budget targets as personal goals (Klein et al. 1999; 
Wright et al. 1994).8 Goal acceptance and commitment are terms that define an individual’s 
determination to try, and keep trying, for a desired end state or goal (Hollenbeck and Klein 
1987; Locke et al. 1981).9 The two primary determinants of goal acceptance and commitment 
are the attractiveness of goal attainment and the expectancy of goal attainment (Locke et al. 
1988; Hollenbeck and Klein 1987). Goal attractiveness represents an individual’s “anticipated 
satisfaction from goal attainment” (Klein 1991, p. 238). Expectancy represents an individual’s 
perceived probability or likelihood that if sufficient effort is exerted a desired performance 
level or outcome is achieved (referred to as the effort-outcome relationship) (Bonner and 
Sprinkle 2002; Vroom 1964). Therefore, by increasing employees’ perceptions that the target 
is both attractive and achievable, employers increase the likelihood that difficult budget 
targets will have a positive effect on employee effort.  
                                                     
8 When goals are assigned, goal commitment moderates the effect of goal difficulty on performance (Klein et al. 
1999; Wright et al. 1994). That is, the positive effect of goal difficulty on performance increases only when goal 
commitment is sufficiently high. However, when goals are assigned to individuals of the same ability or an 
individual self-selects his performance goal, goal commitment mediates the effect of personal goal difficulty on 
performance (Klein and Kim 1998). 
9 Goal acceptance reflects an individual’s initial agreement with an assigned goal and represents a measure of 
goal attractiveness and expectancy of goal attainment prior to any effort being exerted (Erez and Zidon 1984). 
Thus, measures of goal acceptance are initial measures of goal commitment (Hollenbeck et al. 1987). Goal 
commitment is a point in time measure, and research shows that measures of commitment close to the end of 
performance are more correlated with performance than initial measures of commitment such as goal acceptance 
(Klein et al. 2001). 
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2.3.2 Budget-Based Incentives  
Employees often receive a bonus for performance-to-budget (i.e., budget variance) to 
enhance both their commitment towards budget attainment and their performance (e.g., 
Indjejikian and Nanda 2002; Murphy 2001). In their meta-analysis, Locke et al. (1981) 
maintain that there are two ways that goal-contingent (or budget-contingent) financial 
incentives may affect effort.10  First, these incentives can encourage people to set more 
difficult personal goals than they otherwise would because budget-relevant effort increases 
personal wealth (Covaleski et al. 2003; Jenkins et al. 1998). Second, goal-contingent financial 
incentives increase commitment by increasing the valance and attractiveness of goal 
attainment and stressing its importance (Klein and Wright 1994; Wright 1989; 1992). Indeed, 
studies find that budget-based incentives positively impact performance by increasing 
commitment towards goal attainment and by clearly linking pay with effort. Bonner et al. 
(2000) review 131 experiments and observe that budget-based incentives (referred to as 
quota-based incentives) have the highest likelihood of positively affecting effort compared to 
piece-rate, tournament, or flat-wage incentives.11 Further, Fisher et al. (2003) find that the 
positive effect of budget-based incentives extends to group performance. The authors show 
that group budget-based contract lead to higher group performance than group piece-rate 
                                                     
10 Although rare, there is some research that suggests cash incentives may alter an individual’s level of 
expectancy in certain situations (e.g., Wright and Kacmar 1995). 
11 Webb et al. (2013) find that challenging targets and target-based pay reduce the discovery of production 
efficiencies (i.e., thinking “outside-the-box”), yet motivate higher conventional productive effort. Thus, target-
based or budget-based incentives may be counterproductive if the desired effort is creative output rather than 
conventional output. 
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contracts do and that a group budget-linear contract leads to greater performance than a group 
budget-fixed contract.12   
2.3.3 Participation in the Budgeting Process 
Participative budgeting describes the “process in which [an employee] is involved 
with, and has influence on, the determination of his or her budget” (Shields and Shields 1998, 
p. 49). Anderson et al. (2010, p.92) describes participative budgeting as “visible, intentional 
processes of the firm that have planning, coordination, and motivational benefits.” One reason 
for encouraging employees to participate in the budgeting process is that budget participation 
improves the information exchanged between employees and employers (Covaleski et al. 
2003; Kren 1992). Employees typically maintain private information about their productive 
capabilities or the resources they need to do their job. If employees share this private 
information with employers, budget accuracy and the quality of budget-related decisions 
usually improve. In fact, Locke and Schweiger (1979, 206) argue that employees' private 
information is the “single most important contextual factor determining the usefulness of 
participative decision making.” Moreover, Baiman and Evans (1983) and Penno (1984) use 
analytic models to show that incorporating employees’ communication of their private 
information into the budget, regardless of how accurate the communication may be, leads to 
better firm performance than not incorporating that communication.13 As long as there is 
                                                     
12 In addition to their positive effects on motivation, budget-based incentives can improve organizational 
planning by reducing the variance in employee performance (Fisher et al. 2003). 
13 Accounting research traditionally applies an agency theory perspective (see Ross 1973 for discussion) when 
examining how firm value increases when participative budgeting is included in employees’ incentive contracts. 
Similar to Brown et al. (2009, p.318), I apply agency theory to mean “formal theories that analyze the optimal 
design of organizational and incentive arrangements between a self-interested principal and one or more self-
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some true information contained within the report, an employer is better informed than if the 
report was not provided in the first place. Thus, participative budgeting can serve as a 
valuable tool for improving the planning and coordination of firm activities. 
Another reason for encouraging employees to participate in the budgeting process is 
that participation can increase employee effort (Argyris 1952; Kenis 1979; Merchant 1981).14 
There are two ways participation can affect employee effort. First, because budgets are more 
accurate and informative when employees participate, budget targets better reflect employees’ 
performance capabilities or their resource needs (Covaleski et al. 2003). In turn, employees 
receive “more efficient, goal-congruent incentive contracts which increase their motivation to 
achieve the budget” (Shields and Shields 1998, p. 59). Second, employees who participate in 
the process likely remain committed to, and exert greater effort towards, budget attainment 
than they otherwise would because they experience a sense of responsibility for budget 
performance (Chong and Chong 2002; Latham and Locke 1991). 
In summary, difficult, yet attainable, budget targets can have a positive effect on 
employee effort because they provide a performance goal. This motivational effect can be 
enhanced by using budget-based incentive contracts and by allowing employees to participate 
in the budgeting process. Further, both budget-based incentives and budget participation 
provide employers additional potential benefits in terms of organizational planning by 
                                                                                                                                                                      
interested agents.” See Baiman (1982; 1990), Lambert (2001), and Brown et al. (2009) for reviews of accounting 
research applying agency theory.  
14 There is mixed evidence regarding the effect of budget participation on employee effort (see Kren and Liao 
1988; Murray 1990; Shields and Shields 1998 for reviews). For instance, pseudo budget participation occurs 
when employees are involved with, but have no influence on, their budget. Research shows that pseudo budget 
participation can have demotivating effects for employees and can result in dysfunctional behaviour such as 
dishonest reporting (e.g., Argyris 1952; Krishnan, Marinich, and Shields 2012; Libby 1999; Pasewark and 
Welker 1990). 
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reducing the variance in employees’ performance and by improving the exchange of 
information. 
2.4 Budget Slack and Dishonesty in Reporting 
2.4.1 Budget Slack 
A major concern when offering employees budget-based incentives in conjunction 
with allowing them to participate in the budgeting process is that employees may generate 
budget slack (Dunk and Nouri 1998). Budget slack refers to the intentional under-statement of 
employees’ productive capabilities or over-statement of the resources they require to complete 
a task (Fisher et al. 2002; Young 1985). That is, employees do not necessarily fully reveal 
their private information during the budgeting process. Because budgets containing slack are 
inherently less informative (accurate) and less difficult to attain than budgets not containing 
slack, they have harmful consequences for planning, control, and motivation. These harmful 
effects lead some to conclude that firms should avoid comparing employees’ performance to 
participatively set targets when determining their compensation (e.g., Hope and Fraser 2003; 
Jensen 2001, 2003). 
Research studies applying agency theory maintain that, before choosing to create 
budget slack, employees rationally analyze the potential financial rewards and costs (Baiman 
1982; Brown et al. 2009; Eisenhardt 1989). A fundamental premise in this literature is that 
employees are guided strictly by economic self-interest, and they will exploit their private 
information to maximize personal wealth at the expense of the firm. Further, these studies 
typically assume that employees are risk-averse or risk-neutral (Holmstrom and Milgrom 
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1991; Prendergast 1999). When employees are exposed to the risk that their effort will not be 
rewarded (i.e., negative externality) or when they are inherently risk-averse, they will create 
slack in an attempt to share risk with their employer (Onsi 1973). That is, the more risk averse 
employees are the more slack they are likely to create (Dunk and Nouri 1998; Young et al. 
1993; Young 1985).  
To deter the pervasive and harmful effects of slack, research has considered ways that 
employers can influence employee benefits and costs of slack creation. In terms of benefits, a 
large body of theoretical literature explores how contracts can be designed to better align 
employees’ financial interests with those of the organization (see Prendergast 1999). For 
instance, some studies show that truth-inducing incentive contracts are effective at reducing 
budget slack (e.g., Chow, Cooper and Waller 1988; Waller 1988). In these contracts, 
employees maximize their financial payoff by truthfully revealing their private information to 
employers because there is no financial incentive to generate budget variance (Chow et al. 
2000).15 However, studies also show that truth-inducing contracts are less effective when 
employees are risk-averse than when they are risk-seeking (Waller 1988) and are infrequently 
used in practice, likely due to their complex nature and the negative feelings associated with 
penalty-type contracts (Brown et al. 2009; Waller 1994; Waller and Bishop 1990). 
In terms of financial costs, other studies consider how increasing the probability that 
slack will be detected and increasing the financial costs when slack is detected affect slack 
                                                     
15 Generally, a truth-inducing scheme attempts to reduce the amount of earnings individuals obtain from 
exceeding their budget, while still motivating them to set challenging targets. The scheme has the following 
features: If y > y’’ then 𝐵 = 𝐵′ + 𝑏(𝑦′′ − 𝑦′) + 𝑎(𝑦 − 𝑦′′) and if y < y’’ then 𝐵 = 𝐵′ + 𝑏(𝑦′′ − 𝑦′) + 𝑐(𝑦 −
𝑦′′) where B is the bonus and y is performance; B’ and y’ are the initial bonus and budget levels, respectively; 
y’’ is the revised budget through participation; and a, b, and c are reward/penalty coefficients such that 0 < a < b 
< c (Chow et al. 1988; Weitzman 1980).  
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creation (e.g., Kren 1993; Fisher et al. 2012; Webb 2002). For instance, Webb (2002) 
conducts an experiment and finds that the existence of a variance investigation policy 
decreases the amount of slack participants create. In another example, Fisher et al. (2013) find 
that superiors can detect and remove slack from subordinates’ budgets by performing budget 
reviews, even though subordinates possess private information. Further, the authors show that 
providing superiors with financial incentives to use subordinates’ budgets to plan accurately 
increases superiors’ efforts to detect and remove slack from the budgets. Despite evidence 
that effective slack detection systems such as a budget review can reduce slack creation, these 
systems typically rely on precise performance measurement and stable operating 
environments (Dunk and Nouri 1998), two features that are increasingly less common in 
business (Fallon and Senn 2006). 
Notwithstanding these efforts to deter slack creation, it remains an ongoing issue for 
many organizations. In fact, Libby and Lindsay (2010) find 77% of managers surveyed 
believe their employees are creating budget slack. Consequently, a simple economic trade-off 
(i.e., financial cost/benefit) model appears insufficient in explaining slack creation.  
2.4.2 Budget Slack and Dishonest Reporting 
By knowingly providing false or misleading information (i.e., lying), the creation of 
budget slack can be characterized as employees' dishonest reporting of their private 
information (e.g., Evans et al. 2001; Salterio and Webb 2006). For example, Lukka (1988, p. 
282) refers to budgets that contain slack as “intentionally made easier to achieve in relation to 
an honest budget estimate.” In terms of honesty, several experimental studies find that 
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individuals are motivated by more than just economic self-interest and derive utility from 
obeying social norms (e.g., honesty, fairness, reciprocity). Moreover, people experience a 
psychological disutility from feelings of shame, guilt, or embarrassment that arise when they 
are overly dishonest (see Luft and Shields (2009) and Sprinkle (2003) for review).16 As a 
result, people create less slack (i.e., are less dishonest) than what is predicted by traditional 
economic theory (e.g., Chow et al. 1988; Evans et al. 2001; Waller 1988; Young 1985).17 
Evans et al. (2001) provide experimental evidence that people show great concern for 
a fair distribution of rewards as they attempt to share any surplus (profits) with employers. 
The majority of participants in their study neither report completely dishonestly (i.e., 
maximize slack) nor completely honestly (i.e., no slack). Instead, participants sacrifice some 
wealth to make partially honest reports, and this choice in reporting is unaffected when the 
potential payoff is increased.18 Hannan et al. (2006) extend these findings by arguing that 
people balance the economic benefits they receive from dishonest reporting with the 
psychological benefits they receive from appearing to be honest. Using an experiment, 
Hannan et al. (2006) examine how the precision of an information system affects honest 
reporting. Consistent with the theory relating to the costs of appearing honest, the authors find 
that honesty is lowest when participants work under a precise information system than when 
they work under a coarse information system.  
                                                     
16 Cialdini and Trost (1998) define social norms as “rules [or] standards that are understood by members of a 
group, and that guide and/or constrain behaviour without the force law” (p.152). 
17 These findings are consistent with evidence from economics (e.g., Gneezy 2005) and marketing (e.g., Mazar et 
al. 2008) research, and are consistent with recent theoretic models that assume individuals have social 
preferences in addition to preferences for wealth (e.g. Akerlof and Kranton 2010; Mittendorf 2006; Fehr and 
Schmidt 1999; Rabin 1993). 
18 Evans et al. (2001) are the first to provide evidence that a trust contract, which takes into consideration an 
employees preference for honesty, leads to greater firm profit than a traditional hurdle contract which strictly 
assumes employees are wealth maximizing. 
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Evans et al. (2001) and Hannan et al. (2006) have laid the ground work for other 
behavioural accounting studies to explore ways in which various organizational control 
system features can improve budget accuracy by altering the point at which dishonest 
budgeting (i.e., slack creation) becomes psychologically costly.19 For instance, budget 
authority is one feature of an organization’s control system shown to affect dishonest 
reporting (e.g., Fisher et al. 2000; Krishnan et al. 2012; Rankin et al. 2008). Rankin et al. 
(2008) find that subordinates create more slack when their superior has final authority over 
setting the budget than when the subordinates have final authority. Further, the authors find 
that requiring subordinates to make factual assertions when making budget requests improves 
honest reporting only when the subordinate has final authority. Studies also show that peer-
related reporting can affect slack creation and dishonest reporting (e.g., Fisher et al. 2002; 
Hales et al. 2011; Maas and Van Rinsum 2011; Zhang 2008). Zhang (2008) finds that 
participants report more honestly when the wage offered by their superior is perceived to be 
fair and that participants collude with others against superiors that offer unfair wages. Further, 
Zhang (2008) finds that inter-participant communication reduces honesty only for those 
participants who believe their superior is unfair. Other features shown to affect dishonest 
reporting include whether rewards earned through dishonest means are shared among fellow 
employees (Church et al. 2012), whether there is a potential for slack creation to affect 
employees’ reputations (Stevens 2002; Webb 2002), and an individual’s ethical predisposition 
(Stevens 2002; Stevens and Thevaranjan 2010). 
                                                     
19 Psychology-based researchers also argue people are dishonest only to the point at which they can obtain some 
financial rewards while still avoiding the harmful psychological costs of thinking of themselves as being 
dishonest (e.g., Ariely 2012; Bandura 1999). 
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Citing many of these studies, Luft and Shields (2009) conclude that employees’ 
preference for honest reporting is largely contextual, and they recommend that researchers 
continue to examine the effects that various features of an organization’s control system have 
on employees’ honesty in reporting. Further, Brown et al. (2009) challenge future research to 
consider features that lead to differential behavioural and economic predictions concerning 
slack creation. The two features explored in this dissertation are budget-based reward type 
(cash, tangible, redeemable points) and relative performance information [RPI]. Specifically, 
the focus is on the effects of reward type and RPI on budget slack and performance. 
2.5 Reward Type: Tangible vs. Cash Rewards  
2.5.1 Introduction to Reward Type 
Organizations have traditionally used performance-based cash rewards to motivate and 
control employee behaviour.  More recently, organizations have been using tangible rewards 
such as gift certificates, trips, and merchandise in lieu of, or in addition to, cash to reward 
employee performance (Peltier et al. 2005). Tangible rewards are non-cash incentives that are 
restricted in use, yet still have a measurable monetary value (Condly et al. 2003; Presslee et 
al. 2013).20 They are distinct from cash rewards because of their reduced fungibility and their 
visible, concrete nature. They are also distinct from other extrinsic, non-financial rewards 
such as plaques or social recognition that have a trivial market value (Jeffrey and Adomdza 
                                                     
20 Condly et al. (2003) make the distinction between tangible monetary (i.e., cash) and tangible non-monetary 
rewards; that is, they consider cash as the most liquid form of tangible reward. For expositional purposes and to 
remain consistent with both academic (e.g., Jeffrey and Shaffer 2007; Presslee et al. 2013) and practitioner (e.g., 
BI 2009; Globoforce 2008) literature, I distinguish cash from tangible rewards based on its complete fungibility. 
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2011).21 Organizations can deliver tangible rewards to employees either directly, or indirectly 
through points programs in which employees earn points redeemable for tangible items from a 
list or catalogue (Presslee et al. 2013).  
Regardless of how tangible rewards are delivered, survey evidence shows that 
organizations of all sizes, and with employees of various seniority levels are currently 
distributing billions of dollars annually in performance-based tangible rewards (Incentive 
Federation 2007; Peltier et al. 2005). Peltier et al. (2005) survey 235 managers involved in 
compensation-related decisions and find that tangible rewards are being used to motivate all 
types of employees including customer service, support staff, management, manufacturing, 
and sales staff.22 Further, they find that, although managers frequently use cash rewards to 
motivate their employees (59%), they also frequently use tangible rewards such as gift cards 
(66%), merchandise (57%), and trips (21%). In another survey, the Incentive Federation 
(2007) contacted 1,121 company executives responsible for their firms incentive program and 
found that 34% of firms use tangible rewards (trips or merchandise), and this amount 
increases to 57% for firms with over $100 million in annual revenues. The survey results also 
show that respondents’ firms spent $46 billion on tangible rewards in 2006.23 Although these 
results suggest a significant amount of money is being spent on tangible rewards each year, 
                                                     
21 Indeed, tangible rewards are often visible in nature (i.e., trophy value) and are regularly combined with social 
reinforcement. Jeffrey and Shaffer (2007) argues the reason tangible rewards are used in conjunction with social 
reinforcement is that most people feel bragging about tangible items such as golf clubs or trips more socially 
acceptable, whereas bragging about cash earnings is socially unacceptable. The different social norms made 
salient by cash and tangible rewards are discussed further in the chapter 3.  
22 Twenty-one percent of managers are from organizations with less than 100 employees, 25% are from 
organizations with between 100 and 1,000 employees, and 54% are from organizations with more than 1,000 
employees. Industries that are represented in their sample are manufacturing (13%), financial/insurance (21%), 
health care (17%), hospitality/tourism (10%), professional services (10%), retail trade (6%), and other (23%). 
23 Jeffrey and Shaffer (2007) quote a senior industry executive who expects a 7% increase in the use of tangible 
rewards in 2007 and continuing for the foreseeable future. Using this estimate, the use of tangible rewards in 
2013 may be as much as $70 billion.  
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little is known about their effects on employee behaviour relative to cash rewards.  
According to conventional economic theory, employees should prefer, and will work 
harder to earn cash than tangible rewards of equivalent monetary value because cash is more 
fungible and offers the highest level of transaction utility (Sandel 2012; Shafir et al. 1993; 
Waldfogel 1993). Generally, financial incentives (cash or tangible) derive their value from 
being used to purchase/experience some form of tangible outcome (Banduara 1986). Cash 
rewards are completely fungible in so far as they are exchangeable for most goods or services. 
Conversely, tangible rewards are restricted in their use, which can lead to additional 
transaction costs if the tangible items do not perfectly reflect a person’s preferences (Shaffer 
and Arkes 2009).24 So, if cash is compared to a list of fair market tangible items that do not 
perfectly reflect the desired outcome an individual is looking for, cash should be chosen 
(Stajkovic and Luthans 1997).25 Specifically, research shows that, when people compare the 
two reward types, they recognize the difference in fungibility and indicate a strong preference 
for cash over tangible rewards of equivalent economic value (Jeffrey 2009; Shaffer and Arkes 
2009).26 Further, Condly et al.’s (2003) meta-analysis finds that cash rewards are two-times 
more effective at improving workplace performance than tangible rewards. While many stress 
the need for more research examining the relative merits of the two reward types, this 
                                                     
24 Many firms use gift cards as a form of tangible reward (Incentive Federation 2007).  Gift card swapping 
websites (e.g., www.cardswap.ca, www.giftah.com, www.plasticjungle.com) help to reduce the transaction costs 
associated with converting undesired gift cards to cash or to other types of gift cards. However, consumers 
typically receive only 80%-90% of the value of their original gift card in return (Sandel 2012). Therefore, 
transaction costs associated with undesired gift cards are not entirely eliminated.  
25 In circumstances in which the list of tangible items perfectly reflects the desired outcome an individual is 
looking for, economic theory suggests that individual should be indifferent to the two reward types, assuming no 
conversion costs are associated with the use of cash. 
26 Conversely, several studies find that when people consider the two reward types separately, they anticipate 
enjoying receiving a tangible reward more than they do cash (Jeffrey 2009; Shaffer and Arkes 2009). 
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evidence supports conventional economic theory that cash is the most effective type of 
financial reward.27  
However, according to practitioner literature tangible rewards are more effective 
motivators than cash (BI 2009; Globoforce 2008; Incentive Services 2003; 2006; Maritz 
2009). Bearing in mind their economic incentives to promote tangible reward programs, 
consultants argue that employees think differently about hedonic, non-essential tangible 
rewards than they do about cash (Alonzo 1996; Incentive Services 2003, 2006).28 Tangible 
rewards are usually physical in nature and represent “wants” that are often difficult for 
employees to justify otherwise purchasing. Jeffrey and Shaffer (2007) argue that these 
features lead employees to think about their rewards more frequently, experience greater 
positive affect in anticipation of their rewards, and ultimately value their rewards more than 
they do cash of an equivalent market value. Further, consultants claim that the distinct, 
physical properties of tangible rewards lead to longer-term benefits such as trophy value 
(Incentive Services 2003). Employees quickly forget how their cash reward was spent because 
they mentally group (account) the cash with their salary, yet employees typically remember a 
tangible reward like a plasma television for a longer period (Thaler 1999). Maritz (2009) finds 
that, although employees may state a preference for cash, they rarely use the cash reward in a 
memorable or enjoyable way, diminishing the ‘trophy value’ of the reward. This attribute of 
tangible rewards has not gone unnoticed by managers as they believe employees are likely to 
                                                     
27 The authors find that the number of cash incentive studies is nearly 4 times more (52 studies) than the number 
of tangible incentive studies (12 studies). Further, those that have examined tangible incentives rarely report the 
cash value of the items offered. Thus, the authors stress that “much more research needs to be performed on the 
issue of cost-benefit of different types of incentives” (p.52). 
28 Many practitioners encourage the use of hedonic goods/experiences as tangible rewards rather than utilitarian 
goods/experiences. Dhar and Wertenbroch (2000) associate hedonic goods/experiences with “experiential 
consumption, fun, pleasure, and excitement” (p.60). 
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experience greater organizational commitment and are less likely to expect a permanent 
increase in rewards if they are provided tangible rewards, rather than cash (Incentive 
Federation 2007; Peltier et al. 2005).  
2.5.2 Prior Research Comparing Tangible and Cash Rewards 
Only recently has research begun to examine practitioners’ claims about the relative 
effectiveness of tangible rewards. McGraw et al. (2010) use a variety of experiments to 
compare individuals’ risk-based decisions (hypothetical gambles) when the related outcomes 
are either cash or tangible items. The authors find that changes in peoples’ decisions are less 
sensitive to changes in risk when the outcome they are seeking is a tangible item rather than 
cash. Further, they find that this “probability insensitivity” (McGraw et al. 2010, p. 828) 
effect is not due to the affect-rich nature of the tangible item. Rather, the authors suggest 
tangible items lead people to frame their decisions differently, choosing to not think of the 
outcome in terms of cash value, despite being able to do so. To the extent exerting effort in 
exchange for rewards is a risk-based decision, the results of McGraw et al. (2010) have 
important implications for people designing reward systems. Specifically, to the extent that 
the employees’ choice to exert effort to pursue a reward is a risk-based decision (Fredrickson 
and Waller 2005), employers that choose to use tangible rewards may find employee effort is 
less sensitive to changes in the probability that a reward will be earned. Further, to the extent 
the size of a reward compensates employees for taking on greater risk, employees pursuing 
tangible rewards may be less sensitive to changes in the value of the reward than those 
pursuing cash. 
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Shaffer and Arkes (2009) conduct various studies to examine how making visible or 
salient the equivalent cash alternative to a tangible reward changes how participants value that 
tangible reward. They argue that people focus less on fungibility and more on the unique, 
hedonic features associated with tangible items when evaluating tangible rewards without 
being provided information about the cash equivalent. Also, participants in this separate 
evaluation condition enjoy their rewards and their work task more when pursuing tangible 
rewards than when pursuing cash rewards. Conversely, when participants evaluate their 
tangible rewards in the presence of a salient cash alternative, the dominant attribute used to 
make decisions shifts to the fungibility of the reward. Thus, participants in this joint 
evaluation condition appear to show a preference reversal by preferring cash. Finally, the 
authors attempt to extend their preference reversal findings from a choice-task to an effort 
sensitive anagram task. However, they find no difference in performance (accuracy) for those 
pursuing tangible rewards compared to those pursuing cash, regardless of evaluation 
condition. While Shaffer and Arkes (2009) provide evidence that preferences are susceptible 
to reward-induced framing effects, their inability to find differences in people’s performance 
when pursuing the two types of rewards suggests that differences in how people think about 
tangible rewards compared to cash may not affect effort. 
Jeffrey (2009) offers the first empirical evidence that tangible rewards can lead to 
greater improvement in performance than cash rewards. Jeffrey conducts an experiment in 
which participants either work towards a cash incentive or a tangible incentive (a massage). 
He argues that because the tangible reward is a “treat” and is difficult for people to justify 
purchasing, participants will perform better in pursuit of the treat than they will in pursuit of a 
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cash reward. Consistent with the prediction, participants pursuing tangible rewards increase 
their performance (round over round) more than those pursuing cash rewards, despite stating a 
post-experiment preference for cash. Extending Jeffrey’s (2009) study, Jeffrey and Adomdza 
(2011) use data from a call center to show that employees pursuing tangible rewards 
(merchandise and travel) think about their rewards more frequently than those pursuing cash. 
Further, the authors find that the frequency with which employees’ think of their rewards 
mediates the effect of reward type on performance. Ultimately, the authors find that 
employees pursuing tangible rewards achieve 40% greater performance than those pursuing 
cash rewards. 
 Finally, in the study most similar to mine, Presslee et al. (2013) employ a quasi-
experiment in which call center employees receive either tangible rewards (via redeemable 
points) or cash rewards for attaining their self-selected performance goals. Presslee et al. 
(2013, p. 1810) argue that employees “mentally account” for tangible rewards differently than 
they do cash. Mental accounting theory describes the series of cognitive operations people use 
to organize and evaluate their financial activities, explaining why people treat economically 
equivalent financial choices differently (Fennema and Koonce 2011; Thaler 1985, 1999). 
Presslee et al. (2013) argue that employees group their cash rewards in a mental account 
similar to that of cash, whereas they group their tangible rewards into a separate, seldom used 
mental account. Because of this difference in mental accounting, there is a smaller percentage 
of mental account balance at stake for employees that fail to attain a goal when rewarded cash 
than rewarded tangible items. As a result, the authors predict and find that employees 
pursuing cash are more risk seeking (i.e., set more difficult budgets) than those pursuing 
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tangible rewards. Further, they find that budget difficulty has a positive effect on 
performance. So, in Presslee et al.’s (2013) field setting, cash rewards are more effective at 
motivating performance than tangible rewards of equivalent economic value.  
Although the evidence is mixed regarding the effectiveness of tangible rewards on 
performance, research consistently finds that people think differently about tangible rewards 
than they do about cash. Thus, it is important for employers and designers of reward systems 
to understand how employees perceive these two reward types and how those perceptions 
may impact employee behaviour. Grover (2005) states that an organization’s reward system is 
central to promoting or preventing dishonesty in the workplace. In keeping with these 
argument, my dissertation examines the effects of reward type on slack creation and 
performance.  
2.6 Relative Performance Information 
2.6.1 Introduction to Relative Performance Information 
Employees regularly receive information or feedback about other employees’ 
performance either informally while working in close proximity or formally through an 
organization’s information system. In fact, some firms actively share relative performance 
information [RPI] with employees to help them coordinate business-related activities and to 
improve their motivation through competition, even when their compensation is unaffected by 
others’ behaviour or performance (Nordstrom et al. 1990). For instance, Vidal and Nossol 
(2011) provide evidence of a German wholesaler/manufacturer that shares the average 
employee performance and each employee’s rank-order position based on productivity with 
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all other employees, even though they only receive fixed salaries and piece rate incentives. In 
another example, some branch managers in the banking industry disclose RPI to tellers by 
providing them with the number of new accounts opened by each teller and the funds in each 
of these accounts, despite tellers being compensated with a fixed wage (Tafkov 2013).  
Research tends to apply social comparison theory to explain the effects of RPI on 
employee behaviour (e.g., Frederickson 1992; Hannan et al. 2012; Mas and Moretti 2009; 
Miller et al. 2011; Tafkov 2013). Social comparison theory maintains that individuals have an 
innate desire to compare their beliefs and their abilities with their peers in an attempt to self-
evaluate (Festinger 1954; Buunk and Gibbons 2007). Further, people desire their behaviour to 
be above average, and they use the information about similar others (RPI) to evaluate and 
adjust their behaviour accordingly (Cialdini 2001; Cialdini and Goldstein 2004; Festinger 
1954). In fact, when people perceive themselves to be below average they experience 
disutility from having to negatively revise their self-concept (Tesser 1988; Tesser and 
Campbell 1980). 
A number of studies apply social comparison theory to examine the informational and 
effort effects of RPI on behaviour. In terms of informational effects, Hannan et al. (2008) use 
an effort-allocation task, as opposed to a real-effort task, to investigate the interactive effects 
that RPI and incentive compensation method have on participants’ performance. They find 
that the provision of RPI improves performance for those pursuing individual incentives 
(piece rate), but worsens performance for those pursuing tournament incentives. Specifically, 
when participants pursue individual incentives, RPI appears to lead to more effective 
allocation of costly effort and to facilitate learning, regardless of the precision or information 
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contained in the feedback. However, when participants pursue tournament incentives, precise 
RPI leads low performers (i.e., bottom 80%) to adopt ineffective task strategies and devote 
cognitive effort to tasks unrelated to performance. Although the authors show compelling 
evidence that RPI is used by participants to inform their strategy-related choices, the author’s 
use of an effort allocation task limits the test of the effect that RPI has on real-effort (i.e., 
duration and intensity).  
Regarding effort effects, Mas and Moretti (2009) use archival data from a large 
supermarket to provide evidence that RPI affects employee effort duration and intensity. The 
authors show that employees tend to work harder when they work with other highly 
productive employees and that this effect is strongest when an employee’s effort is visible to 
others. Further, the authors find that employees’ productivity is more sensitive to the effects 
of the efforts of other employees with whom they regularly interact. Consistent with Mas and 
Moretti (2009), Vidal and Nossol (2011) also find that provision of RPI affects employee 
effort. At their research site (warehouse), the provision of daily, individual productivity 
information of other employees (relating to the previous two months) results in an 
approximately 7% increase in immediate employee productivity (the two months following 
the provision of RPI). This increase in output is sustained over time and does not come at the 
expense of a decrease in quality of production or an increase in employee turnover.    
These studies, along with others, show how RPI, through social comparison, can affect 
individuals’ strategy-related choices (e.g., Hannan et al. 2008; Hannan et al. 2012; Klugger 
and DeNisi 1996) and effort duration or intensity (e.g., Falk and Ichino 2006; Mas and 
Moretti 2009; Vidal and Noseel 2011; Tafkov 2013). In the next section, I discuss several 
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studies that examine how RPI affects budget-based behaviour. Specifically, I discuss prior 
research looking at the effects of RPI on budget slack and on honesty in reporting.   
2.6.2 Prior Research on the Effects of Relative Performance Information on Budget Slack and 
Honesty in Reporting 
Management accounting research has primarily studied budget slack and budget-
related performance using single-employee scenarios. However, most organizations employ 
multiple employees, and there is reason to believe that information about other employees can 
impact employee budget-related behaviour such as slack creation and performance. Young 
(1985) and Chow et al. (1988) provide initial evidence that people report more honestly when 
they experience social pressure to do so, despite social pressure having no economic effects. 
Extending this finding, Fisher et al. (2002) examine whether firms can provide employees 
with information about their coworkers’ budgets and performance (i.e., RPI) to decrease 
budget slack and increase employee performance. The authors find that when two individuals 
each negotiate their own unique performance target with the same superior, and receive RPI 
regarding each other’s budget and performance, they create less budget slack because of the 
social pressure created by the setting. However, the authors are unable to link the decrease in 
budget slack to an improvement in employee performance and stress the need for further 
research to examine the social-psychological mechanisms underlying the effects of RPI.  
Similarly, Maas and Van Rinsum (2011) find that participants in their study misreport 
their performance to a lesser degree when other participants are informed of their report as 
opposed to when other participants are only informed of the average group performance. Like 
Fisher et al. (2002), the authors conclude that reducing the horizontal information asymmetry 
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between coworkers through the provision of RPI can be an effective deterrent to employee 
misreporting because people do not want to appear dishonest to others. However, consistent 
with Fisher et al. (2002), Maas and Van Rinsum (2011) do not find that honest reporting leads 
to improved performance for participants.  
Unlike Fisher et al. (2002) and Maas and Van Rinsum (2011), Hales, Hobson, and 
Resutek (2011) find that the mutual observation of other participants’ reported performance 
increases participants’ propensity to misreport their performance. Specifically, they find that 
when relative performance feedback is expressed through a rank ordering from highest 
performer to lowest performer, and when the highest ranked performer receives positive 
social recognition, most participants respond by inflating their reported performance.29 
Therefore, the competition induced by the type of RPI in their study leads participants to 
report more dishonestly than they otherwise would have. 
Collectively, the findings discussed above suggest that effects of RPI on behaviour 
largely depend on the type of RPI provided and that other organizational factors may impact 
employees’ interpretations of the feedback contained within RPI. Specifically, it appears that 
people use the type of RPI to determine what “above average” means in a given setting, and 
they adjust their slack creation accordingly.  Similar to Fisher et al. (2002) and Maas and Van 
Rinsum (2011), I consider a setting where RPI is presented and participants endogenously 
determine how to respond to RPI feedback. Further, I consider how reward type, a central 
                                                     
29 Unlike Fisher et al. (2002) and Maas and Van Rinsum (2011), Hales et al. (2011) express RPI to participants 
with a rank order from highest to lowest performance. This feature likely heightens competition and suggests 
dishonesty is acceptable/encouraged from a firms’ perspective, both of which can induce more dishonest 
reporting.  
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component of an organization’s reward system, can impact an employee’s interpretation of 
RPI and, in turn, affect slack creation and performance. 
2.7 Conclusion 
This chapter reviews relevant psychology, economics, and accounting research 
relating to the effects of budgets and budget slack on planning, motivation, and control. 
Overall, the findings reviewed above suggest that, although budget-based incentives and 
participation in the budgeting process create conditions conducive to budget slack, people 
choose not to create the maximum amount of slack (i.e., chose not to maximize their earnings 
by reporting dishonestly). That is, people appear to have an innate desire for honesty in their 
budget reports. Further, this chapter introduces reward type (tangible or cash) and RPI, and 
related research on their behavioural effects. In Chapter 3, I develop predictions regarding the 
effects of reward type and RPI on budget slack creation and performance, given the budget 
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Chapter 3: Hypotheses Development  
3.1 The Effects of Reward Type on Budget Slack 
3.1.1 Cash vs. Tangible Rewards  
Features of an organization’s control system (e.g., reward type) influence which 
behaviours employees view as acceptable or appropriate (i.e., personal norms) in a given 
situation (Messick 1999; Tayler and Bloomfield 2011; Weber et al. 2004).30 Bandura (1990, 
2002) argues that people apply their personal norms and moral standards to regulate their 
behaviour and that they experience disutility (e.g., diminished self-concept) from violating 
their personal norms. However, personal norms such as honesty only regulate moral 
behaviour when they are activated, and often are a result of situational or contextual factors 
(Bandura 1996). And even if activated, the applicability of personal norms can be diminished 
if individuals ‘morally disengage’ from their self-serving behaviour (Bandura 1999).31  
According to Ariely and his co-authors, people have a desire to think of themselves as 
being honest, and their use of contextual features to justify their dishonesty allows them to 
maintain an honest self-concept, yet still enjoy the benefits of being dishonest (Ariely 2012; 
Mazar and Ariely 2006; Mazar et al. 2008). In fact, “[p]eople do not engage in harmful 
conduct until they have justified to themselves the morality of their actions” (Bandura 1999, 
                                                     
30 Personal norms are “self-based standards or expectations for behaviour that flow from our internalized values” 
(Cialdini and Trost 1998, p. 160). Research finds that the personal norms that are made salient by contextual 
features (e.g., control) or situational factors guide people’s behavior to a great extent (Cialdini et al. 1991; Reno 
et al. 1993; Tayler and Bloomfield 2011). 
31 Personal norms or moral standards may be selectively disengaged such that people view detrimental behaviour 
such as dishonesty as more appropriate (Bandura et al. 1996). Some mechanisms that allow people to morally 
disengage include moral justification, displacing responsibility/blame, ignoring/minimizing the consequences of 
being dishonest, and attributing blame to someone else (Bandura 1986, p. 376). 
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p.194). To this end, people tend to justify or rationalize their dishonesty as appropriate when 
they encounter morally ambiguous situations (Mazar et al. 2008); individuals exploit the 
‘moral wiggle room’ of situations to justify their dishonest behaviour (Dana et al. 2007).32 
Further, people use contextual features such as their emotional state (e.g., happy, angry) to 
justify their dishonest behaviour (Schweitzer and Hsee 2002). For example, Vincent et al. 
(2012) find that when people experience greater emotion, they are more likely to justify a lie 
by ‘morally disengaging’. Therefore, the magnitude of people’s harmful behaviour such as 
dishonesty appears to depend on contextual features (e.g., control system features) that make 
personal norms salient and provide opportunities for people to justify their self-serving 
behaviour as appropriate (Church et al. 2012; Mazar et al. 2008).  
I argue that reward type, one aspect of an organization’s control system, may lead to 
different levels of budget slack creation. Budget-based cash rewards share similar properties 
to other forms of cash compensation such as salary (Presslee et al. 2013), and there is a widely 
held social stigma associated with earning cash through dishonest means (Ariely 2012). That 
is, people seem to maintain personal norms against stealing cash. Further, cash rewards tend 
to be more utilitarian and less vivid than tangible rewards because employees often spend 
these rewards on necessities such as groceries and rent (Jeffrey and Adomdza 2011; Jeffrey 
and Shaffer 2007). Therefore, employees likely visualize spending their cash rewards on 
items that will result in affect-neutral outcomes. Jeffrey (2009) argues it is these properties 
that lead choices involving cash to be less influenced by emotion and to be made with less 
concern for instant gratification than those involving tangible rewards. This less emotional, 
                                                     
32 The ability to rationalize behaviour to protect one’s self-concept is only effective to a point; beyond that point, 
people are unable to avoid the moral implications of their behaviour (Mazer et al. 2008).  
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more rational approach to decisions involving cash likely increases the saliency of and 
adherence to personal norms such as honesty thus reducing people’s ability to justify lying. 
Conversely, the personal norms that govern behaviour relating to tangible items allow 
people to more easily rationalize dishonest behaviour. Mazar et al. (2008) argue that 
differences in how people think about tangible goods, such as office supplies or merchandise, 
relative to cash, lead to an “incomparably excessive contribution of employee theft and fraud” 
(p.638). Jeffrey (2009) maintains that unlike cash, tangible rewards are evaluated without 
regard for social factors when determining how to act. Further, people tend to experience 
positive affect when thinking about potential tangible rewards because the rewards are 
typically used for “wants” that are often easy to visualize and difficult to otherwise justify 
purchasing (Jeffrey and Shaffer 2007; Shaffer and Arkes 2009; Presslee et al. 2013). Because 
positive affect often leads people to desire instant gratification (e.g., Hsee 1996; Loewenstein 
1996; Loewenstein, Weber, Hsee, & Welch 2001; Schwarz and Clore 1988) and to morally 
disengage (Vincent et al. 2012), people are better able to rationalize dishonest, self-serving 
behaviour. Thus, the distinct, hedonic nature of tangible goods likely explains why people 
tend to find it easier to justify stealing merchandise from their employer than cash (Ariely 
2012).  
To summarize, reward types (cash vs. tangible) may influence peoples’ ability to 
justify dishonesty by 1) affecting their perceptions of applicable personal norms and 2) 
affecting their affective responses. My first hypothesis stated in the alternative form is as 
follows: 
H1: Individuals pursuing budget-based cash rewards will create less budget-slack than 
individuals pursuing budget-based tangible rewards. 
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Hypothesis 1 is not without tension. First, traditional agency theory predicts that 
people will report dishonestly up to the point at which the marginal benefits equal the 
marginal costs associated with being caught (Baiman 1982; Brown et al. 2009). Because there 
are no financial costs and no risk of detection in my study, agency theory suggests that people 
will be completely dishonest in their reporting regardless of the type of financial reward. 
Second, other studies show that increasing the dollar value of cash rewards that can be earned 
through dishonest means does not increase the magnitude of people’s dishonesty (Evans et al. 
2001; Mazar et al. 2008). Thus, assuming people perceive the economic value of tangible 
rewards as greater than $0, there should not be a difference in the magnitude of their 
dishonesty based on financial reward type. That is, although tangible rewards may have 
additional transaction costs associated with them, there should be no difference in dishonesty 
to earn higher valued cash reward than to earn a lower valued tangible reward. Both of these 
streams of research support the null hypothesis that there will be no difference in slack 
creation across cash and tangible reward types. 
3.1.2 Points Redeemable for Tangible Rewards  
The Effect of Direct Tangible Rewards vs. Points Rewards on Budget Slack 
Instead of paying tangible rewards directly, many organizations distribute tangible 
rewards using ‘point programs’ through which employees earn points that are then 
redeemable for tangible items chosen from a catalog of options (e.g., Presslee et al. 2013). 
Theory suggests that how tangible rewards are distributed, whether directly or indirectly via a 
points program, may impact employees’ ability to justify the creation of budget slack. 
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Specifically, research on narrow bracketing and on psychological myopia finds that people 
tend to rely on the unique features of a medium (e.g., redeemable points) when deciding how 
to behave (Hsee et al. 2003; Read et al. 1999); they often ignore less salient yet more 
fundamental information regarding the final outcome or its consequences. As a result, 
employees likely frame the budgeting context differently when they pursue budget-based 
tangible rewards than when they pursue budget-based points redeemable for tangible items.  
Financial rewards (e.g., cash, tangible items) tend to generate an economic frame, 
whereas non-financial rewards (e.g., social recognition) tend to generate a social frame 
(Heyman and Ariely 2004).33 An economic frame is characterized by an ongoing financial 
cost-benefit analysis, where the magnitude of rewards directly influences individuals’ 
behaviour (Clark & Mills 1993; Rabin 1993) and likely reduces the saliency of personal 
norms such as honesty. Conversely, a social frame prompts individuals’ to be less concerned 
with the magnitude of their rewards and more concerned with adhering to personal norms 
(Batson et al. 1997). Thus, adding points as an intermediary step in the provision of tangible 
rewards likely reduces the financial nature of the exchange, in turn reducing employees’ 
tendency for dishonest reporting.34 Further, rewarding employees with redeemable points 
                                                     
33 It could be argued that cash rewards create an economic frame, while tangible rewards create a social frame 
because of their gift-like nature, regardless of whether they are delivered directly or indirectly. To the extent this 
argument applies, it biases against hypotheses 1 and 2. However, I argue that the saliency of the cash value of the 
tangible reward (i.e., a gift card worth $X) is more likely to prompt an economic rather than a social frame. 
34 How employees frame the budgeting process (i.e., social exchange vs. economic exchange) can also influence 
their perceptions of the managers’ motives for offering budget-based rewards (Hannan 2005; Fehr and Falk 
2002). As documented by various gift-exchange studies (e.g., Charness 2004; Hannan et al. 2002; Kuang and 
Moser 2009), the theory of reciprocity describes people as inherently caring about other people’s motives or 
intentions; for this reason, people respond to others’ treatment in-kind (Akerlof 1982; Cialdini 1993; Fehr and 
Falk 2002; Falk and Fischbacher 2006). For example, workers tend to reciprocate the gift of higher 
unconditional wages from employers with the gift of greater effort (Akerlof 1982; Hannan 2005). While these 
prior studies were with respect to cash wages, there is reason to believe points bonus may induce more 
reciprocity than cash bonus or tangible bonus. Specifically, to the extent points rewards are framed more as a 
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likely reduces the appeal and the resultant affect that employees experience when thinking 
about their potential financial rewards (Urminsky and Kivetz 2011). As a result, employees 
are likely to view their potential points rewards as less hedonically attractive than a direct 
tangible reward.35 Therefore, to the extent that the use of redeemable points leads people to 
focus on the medium rather than the financial dimension of a tangible reward, their use is 
likely to increase the saliency of the personal norm of honesty. For this reason, I pose the 
following hypothesis, stated in the alternative form: 
H2: Individuals pursuing budget-based points redeemable for tangible rewards will 
create less budget slack than individuals pursuing budget-based tangible rewards 
directly. 
 
There is tension regarding hypothesis 2. If point rewards lead employees to frame the 
budgeting process as a game, a point system may result in greater budget slack than direct 
tangible rewards. That is, employees may attempt to maximize what they perceive to be a 
“worthless” medium (i.e., points) with little regard for the honesty norm associated with the 
financial outcome (Hsee, Yu, Zhang, and Zhang 2003; Mazar et al. 2008). However, I believe 
that the incremental effect that points have on creating psychological distance between acts of 
dishonesty and related financial outcomes is likely minimal compared to the distance that 
exists when tangible items are rewarded directly. 
The Effect of Cash vs. Points Rewards on Budget Slack 
The theory leading to hypothesis 1 argues that budget-based cash rewards will result in 
less slack than tangible rewards because people are less able to justify violating a personal 
                                                                                                                                                                      
social exchange and as kindness by the employer, employees are likely to budgeting more honestly. Although 
my study is not designed to test concerns for reciprocity because the employer (others) are not made salient in 
the instructions, I do measure these concerns post-experiment. 
35 By using rewards of equal monetary value, economic attractiveness is held constant between reward type 
condition.  
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norm of honesty to earn cash than they are to earn tangible rewards. Further, an honesty norm 
(vs. a dishonesty norm) is made less salient when pursuing an affect-rich tangible reward than 
when pursuing cash. The theory leading to hypothesis 2 argues that budget-based redeemable 
points will result in less budget slack than direct tangible rewards because 1) the non-financial 
nature of points leads people to frame the exchange as social instead of financial and 2) point 
rewards lead people to experience less affect. Because theory does not suggest an answer as to 
which of these effects will be the strongest when I compare budget-based cash and budget-
point rewards, I pose the following research question:36  
RQ1: Does budget slack creation differ for individuals pursuing budget-based points 
redeemable for tangible rewards than for individuals pursuing budget-based cash 
rewards? 
3.2 The Effect of RPI on Budget Slack 
In addition to wanting to adhere to their personal norms, people have preferences to 
compare and conform their behaviour to that of their peers (Cialdini et al. 1990; Tayler and 
Bloomfield 2011). People have an innate desire to compare themselves to their peers, and this 
comparison provides them with a descriptive norm of how others are actually behaving 
(Cialdini 2001; Festinger 1954; Salancik & Pfeffer 1978; Tesser et al. 1983).37 These 
                                                     
36 Mazar et al. (2008) find that participants pursuing tokens redeemable for cash were more dishonest than those 
pursuing just cash. The authors argue that redeemable tokens create psychological distance (via categorization 
malleability) between acts of dishonesty and the associated financial outcomes, which is claimed to reduce the 
moral implications of dishonesty. However, Mazer et al.’s (2008) experiment setting contains potential 
confounds whereby the level of dishonesty in their token condition could be a function of tokens as a medium, of 
method of redemption which differed from the cash condition, or of participants’ lack of understanding of the 
token-cash exchange rate. Specifically, their study biases in the direction of their findings by providing 
participants with actual tokens and then having them redeem those tokens with a second experimenter for a cash 
reward. To address these issues, in my experiment setting, all reward types are paid using the same method, and 
participants must correctly identify the exchange rate of points-tangible rewards before completing the task. 
37 Descriptive norms are “derived from what other people do” and provide a “social reality” regarding what 
constitutes normal behaviour (Cialdini and Trost 1998, p.155). According to Cialdini (1993), people rely on 
descriptive norms as social support for behaviour that has the highest probability of being effective, all the while 
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descriptive norms offer social proof of what is acceptable in a given social situation, 
providing people with an understanding of how to effectively respond during times of 
uncertainty (Cialdini 2001; Cialdini and Trost 1998; Goldstein and Caildini 2007). This 
understanding encourages people to conform to a standard of behaviour set by others. Thus, 
salient descriptive norms can have a dramatic effect on the level and variance of people’s 
dysfunctional behaviour by affecting their views on what is appropriate.  
Descriptive norms disseminated by an organization’s culture or climate can either 
stress the importance of honest behaviour or legitimize the level of dishonest behaviour for 
employees (Greenberg and Scott 1996; Payne 1989). One feature of an organization’s control 
environment that can provide employees with evidence of descriptive norms is the provision 
of RPI. Employees can use RPI to determine the prevalence of behaviour and to determine a 
standard of behaviour they do not want to deviate from. In fact, RPI can either threaten or 
protect employees’ self-concepts by disseminating descriptive norms against which they can 
compare their behavior (Miller et al. 2011; Tesser and Campbell 1980). Consequently, 
employees may choose to conform to the norm to protect their self-concepts.  
A number of recent experiment-based studies examine how the interaction with 
(dis)honest others and the presence of (dis)honest descriptive norms impacts people’s 
behaviour (e.g., Gino et al. 2009; Hales et al. 2011; Huddart and Qu 2012; Maas and Van 
Rinsum 2011; Paz et al. 2013). For example, Gino et al. (2009) find that the magnitude of 
participants’ cheating is strongly influenced by their exposure to a confederate who is 
cheating and by whether participants’ view the confederate as an in-group member (i.e., 
                                                                                                                                                                      
conserving time, cognitive effort, and accountability relating to any negative outcomes. People tend to rely on 
descriptive norms more so in ambiguous or novel setting. 
  41 
similar) or an out-group member (i.e., dissimilar). That is, the degree to which people identify 
others as in-group members significantly impacts the way they interpret feedback about 
others’ inappropriate or unethical behaviour (Tajfel 1982). Viewing unethical behavior of in-
group members represents a more applicable descriptive norm and is likely to weaken an 
individual’s moral objections to behaving dishonestly (Ariely 2012); Gino et al. (2009) refer 
to this as the contagious nature of dishonesty. Conversely, viewing unethical behavior of out-
group members likely raises the saliency of the dishonest act, making people pay more 
attention to the importance of their own moral standard (Mazar et al. 2008); people will 
respond by being more honest than out-group members in an attempt to differentiate 
themselves. Regardless of an individual’s identity, this evidence suggests that observing peers 
behaving dishonestly can affect individuals’ understanding of the descriptive norms as they 
relate to their own moral behaviour. 
Traditionally, management accounting texts have supported the use of budget variance 
(i.e., performance over budget) as a means of performance measurement and evaluation 
(Garrison et al. 2012; Hobbs 1964; Webb 2002).38 The provision of RPI regarding others’ 
budget variances naturally arises in settings with multiple employees and when competition 
among them is desired (Brown et al. 2013; Fisher et al. 2002). Employees can generate 
positive budget variances by either exerting effort or by creating budget slack. In their seminal 
paper on budget slack, Evans et al. (2001) find that 70% of individuals create some slack 
                                                     
38 In practice, evaluating managers on budget variance alone can be problematic because a number of exogenous 
(i.e., uncontrollable) factors could have led to the variance. Thus, if the operating environment is unpredictable, 
firms should avoid managing by exception through the use of budget variance alone because budgets may not be 
reliable (Garrison et al. 2012; Lukka 1988; Webb 2002). For the purpose of this study, the operating 
environment for participants is void of uncertainty. 
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when reporting (Evans et al. 2001). Thus, most employees viewing the budget variance of 
others are likely to view RPI suggesting (or could be interpreted as suggesting) that some 
members of the group are reporting dishonestly. In fact, when RPI is provided only about 
other’s budget variances, theory suggests people will make asymmetric, self-serving 
assumptions about how others generated that variance. People are motivated to interpret 
others’ behaviour as dishonest because this interpretation reduces the constraint that 
descriptive norms have on their own self-serving behaviour (Cialdini and Trost, 1998). That 
is, people tend to interpret ambiguous feedback as evidence of others’ dishonesty so they can 
better justify behaviour that would otherwise violate a personal norm (Emett et al. 2013; Shu 
et al. 2011; Steven and Qu 2013). Thus, RPI in the form of budget variance information 
provides people with evidence that their own misreporting is acceptable.39 Given the 
arguments above, I pose the following prediction, stated in the alternative form:40 
H3: Individuals provided with information about their coworkers’ budget variance will 
create more budget slack than individuals not provided with the same information. 
3.3 The Interactive Effect of Reward Type and RPI on Budget Slack 
There is reason to expect that the effect of RPI on budget slack, via the provision of 
descriptive norms, depends on the personal norms that are activated by budget-based reward 
type. That is, the extent to which people make self-serving interpretation of descriptive norms 
is likely influenced by salient personal norms (Cialdini and Trost 1998; Cialdini et al. 1990, 
                                                     
39 Theory underlying hypothesis 3 relies on the receipt of the information contained in RPI to form the 
descriptive norm rather than simply the anticipation that RPI will be provided. 
40 Indeed, the provision of RPI in the form of budget variance could increase the competitive behaviour of 
participants, which may induce them to cheat in an attempt to perform well (Brown et al. 2013). This alternative 
explanation suggests that budget variance feedback does not provide additional information (i.e., descriptive 
norm). Therefore response to RPI should not differ depending on the amount of slack contained in the feedback. 
This is examined further in Chapter 4.  
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1991). Theories used to develop hypothesis 1 and 2 suggest that budget-based cash and 
budget-based redeemable points make salient stricter personal norms against dishonest 
reporting than do budget-based tangible rewards. Tayler and Bloomfield (2011) argue that 
activated personal norms frame people’s perceptions of descriptive norms, making more 
salient concerns about the social cost of their behaviour in a given setting. When people have 
lax personal norms (i.e., less salient) regarding honesty, they are likely to interpret RPI that 
contains positive budget variance as evidence supporting the appropriateness of dishonesty. 
However, when people have more concern for behaving honestly, they are likely to interpret 
the outcomes of others as evidence of effort rather than dishonesty. Thus, I make the 
following predictions, stated in the alternative form:  
H4a: The positive effect of providing relative performance information about 
coworkers’ budget variance on budget slack creation will be greater for individuals 
pursuing budget-based tangible rewards than for individuals pursuing budget-based 
cash rewards. 
 
H4b: The positive effect of providing relative performance information about 
coworkers’ budget variance on budget slack creation will be greater for individuals 
pursuing budget-based tangible rewards directly than for individuals pursuing budget-
based points redeemable for tangible rewards. 
 
There is tension regarding hypothesis 4a and 4b. If a descriptive norm is clearly 
established, there is reason to expect cash and redeemable points will lead to greater 
conformity in behaviour than tangible rewards. Tayler and Bloomfield (2011) argue that 
people who have a salient social-oriented personal norm tend to conform their behaviour to 
that of others to a greater extent than people who have a salient personal norm of self-interest. 
To the extent RPI in my setting provides an unambiguous descriptive norm (if at all) of the 
acceptability of dishonesty, this biases against finding support for hypothesis 4. 
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Last, because I pose a research question regarding the effect of budget-based cash 
versus budget-point rewards on slack creation, I raise the following research question 
regarding the interaction of these two reward types with RPI: 
RQ2: Will the positive effect of providing relative performance information about 
coworkers’ budget variance on budget slack creation be greater for individuals 
pursuing budget-based cash rewards or for individuals pursuing budget-based points 
redeemable for tangible rewards? 
3.4 The Mediating Effects of Budget Slack on Performance 
Research has demonstrated that performance targets contained within traditional 
budget-based incentive contracts can provide employees with performance goals (Bonner et 
al. 2000; Hirst 1987; Locke and Latham 1990). A well-established finding is that difficult and 
specific goals motivate greater effort, resulting in greater performance until people reach the 
limits of their ability (Bonner and Sprinkle 2002; Locke and Latham 2002; Webb et al. 2010). 
Ceteris paribus, budgets that contain slack are less difficult to attain than budgets that do not 
contain slack. Given my previous hypotheses regarding the interactive effects of reward type 
and RPI on budget slack and given that budget slack by definition is negatively correlated 
with budget difficulty, I predict the following mediation, stated in the alternative form: 
H5: Budget slack will mediate the interactive effects of reward type and relative 
performance information on performance.  
3.5 The Direct Effects of Reward Type and RPI on Performance 
Waller and Chow (1985) argue that, when people self-select their contract (e.g., self-
set their performance budget), they fully consider the effects of their skills and other 
exogenous factors (e.g., reward type, RPI) before making their selection; thus, contract 
selection is a predictor of an individual’s subsequent performance. However, people may not 
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fully incorporate these factors into their selection due to either cognitive constraints or the 
desire to create slack, and there may be competing effects of exogenous factors on contract 
selection versus on performance. Complicating matters, in a setting with no punishment for 
slack creation, people maximize their earnings by setting a budget low; thus, contract 
selection may be negatively correlated with desired outcome (i.e., subsequent performance). 
For these reasons, exogenous factors may have a direct effect on performance in addition to 
their indirect effect via contract selection. In this subsection, I discuss theory as it relates to 
the direct effect of reward type and RPI on performance. 
3.5.1 The Direct Effect of Reward Type on Performance 
As previously discussed, research provides mixed results regarding the effectiveness 
of tangible rewards versus cash rewards on performance (e.g., Jeffrey 2009; Presslee et al. 
2013; Shaffer and Arkes 2009). Further, Hsee et al. (2005) argue that, once a reward has been 
received, people gain more utility from each additional unit of an affect-neutral reward such 
as points or cash than they gain from each additional unit of an affect-rich reward such as 
tangible items. The authors suggest that affect rich rewards result in people conducting a 
valuation by feeling rather than by calculation. Under calculation, each increment increase of 
reward has a relatively constant value (i.e., value function is relatively steep and linear), 
whereas under feeling, each increment increase of reward varies with affect (i.e., initial value 
function is very steep and then flattens quickly, appearing concave) (Hsee and Rottenstreich 
2004). Thus, while feeling valuation may translate to more effort initially, calculation 
valuation should translate to more effort over time. Conversely, others suggest that affect-rich 
rewards may translate into greater intrinsic motivation for employees to perform, regardless of 
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magnitude or frequency (Ryan and Deci 2000). Finally, evidence is inconclusive regarding 
the nature of direct effects of cash versus tangible rewards on performance in a budgeting 
setting (Presslee et al. 2013). For all of these reasons, I pose the following research question:  
RQ3: Controlling for the effects of budget-slack, does performance differ between 
individuals pursuing budget-based cash rewards, tangible rewards, and redeemable 
point rewards? 
3.5.2 The Direct Effect of RPI on Performance 
 Unlike reward type, there is a theoretical basis for predicting directional effects of 
RPI on performance. People have an innate desire to appear more motivated or capable than 
their peers (Festinger 1954; Buunk and Gibbons 2007). Relative performance information 
provides employees with feedback that can increase their motivation to perform by allowing 
for social comparison (Hannan et al. 2012). That is, the natural inclination people have to 
compete with others may lead them to view RPI as a standard against which to compare their 
performance (Kluger and DeNisi 1996). Goal theory maintains that people are motivated to 
achieve personal goals relating to performance (Latham and Locke 1991). Accordingly, if RPI 
leads employees to adopt more difficult personal performance goals than they otherwise 
would, they will exert greater effort to perform, regardless of the amount of budget slack 
created. Indeed, many studies find that RPI has a positive effect on performance by creating 
competition among employees, despite rewards being independent of others’ performance 
(e.g., Falk and Ichino 2006; Mas and Moretti 2009; Tafkov 2013; Vidal and Nossel 2011). 
Accordingly, I make the following prediction stated in the alternative form: 
H6: Controlling for the performance effects of budget slack, individuals provided with 
information about their coworkers’ budget variance will outperform individuals not 
provided with the same information. 
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3.6 Conclusion 
This chapter makes predictions regarding the interactive effects of reward type and RPI on 
budget slack creation and performance. These predictions and their relationships are 
summarized in Figure 1. Further, prior research shows a positive association between 
individuals’ ability and both budget slack creation and performance (Bonner and Sprinkle 
2002; Locke and Latham 1990; Presslee et al. 2013). Therefore, the Figure 1 model includes 
the effects of individual ability on slack and performance. The next chapter provides details 
about the research design I use to test this predictive model. 
 























H6, H7, & RQ2, RQ3 
Ability 
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Chapter 4: Research Method 
4.1 Overview 
I employed a 3 x 2 x 3 mixed factorial laboratory experiment with Reward Type (three 
levels: cash, tangible, and points) and RPI (two levels: absent and provided) as between-
subject factors with Round as a within-subjects factor (see Figure 2). In this experiment, 
participants completed a computer-based, effort-sensitive task and earned a bonus reward in 
each of three, two-minute Rounds for performance that exceeded their self-set budgets. My 
dependent variables include the amount of budget slack participants created (i.e., their 
dishonest reporting) and their performance. 
Figure 2: Experimental Design1 
 
Reward   
Type 
Cash Rewards Tangible Rewards Points Rewards 
RPI     
Absent  A B C 
Present  D E F 
 
1 
See Appendix F for variable definitions; Reward Type and RPI are manipulated between subjects. 
 
This chapter is organized as follows. Section 4.2 describes the task and provides 
details of the participants. Section 4.3 describes the experimental procedures used. Section 4.4 
describes the independent variables that were manipulated. Section 4.5 describes the 
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dependent variables of budget slack and performance, and various process measures asked. 
This chapter concludes in Section 4.6.  
4.2 Task Details and Participants 
4.2.1 Task Details 
Prior experimental research uses effort-sensitive tasks that require limited cognitive 
effort (e.g., Chow (1983) letter-decode task) to test participants’ effort duration and intensity 
(e.g., Kelly et al. 2013; Fisher et al. 2002). Kluger and DeNisi (1996) argue that, when testing 
duration and intensity, experimental tasks should be primarily mechanical because these tasks 
require limited strategy. Further, tasks should be easily learned, allowing participants to 
quickly develop expectations regarding their performance and reducing the effects that innate 
skill has on performance. Therefore, I created a custom computer-based, mechanical task to 
meet these conditions. 
In this study, I employed a task in which participants were assigned the role of a 
virtual concession-stand clerk. The task required participants to accurately complete online 
concession orders over multiple rounds.  Each round, the concession program generates and 
displays three-item orders. Items vary over four product types and three product sizes (12 
product/size combinations). The four product types include popcorn, drink, candy, and ice 
cream, and the three product sizes are small (S), medium (M), and large (L). For example, one 
order could read “large popcorn, small ice cream, small drink.” To obtain the three items 
necessary to fill the order, participants move their clerk icon in front of the requested product 
using the left or right arrow key on their keypad. Once the icon is moved in front of the item, 
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participants must type the letter that corresponds with the size of the product being ordered. 
Products are selected one at a time, and, after each selection, the clerk icon automatically 
returns to the starting position at the center of the screen. Once an order is filled, the program 
checks whether the order is accurate. If the order is correct, participants receive a new three-
item order. If the order is incorrect, an error message informs participants that they must re-try 
until the order is correct.41 At all times during the round, the screen shows participants the 
total number of correct orders completed and the time remaining for that round. An example 
of the task screen is presented in Appendix A. 
4.2.2 Participants 
Bonner et al. (2000) stress the importance of appropriately matching participants with 
the experiment task. There is little evidence to suggest that higher educated or more 
experienced participants perform effort-sensitive experimental tasks differently than less-
educated participants (see Ball & Cech 1996). Thus, undergraduate students are appropriate 
participants in this experiment given the features of the concession task described in Section 
4.2.1.  
One hundred sixty-six undergraduate business students from a large Canadian public 
university participated in one of 12 experimental sessions, with each session consisting of 
between 10-20 participants. The number (percentage) of females that participated was 86 
(52%) and the mean (standard deviation) age of all participants was 18.4 (1.2) years. 
                                                     
41 In order to discourage participants from adopting a strategy of randomly typing to complete an order, their 
cumulative score for the round is reset to zero if they enter five consecutive incorrect responses for an individual 
order. The program warns participants about the number of attempts remaining before their score is reset to zero. 
Kelly et al. (2013) use this same control in their letter-decode task. 
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Consistent with the prior research finding that men are more likely to be dishonest and act in 
their own self-interest than women (Cohen et al., 1998; O’Fallon and Butterfield 2005), men 
overall generated more budget slack in this study (b  = 1.82, p = 0.03, two-tailed).
42 In 
addition, men performed better than women at the concession task ( b  = 1.78, p < 0.01, two-
tailed).43 Participant age, however, was not associated with either budget slack ( b  = 0.50, p = 
0.28, two-tailed) or performance ( b  = 0.12, p = 0.63, two-tailed). Neither the number of 
female participants (p = 0.40, two-tailed) nor the average age of participants differed by 
experiment condition (p = 0.22, two-tailed). 
4.3 Experimental Procedures 
On arrival, participants consented to participate in the study and were each provided a 
unique user name/password. After participants entered their user names, the program provided 
instructions on how to fill orders in the concession task. Participants first completed three 
practice rounds of the task, each round lasting for two minutes and consisting of three-item 
orders. To encourage them to learn the task and learn their maximum performance 
capabilities, participants were informed they could earn $0.05 per order completed during 
these practice rounds. The program informed participants of the number of orders they 
accurately filled and the total amount they earned after each practice round. Research shows 
that participants’ risk attitudes influence slack creation when there is task uncertainty 
                                                     
42 There is no difference is budget slack by gender when RPI is absent (𝛽=1.35, p = 0.32, two-tailed), but men 
create more slack than women when RPI is present (𝛽 = 2.55, p = 0.06, two-tailed). 
43 Although gender meets the necessary conditions to be included as a covariate in further analysis (correlated 
with the dependent variable but not correlated with the independent variable), its inclusion does not change any 
conclusions made regarding the direction of results or the level of significance. Thus, gender is excluded from 
further analysis. 
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(Merchant 1985; Waller 1988; Young 1985). To remove the effects of participants’ risk 
perceptions, task uncertainty was removed by telling participants, prior to starting the 
concession task, that all rounds would consist of three-item orders and that all rounds would 
last two minutes. Further, the sequence of the three-item orders was the same for all 
participants in each round, and participants in the RPI condition were made aware that 
everyone within their work group would face the same task environment and would also be 
working on three-item orders. The practice rounds and task features allow participants to 
receive feedback regarding their productive capabilities, thus decreasing their perception of 
risk relating to the relationship between effort and rewards (Webb 2002).44 
After all three practice rounds were completed, the program randomly assigned 
participants to groups of three and randomly distributed each group to one of the six 
conditions as described in Section 4.4.1: 1) Cash/ RPI absent, 2) Tangible/RPI absent, 3) 
Points/ RPI absent, 4) Cash/RPI present, 5) Tangible/RPI present, and 6) Points/RPI present. 
If the number of participants in a session was not divisible by three, 1 (or 2) participants were 
randomly assigned to conditions 1, 2, or 3 (i.e., no RPI condition). Participants were informed 
that they would complete three additional rounds of the concession task, with each round 
lasting two minutes, and that they would have an opportunity to earn a bonus reward for 
performance in excess of their self-set budget in each round, as described below.  
                                                     
44 Pilot testing of the concession task showed that three, two-minute practice rounds are sufficient for 
participants to learn their performance capabilities There is modest variation in performance in the third practice 
round (prior to treatment) as the mean performance is 17.7 orders and the standard deviation is 2.9 orders or 15% 
of average performance. To evaluate whether or not randomization led to similar productive capabilities (i.e., as 
determined by innate ability and effort) across conditions, the average number of orders completed by 
participants in the third practice round by condition is considered. The number of orders in the third practice 
round does not differ by either Reward Type or RPI conditions (p>0.43 two-tailed). 
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Before starting the first production round, participants answered a series of questions 
designed to test their understanding of the bonus rewards, details regarding the task, and if 
applicable, their RPI condition (see Appendix D). Participants had to answer each question 
correctly before proceeding to the production rounds. Before the start of each production 
round, the program asked participants to accurately budget their maximum performance 
capabilities for that round (as described in Section 4.5). Once participants completed 
concession orders for each of the production rounds, they responded to a series of post 
experiment questions (as described in Section 4.4.3). After completing these questions, the 
program randomly selected one round from which to pay participants their bonus, in addition 
to their practice-round earnings.45 To allow the study administrator to acquire the necessary 
tangible rewards, participants were paid 4-6 days after completion of their session. 
4.4 Independent Variables and Process Measures 
4.4.1 Independent Variables 
I manipulated two variables between participant groups: Reward Type (cash, tangible, 
or redeemable points) and RPI (absent or present). The program randomly assigned 
participant groups to one of six conditions after their third practice round. Participants 
remained in the same condition throughout the study. Importantly, in the RPI condition, all 
participants within the same workgroup received the same type of reward and remained in the 
                                                     
45 Participants were informed prior to round 1 that they were going to be paid based on their performance in one 
randomly selected round. This design choice was made to allow for greater financial value of budget-based 
rewards, while still offering greater statistical power through a repeated-measures design. 
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same group for the remainder of the study.  
Reward Type 
Participants had the opportunity to earn rewards for their performance above their self-
set budgets (i.e., budget variance).46 This type of incentive contract incentivizes participants 
to understate their performance capabilities by creating slack when participating in the 
budgeting process (i.e., slack-inducing incentive contract) (Waller 1988; Young 1985).47 
Those in the cash rewards condition earned $1 for each order they completed above their self-
set budgets. Those in the tangible rewards condition earned a gift card, the value of which was 
based on earning one dollar for each order completed above budget. Fifty-five percent of 
organizations that employ tangible rewards to compensate employees use gift cards that 
employees can use towards merchandise or services (Incentive Federation 2007). Consulting 
firms stress the importance of giving employees a choice when using tangible rewards and 
recommend that the rewards take the form of hedonic, non-essential items (BI 2009; 
                                                     
46 Participants did not receive a wage for participating. The design choice to exclude a wage was an attempt to 
increase the tension between participants’ preferences for honesty and for wealth (Rankin et al. 2008). The 
exclusion of a wage has no effect on economic predictions of behaviour in this setting. For example, if a $5 wage 
(i.e., show-up fee) were provided to participants, an individual in the cash condition that created 10 units of slack 
would earn $15 plus their practice round pay, whereas an individual that created no slack would earn only their 
practice round pay. In my study, an individual in the cash condition that created 10 units of slack would earn $10 
plus their practice round pay, whereas an individual that created no slack would earn only their practice round 
pay. Thus, a show up fee results in earnings (excluding practice round pay) ranging from $5 to $15, whereas no 
show up fee results in earnings (excluding practice round pay) ranging from $0 to $10; both offer a $10 range of 
earning possibility. 
47 Prior studies examining honesty in terms of budget slack tend to use a slack-inducing incentive contract (e.g., 
Evans et al. 2001). However, prior studies examining both budget slack and performance simultaneously tend to 
also use a review mechanism such as superiors’ acceptance as a way to improve the link between budget level 
and performance (e.g., Fisher et al. 2002). Chow et al. (1988) is the only study other than mine (that I am aware 
of) that examines both budget slack and performance using a slack-inducing incentive contract. In their study, 
they compare the relative effects of a slack-inducing contract versus a truth-inducing contract on budget slack 
and performance. Notably, the authors find that budget slack and performance are positively correlated, which is 
opposite to my prediction in hypothesis 5. While use of a slack-inducing incentive contract allows for greater 
power regarding my study of honest budgeting, it biases against finding that budget slack has a negative effect 
on performance. Thus, my incentive contract choice may result in a budget that has greater implications for 
planning (via its effect on budget slack) than employee motivation and effort.   
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Globoforce 2008; Incentive Services 2003; 2006; Maritz 2009). Based on pilot testing, 
Second Cup, Chapters, Cineplex Odeon, and Marble Slab were identified as hedonic gift card 
locations from which participants could select their tangible reward (see Appendix C for 
description of locations). Finally, in the redeemable points condition, participants earned 1 
point for each order they completed above budget. At the end of the study, participants in this 
condition redeemed their points for a gift card of equivalent dollar value for one of the four 
locations listed above.  
Prior to the first production round, participants from both the tangible and points 
conditions selected the gift card they would like to receive; however, both conditions allowed 
participants to change this selection once the task was completed. This design choice 
attempted to avoid any structural differences between the two conditions (i.e., to avoid 
differences in behaviour that can be attributed to selecting tangible rewards at a different 
time). Importantly, the economic value of the budget-based rewards were equal in all three 
reward conditions, and participants were made aware of the economic value of their tangible 
reward prior to completing the task (McGraw et al. 2010).48 By maintaining the same dollar 
value of rewards between conditions, any difference in participants’ behaviour should be the 
result of how they perceived their reward type as described in the hypotheses development 
rather than differences related to the dollar value of those rewards. 
Relative Performance Information 
                                                     
48 Those in the redeemable points condition were reminded twice that each point earned was equivalent to an 
additional dollar on a gift card of their choosing. Further, prior to round 1, participants in this condition were 
asked, “At what rate are points redeemable for a balance on a gift card?” All but one participant accurately 
answered this question on their first try.  
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At the end of each round, for those not provided with RPI (i.e., RPI absent condition), 
the program informed each participant of his own budget variance, calculated as performance 
over (under) his self-set budget. Each participant was also informed of the rewards (type and 
amount) he earned in that round. For those provided with RPI, the program also informed 
participants of the budget variances (and compensation) of the other two members of their 
work group.49 The provision of budget variance only (not budget level or actual performance 
as separate items) provided sufficient ambiguity around whether others’ budget variance was 
generated by effort or by understating their performance capabilities.50 
4.4.2 Process measures 
Recall, theory suggests people use various contextual factors such as personal norms, 
affective state, and descriptive norms, to rationalize their dishonest behavior. To gain a better 
understanding of how participants rationalized their behaviour in this experiment, I asked 
them to respond to a series of statements by rating their level of agreement on a 7-point Likert 
scale labeled from strongly disagree to strongly agree (see Appendix E).  These measures 
include statements of the following: whether rewards will be spent on wants or needs (Want), 
whether rewards are thought of as separate from everyday cash (Separate), perceptions of 
reward attractiveness (Attractive), affect caused by thinking about potential rewards (Affect: 
adopted from Vincent et al. 2012), whether the reward is framed more as an ethical decision 
                                                     
49 Although most firms do not communicate relative performance information about others’ pay and rewards, 
there are some notable exceptions (Day 2006). Some firms adopt an open management policy to improve control 
and motivation whereby the secrecy around others compensation is removed (Colella et al. 2007). 
50 A number of other accounting experiments that examine the effects of peer influence on individual behaviour 
consider groups of two to four people (e.g., Chen et al. 2012; Fisher et al. 2002; Fisher et al. 2003; Kelly 2010). 
Goldberg (1954) finds that the degree of conformity in groups of four is no different than the degree of 
conformity in groups of two, and regardless of whether groups consist of two or four people, conformity occurs 
within the first few exposures (i.e., rounds). 
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or a business decision (Frame: adopted from Heyman and Ariely 2004), feelings of 
reciprocity (Reciprocity), whether creating slack is unethical (Unethical: adopted from 
Schatzberg and Stevens 2008), and whether others close to them would approve of their 
budgeting decision (Approve). 
4.5 Dependent Variables  
 The two dependent variables in this study were participants’ Budget Slack and their 
Performance over rounds two and three of production. I excluded round 1 from my analysis 
because those in the RPI condition did not receive feedback about others behaviour until after 
round 1. Further, after round 1, participants were reassured that budget slack would not be 
detected nor punished. As in Fisher et al.’s (2002) study, Budget Slack was calculated as: 
  Budget Slackji = Abilityji - Budget Levelji     [1] 
where Budget Levelj is participant j’s budgeted performance in production round i (i is either 
round two or three). Participants self-set their Budget Level before each production round by 
responding to the following statement:  
To help with planning and to determine your potential [enter reward type] for the 
round, set a performance target of the maximum number of orders you think you will 
correctly complete this round: 
 
I target that I will correctly complete   __________  orders this round. 
 
Abilityji represented an individual’s knowledge of his performance capability or skill based on 
his performance in the last practice round (i.e., round 3) (Fisher et al. 2002). For purposes of 
analysis, instances of negative slack (i.e., Budget Slack < 0) were adjusted (Evans et al. 2001; 
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Huddart and Qu 2013) because the choice is inconsistent with participants trading wealth for 
honesty. That is, if Budget Level was greater than Ability, then Budget Level was made equal 
to Ability (i.e., Budget Level ≤ Ability).51 Performanceji was the second dependent variable 
and was measured as the number of correct orders that participant j completed in round i. 
Given the operationalization of Budget Slack, those higher in Ability have an 
opportunity to create more slack than those lower in Ability. Regarding Performance, those 
higher in Ability are likely to outperform those lower in Ability (Bonner and Sprinkle 2002). 
Thus, when analyzing Budget Slack and Performance as dependent measures, I use 
participants’ Ability as a covariate. 
4.6 Conclusion 
I employed a 2 x 3 x 3 mixed factorial experiment to test the effects of Reward Type 
and RPI on Budget Slack and Performance. A summary of the experimental procedures used 
is presented in Appendix B and specifics regarding the programming of the instrument are 






                                                     
51 Five of 166 (3%) budgets resulted in negative slack in either round 2 or 3. Of these ten negative slack budgets, 
three where in the cash condition, one was in the tangible condition, and six were in the points condition. 
Further, five were in the RPI absent condition and five were in the RPI present condition. Three participants 
reported negative slack in both periods (6 of 10). Inferences of results are unaffected by excluding these three 
participants from analysis. 
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Chapter 5: Results 
5.1 Introduction 
This chapter provides the results of the experiment described in Chapter 4. The effects 
of Reward Type on Budget Slack (i.e., Hypothesis 1 and 2, and Research Question 1) are 
tested in Section 5.2 and the effect of RPI on Budget Slack (i.e., Hypothesis 3) is tested in 
Section 5.3. Section 5.4 examines the process measures used to explain results in Section 5.2 
and 5.3. The interactive effects of Reward Type and RPI on Budget Slack (i.e., Hypothesis 4 
and Research Question 2) are tested in Section 5.5. Section 5.6 examines whether budget 
slack mediates the interactive effects of Reward Type and RPI on Performance (i.e., 
Hypothesis 5). The direct effects of Reward Type on Performance (i.e., Research Question 3) 
are tested in Section 5.7, and the direct effect of RPI on Performance (Hypothesis 6) is tested 
in Section 5.8. Supplemental analysis is discussed in Section 5.9. The chapter concludes in 
Section 5.10. 
5.2 The Effects of Reward Type on Budget Slack 
Hypotheses 1 to 4 and Research Questions 1 and 2 examine Budget Slack as the 
dependent variable.52 Panel B of Table 1 provides descriptive results for Budget Slack by 
experiment condition. Table 2 provides the results of a repeated measure ANCOVA with 
Reward Type and RPI as independent variables, Round as the repeated measure, Budget Slack 
                                                     
52 I could have developed hypotheses 1 to 4 using budget difficulty instead of Budget Slack as the theoretical 
construct for the dependent variable, with the directional prediction changing (i.e., higher slack results in less 
difficult budgets). However, I only examine and report results based on Budget Slack. I find budget difficulty 
and Budget Slack are highly negatively correlated (not tabulated, r = -0.91; p < 0.01). Moreover, inferences 
regarding hypotheses 1 to 4 are unchanged if budget difficulty is used instead of Budget Slack. 
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(for each of the last two production rounds) as the dependent variable, and Ability as a 
covariate.53 Results show that Round is the only within-subject effect that is significant (Table 
2: F = 3.17, p = 0.08; two-tailed).54 Specifically, Budget Slack is greater in round 3 than in 
round 2 (Panel B of Table 1: M(round 3) = 9.5 vs. M(round 2) = 8.7). Because Round does 
not interact with any of the between-subject factors, I use participants’ Average Budget Slack 
over rounds 2 and 3 to test hypotheses and research questions relating to Budget Slack.  
Table 1: Descriptive Results [N=162] 1  
Panel A: Total Number of Participants  
 
 Cash Tangible Points Total 
RPI Not Provided 29  28 25 82 
RPI Provided 27  27 30 84 
Total 56  55 55 166 
 
Panel B: Mean (Standard Deviation) Budget Slack 
 
 Round 1 Round 2 Round 3 Avg. Last 22 
RPI Absent     
Cash 7.0 (5.9) 9.0 (6.7) 9.3 (6.8) 9.1 (1.1) 
Tangible 6.6 (5.0) 7.6 (5.7) 8.9 (5.8) 8.4 (1.2) 
Points 6.8 (6.1) 7.2 (6.5) 7.4 (6.7) 7.2 (1.2) 
Average 6.8 (5.6) 8.0 (6.3) 8.6 (6.4) 8.2 (0.7) 
     
RPI Present     
Cash 7.8 (6.0) 10.0 (6.6) 11.2 (6.3) 10.8 (1.2) 
Tangible 6.5 (6.1) 9.9 (6.8) 11.4 (6.3) 10.6 (1.2) 
Points 6.4 (5.8) 8.6 (6.9) 8.9 (6.2) 8.7 (1.1) 
Average 6.9 (5.9) 9.5 (6.7) 10.4 (6.3) 10.0 (0.7) 
                                                     
53 There are two potential alternatives for measuring Ability. 1) Ability could be measured as participants’ 
maximum performance prior to setting their Budget in any particular round. For example, if an individual 
completed more correct orders in his third practice round than his first actual production round, Abilityji for 
calculating budget slack in the second production round would be performance in the third practice round. 
However, if he performed better in his first actual production round than in any of his practice rounds, then 
performance in his first actual production round would be his Ability in the second production round. Results are 
unaffected by using this measure of Ability. 2) Ability could be measured as a participant’s maximum 
performance in the three practice rounds. Inferences are unaffected by using this measure of Ability.  
54 All F-stats from ANCOVA models are reported two-tailed regardless of the directional nature of predictions.   
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Table 1 (Continued): 
 
    
Average Cash 7.4 (5.9) 9.5 (6.6) 10.2 (6.5) 10.0 (0.8) 
Average Tangible 6.5 (5.6) 8.8 (6.3) 10.2 (6.2) 9.5 (0.8) 
Average Points 6.6 (5.9) 8.0 (6.6) 8.2 (6.5) 8.0 (0.8) 
Average Total  6.8 (5.8) 8.7 (6.5) 9.5 (6.4) 9.1 (6.2) 
 
Panel C: Mean (Standard Deviation) Performance 
 
 Ability Round 1 Round 2 Round 3 Avg. Last 22 
RPI Absent       
Cash 18.0 (3.0) 18.5 (3.5) 19.5 (4.0) 19.4 (3.0) 19.2 (0.4) 
Tangible 17.4 (2.6) 18.0 (2.6) 18.8 (2.7) 19.1 (2.7) 19.2 (0.4) 
Points 18.1 (3.0) 18.9 (2.9) 19.6 (2.8) 19.8 (3.1) 19.4 (0.4) 
Average 17.8 (2.8) 18.5 (3.0) 19.3 (3.2) 19.4 (2.9) 19.3 (0.2) 
      
RPI Present      
Cash 17.0 (2.1) 18.4 (2.1) 20.2 (2.9) 20.4 (2.1) 20.9 (0.4) 
Tangible 18.0 (3.5) 19.1 (2.8) 20.2 (3.8) 19.9 (3.5) 19.9 (0.4) 
Points 17.8 (3.3) 19.5 (3.1) 20.2 (3.1) 20.3 (3.2) 20.2 (0.3) 
Average 17.6 (3.0) 19.0 (2.7) 20.2 (3.3) 20.2 (3.0) 20.3 (0.2) 
      
Average Cash 17.5 (2.6) 18.4 (2.9) 19.8 (3.5) 19.9 (2.7) 20.1 (0.3) 
Average Tangible 17.7 (3.0) 18.5 (2.7) 19.5 (3.3) 19.5 (3.1) 19.5 (0.3) 
Average Points 17.9 (3.1) 19.2 (3.0) 20.0 (3.0) 20.0 (3.2) 19.8 (0.3) 
Total Average 17.7 (2.9) 18.7 (2.9) 19.8 (3.3) 19.8 (3.0) 19.8 (0.2) 
 
1 See Appendix F for variable definitions. One hundred sixty-six participants attended one of 12 sessions. The 
number of participants varied in each session (9 participants to 26 participants). 
2 Means reflect Average for rounds 2 and 3, and are covariate-adjusted for participants’ ability. Therefore, 
instead of standard deviations, the brackets report the delta-method standard error. 
 
Panel A of Table 3 reports ANCOVA results with Reward Type and RPI as 
independent variables, Average Budget Slack (over the last two production rounds) as the 
dependent variable, and Ability as a covariate.55 Consistent with prior research (e.g., Fisher et 
al. 2002; Webb 2002), I observe that those higher in Ability generate more slack than those 
                                                     
55 In section 4.5, I argue that excluding round 1 from the analysis is appropriate because participants were still 
familiarizing themselves with the task and RPI feedback had yet to be provided. However, if Average Budget 
Slack also includes round 1 (i.e., average across all three rounds) results differ such that there is no difference in 
Budget Slack between Reward Type conditions (not tabulated: t < 1.55; p > 0.12) or RPI conditions (not 
tabulated: F = 2.26; p = 0.13). 
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lower in Ability (Panel A of Table 3: F = 3.46, p = 0.06; two-tailed).56 I use planned contrast 
tests, without reference to the non-significant ANOVA F-test (Panel A of Table 3; F = 1.60, p 
= 0.20; two-tailed), to test hypotheses 1 and 2, and research question 1 because there are three 
levels of Reward Type (Buckless and Ravenscroft 1990; Keppel 1991). 
Table 2: The Effects of Reward Type and RPI on Budget Slack [N=166] 1 
 
Panel A: Repeated Measures ANCOVA (n=332) 
     
Source df MS F-stat p-value 
Between-Subjects Effects     
Reward Type 2 118.73 1.60 0.20 
RPI 1 278.94 3.76 0.05 
Reward Type * RPI 2 3.53 0.05 0.95 
Ability 1 256.79 3.46 0.06 
Residual  159 74.11   
     
Within-Subjects Effects     
Round 1 24.00 3.17 0.08 
Reward Type * Round 2 8.08 1.16 0.31 
RPI * Round 1 2.76 0.37 0.55 
Reward Type * RPI * 
Round 
2 0.61 0.08 0.92 
Ability * Round 1 14.39 1.90 0.17 
Residual  159 7.57   
Total  331 41.67   
 
1 See Appendix F for variable definitions. Repeated ANCOVA analysis of 166 participants’ Budget Slack for 
rounds 2 and 3 resulted in 332 observations; p-values are two-tailed.  
 
5.2.1 Cash vs. Tangible Rewards 
Hypothesis 1 predicts that those pursuing tangible rewards will generate more Budget 
Slack than those pursuing cash rewards.57 Inconsistent with hypothesis 1, Average Budget 
                                                     
56 Ability is positively correlated with Average Budget Slack (not tabulated: r = 0.13; p = 0.09; two-tailed). 
57 Consistent with economic theory regarding the transaction costs associated with tangible rewards, on average 
participants feel that a $10 gift card to the four locations used in the study is worth less than $10 cash (Table 4, 
Least: M(cash) = $8.66, M(tangible) = $8.65, M(points) = $8.93, and M(overall) = $8.74; M(overall) vs. $10.00, 
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Slack for those in the cash condition is 10.0 orders and for those in the tangible condition is 
9.5 orders (Panel B of Table 1). This difference in Average Budget Slack is insignificant 
(Planned Contrast 1, Panel B of Table 3: t = 0.41, p = 0.68; two-tailed).58 Thus, I do not find 
support for hypothesis 1. 
Table 3: The Effects of Reward Type and RPI on Average Budget Slack  [N=166]1  
 
Panel A: ANCOVA2 
 
     
Source Df MS F-stat p-value 
Reward Type 2 59.36 1.60 0.20 
RPI 1 139.47 3.76 0.05 
Reward Type * RPI 2 1.77 0.05 0.95 
Ability 1 128.39 3.46 0.06 
Residual 159 37.06   
Total 165 37.89   
 
Panel B: Planned Contrasts3 
    
Comparison Contrast t-stat p-value 
1. H1: Tangible vs. Cash -0.48 0.41 0.68 
2. H2: Tangible vs. Points 1.52 1.30 0.08 
3. RQ1: Points vs. Cash -1.99 1.72 0.08 
4. H3: RPI Absent vs. RPI 
Present 
-1.83 1.94 0.03 
5. H4a: (Tangible - Cash) when 
RPI Absent < (Tangible - 
Cash) when RPI Present 
9.24 1.46 0.07 
6. H4b: (Tangible - Points) when 
RPI Absent < (Tangible - 
Points) when RPI Present 
12.81 2.02 0.02 
7. RQ2: (Points - Cash) when 
RPI Absent vs. (Points -Cash) 
when RPI Present 
12.58 1.89 0.06 
                                                                                                                                                                      
t = 7.37, p < 0.01; one-tailed). There is no difference in Least by Reward Type (not tabulated: t < 0.66, p > 0.54; 
two-tailed). Also consistent with economic theory, participants in the tangible and points condition would rather 
receive cash than a gift card of equivalent value (Table 4, Rather: M(tangible) = 5.9 and M(points) = 5.9; 
M(overall) vs. 4.0 (neutral), t = 16.05, p < 0.01; one-tailed). 
58 Hypothesis 1 is a directional prediction but descriptive results are in the opposite direction of the prediction. 
Thus, the contrast p-value has been shown as two-tailed. 
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Table 3 (Continued):  
 
1 See Appendix F for variable definitions. ANCOVA analysis of 166 participants’ Average Budget Slack for 
rounds 2 and 3. 
2 p-values are two-tailed.  
3 p-values are one-tailed with the exception of Contrasts 3 and 7 because of their non-directional prediction. 
Contrasts 5 to 7 use a {-3 1 -2 4} contrast based on main effects predicted in hypothesis 1 and 2, and on the 
findings in research question 1. The contrast order reflects {Reward Type 1/RPI Absent, Reward Type 1/RPI 
Present, Reward Type 2/RPI Absent, Reward Type 2/RPI Present}. See Panel A of Figure 3 for graphical 
representation of covariate adjusted means. 
 
The theory underlying hypothesis 1 argues that people view stealing cash as more 
serious a crime compared to stealing tangible items. Consistent with theory, on average, 
participants feel stealing $10 cash is a more serious crime than stealing a $10 gift card (Steal: 
M(overall) = 4.7, M(overall) vs. 4.0, t = 7.35, p < 0.01; one-tailed).59 Theory underlying 
hypothesis 1 also argues that people pursuing tangible rewards will use their rewards more for 
purchasing/enjoying wants than for purchasing/enjoying needs (Want) and will think of their 
rewards as more separate (Separate) from their everyday cash than those pursuing cash; 
higher levels of Want and Separate are expected to lead to greater Budget Slack. As shown in 
Table 4, those in the tangible condition maintain higher levels of Want (Table 4, Want: 
M(cash) = 4.8 vs. M(tangible) = 5.6, t = 2.40, p = 0.01; two-tailed) and higher levels of 
Separate (Table 2: M(cash) = 5.4 vs. M(tangible) = 6.1, t = 2.47, p < 0.01; one-tailed). 
However, inconsistent with expectations, Want and Separate are uncorrelated with Average 
Budget Slack (not tabulated: respectively, r = 0.07, p = 0.39 and r = -0.09, p = 0.23; two-
tailed). 
                                                     
59 Steal does not differ by reward type conditions (not tabulated: p > 0.37; two-tailed) or by RPI condition (not 
tabulated: p = 0.53; two-tailed). 
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Table 4: Mean (Standard Deviation) Process Measures1 
 
 Want Separate Attractive Affect Desire2 Distinct2 Gift Reciprocity Value Rather Care 
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Table 4 (Continued): 
 
 Unethical Justify Frame Steal Least 
RPI Absent      








































RPI Present      
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1 See Appendix F for description of process measures; Least is missing 5 observations (n = 161) because it was an open-ended question and 5 students choose 
not to answer. 
2 Desire and Distinct are created using exploratory factor analysis and factor loadings. See Table 3 for description of how variables were calculat
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Theory underlying hypothesis 1 also argues that people pursuing tangible rewards 
will view their potential rewards as more attractive (Attractive) and experience greater 
emotion or affect when thinking about their potential rewards (Affect); higher levels of 
both Attractive and Affect are expected to lead to greater Budget Slack.60 Consistent with 
expectations, Attractive and Affect are both correlated with Average Budget Slack (not 
tabulated: respectively, r = 0.14, p = 0.07 and r = 0.16, p = 0.05; two-tailed). However, 
the effect of Reward Type (Cash vs. Tangible) on Attractive and Affect is inconsistent 
with expectations. Specifically, participants in the cash condition experienced levels of 
Affect similar to those in the tangible condition (Table 4: M(cash) = 6.1 vs. M(tangible) = 
6.2, t = 0.52, p = 0.30; one-tailed), and they find their potential rewards to be similarly 
Attractive as those in the tangible condition (Table 4: M(cash) = 6.4 vs. M(tangible) = 
6.1: t = 1.61, p = 0.12; two-tailed). 
Measures of Want and Separate are correlated with measures of Attractive and 
Affect (not tabulated: r > 0.16, p < 0.05; two-tailed). As shown in Table 5, exploratory 
factor analysis indicates that two of these four measures (Affect, and Attractive) represent 
a single construct (Desire) with all loadings greater than 0.81 and an eigenvalue (variance 
explained) of 1.9 (48%).61 Further, Want and Separate represent a second construct 
(Distinct) with loadings greater than 0.70 and an eigenvalue of 1.0 (26%). I use factor 
scores to calculate measures of Desire and Distinct for each participant. Desire is 
correlated with Average Budget Slack (not tabulated: r = 0.19, p = 0.01; two-tailed), while 
Distinct is uncorrelated with Average Budget Slack (not tabulated: r = 0.00, p = 0.99; 
                                                     
60 Affect and Attractive are highly correlated (not tabulated; r = 0.50, p < 0.01; two-tailed).  
61 The Cronbach alpha for Desire and Distinct is low at 0.61 and 0.54. 
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two-tailed). Although participants in the tangible rewards condition score higher on 
Distinct than those in the cash condition (Table 4: M(cash) = -0.3 vs. M(tangible) = 0.3, t 
= 3.17, p < 0.01; two-tailed), participants in the tangible condition appear to Desire their 
budget based rewards similar to those in the cash condition (Table 4: M(cash) = 0.3 vs. 
M(tangible) = 0.1, t = 0.87, p = 0.39: two-tailed). 
Table 5: Exploratory Factor Analysis [N=166]1  
 




1. Want 0.41 0.71 
2. Separate -0.02 0.90 
3. Attractive 0.87 0.09 
4. Affect 0.82 0.09 
      
     Eigenvalue  








1 See Appendix F for variable definitions. All items measured using a 7-point scale with endpoints labeled 
“strongly disagree” (1) and “strongly agree” (7). Exploratory factor analysis was conducted with factors 
rotated using varimax. 
5.2.2 Tangible Rewards vs. Point Rewards  
Hypothesis 2 predicts that those pursuing tangible rewards will generate more 
Budget Slack than those pursuing redeemable points. As shown in Panel B of Table 1, 
those in the tangible condition have Average Budget Slack of 9.5 compared to 8.0 for 
those in the points condition. As shown in Panel B of Table 3 (Planned Contrast 2), this 
difference in Budget Slack is significant (t = 1.30, p = 0.08; one-tailed). Thus, I find 
support for hypothesis 2. 
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Psychological myopia theory provides two reasons to expect points would lead to 
less Budget Slack than tangible rewards. First, points (compared to tangible rewards) 
likely lead people to frame the budgeting task as more of an ethical decision than an 
economic decision. Second, tangible rewards (compared to points) likely lead people to 
experience greater positive emotion, diminishing the saliency of personal norms of 
honesty and leading to more justification of their dishonest behavior (i.e., Budget Slack 
creation). Although participants that frame the budgeting task as more of an economic 
task than an ethical task (Frame) generate more Budget Slack (not tabulated: r = 0.46, p < 
0.01; two-tailed), Frame for those in tangible condition is similar to those in the 
redeemable-points condition (Table 4: M(tangible) = 4.6 vs. M(points) = 4.7, t = 0.19, p = 
0.42; one-tailed). Rather, it appears that support for hypothesis 2 results from participants 
in the tangible condition experiencing higher levels of Desire than those in the points 
condition (Table 4: M(tangible) = 0.1 vs. M(points) = -0.4, t = 2.53, p < 0.01; one-tailed). 
In fact, results in Table 6 show that Desire mediates the effect of tangible vs. point 
rewards on Budget Slack (Baron and Kenny 1986).62 First, Desire has a significant effect 
on Budget Slack (Panel A of Table 6; F = 4.82, p = 0.03; two-tailed). Second, upon 
including Desire in the model, there is no longer a significant difference between the two 
reward types in terms of Budget Slack (Planned Contrast 2, Panel B of Table 6: t = 1.14, 
p = 0.19; one-tailed).63 
                                                     
62 All mediation tests in this study control for Ability. Inferences regarding the effects of Ability are no 
different in mediation tests as compared to those reported for the hypotheses tests. Thus, the effects of 
Ability in the mediation tests are not further discussed.   
63 A potential alternative explanation is that point rewards are viewed more as a Gift than tangible rewards 
and participants reciprocate the gift with less Budget Slack. Although Gift is not correlated with Budget 
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Table 6: The Effects of Reward Type and RPI on Average Budget Slack Controlling 
for Desire  [N=166]1  
 
Panel A: ANCOVA2 
     
Source Df MS F-stat p-value 
Reward Type 2 51.20 0.71 0.49 
RPI 1 126.21 3.49 0.06 
Reward Type * RPI 2 3.77 0.10 0.90 
Ability 1 134.45 3.72 0.06 
Desire 1 174.33 4.82 0.03 
Residual 158 36.19   
Total 165 37.89   
 
Panel B: Planned Contrasts3 
 
Comparison Contrast t-stat p-value 
1. H1: Tangible vs. Cash -0.29 0.26 0.80 
2. H2: Tangible vs. Points 1.04 1.14 0.19 
3. RQ1: Points vs. Cash -1.34 0.90 0.26 
 
1 See Appendix F for variable definitions. ANCOVA analysis of 166 participants’ Average Budget Slack for 
rounds 2 and 3. 
2 p-values are two-tailed.  
3 p-value are one-tailed for contrast 1 and 2 based on the directional prediction; p-value is two-tailed for 
contrast 3. 
5.2.3 Cash Rewards vs. Point Rewards 
Research question 1 considers whether those pursuing cash rewards will generate 
a different amount of Budget Slack than those pursuing points rewards. The Average 
Budget Slack for cash and points rewards is 10.0 and 8.0, respectively (Table 1, Panel B), 
and this difference is significant (Planned Contrast 3, Panel B of Table 3: t = 1.72, p = 
                                                                                                                                                              
Slack (not tabulated: r = 0.01, p = 0.84; two-tailed), Reciprocity is correlated with Budget Slack (not 
tabulated: r = -0.59, p < 0.01, two-tailed). However, Reciprocity does not differ between points rewards and 
tangible rewards (Table 4: M(tangible) = 4.3 vs. M(points) = 4.3, t = 0.19, p = 0.84; two-tailed). Thus, 
support for hypothesis 2 is not related to either Gift or Reciprocity.   
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0.08; two-tailed). Thus, those pursuing cash rewards generate significantly more slack 
than those pursuing points rewards.  
The greater amount of Budget Slack under cash vs. points rewards relates to 
differences in Desire for the rewards. Those pursuing cash rewards Desire their rewards 
more than those pursuing point rewards (Table 4: M(cash) = 0.3 vs. M(points) = -0.4, t = 
1.65, p = 0.09; two-tailed). Moreover, the significance of the difference between the two 
reward types with respect to Budget Slack is eliminated when Desire is included in the 
analysis (Planned Contrast 3, Panel B, Table 6: t = 0.90, p = 0.26; two-tailed). Thus, 
Desire fully mediates the effects of these two reward types on Budget Slack creation. 
5.3 The Effect of RPI on Budget Slack 
Hypothesis 3 predicts that the presence of RPI will result in a greater amount of 
Budget Slack compared to the absence of RPI. As reported in Panel A of Table 3, there is 
a significant main effect of RPI on Average Budget Slack (F = 3.76, p = 0.05; two-tailed). 
Those in the RPI absent condition have average Budget Slack of 8.2 compared to 10.0 
those in the RPI present condition (Panel B of Table 1). These results support Hypothesis 
3.64  
Theory underlying Hypothesis 3 argues that RPI provides people with a 
descriptive norm regarding whether dishonest reporting is acceptable. I conduct two 
                                                     
64 A potential alternative explanation is that those in the RPI present condition create more Budget Slack 
than those in the RPI absent condition in an attempt to compete with others in terms of budget variance. I 
conduct a regression with RPI, Ability, and round 1 slack (prior to seeing RPI feedback) as independent 
variables, and Average Budget Slack in rounds 2 and 3 as the dependent variable. While round 1 slack does 
have a positive association with Budget Slack (not tabulated: 𝛽 = 0.74, p < 0.01; two-tailed), the presence 
of RPI continues to have a positive effect on Budget Slack (not tabulated: 𝛽 = 1.61, p = 0.02; two-tailed). 
  72 
supplemental tests to evaluate participants’ reasoning for creating greater slack when RPI 
is present. First, I examine whether those in the RPI present condition respond to 
information suggesting different descriptive norms regarding the acceptability of 
reporting dishonesty contained within the RPI feedback. For those in the RPI present 
condition, I calculate a new variable called Norm Difference as participants’ round 1 
Budget Variance minus the average round 1 Budget Variance for all three participants in 
their RPI group. So, those with a negative Norm Difference view a descriptive norm 
suggesting dishonesty is acceptable (i.e., others in their group are creating more slack), 
while those with a positive Norm Difference view a descriptive norm of honesty (i.e., 
others in their group are creating less slack). I then conduct a linear regression with Norm 
Difference and Ability as independent variables and Average Budget Slack in rounds 2 
and 3 as the dependent variable. Norm Difference has a negative effect on subsequent 
Budget Slack (not tabulated: b  = -4.76, p < 0.01; one-tailed). This finding is consistent 
with participants using the information contained within RPI feedback to form a 
descriptive norm, which is then used to determine an appropriate level of Budget Slack in 
subsequent rounds. Those viewing a ‘dishonest’ descriptive norm increase their Budget 
Slack after round 1 more than those viewing an ‘honest’ descriptive norm.65  
Second, I consider participants’ level of agreement with the statement “In this 
task, it is unethical for someone to set a target significantly below his or her known 
                                                     
65 The operationalization of RPI may have created an experimental confound such that results could be due 
to 1) RPI providing participants with information about the descriptive norms of budget slack or 2) RPI 
making salient the grouping of the participant with two other participants. The analysis on Norm Difference 
mitigates the latter concern since it demonstrates that slack creation is sensitive to the descriptive norm 
provided in the RPI.  
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performance” (Unethical). As shown in Table 4, Unethical is 5.0 for those in the RPI 
absent condition and 4.3 for those in the RPI present condition; this difference in 
Unethical is significant (not tabulated: t = 2.13, p = 0.02; one-tailed). Further, Unethical 
is negatively correlated with Average Budget Slack (not tabulated: r = -0.46, p < 0.01; 
two-tailed), and results reported in Table 7 show that Unethical fully mediates the effect 
of RPI on Budget Slack. Unethical is a significant factor in the model (Panel A of Table 
7: F = 47.58, p < 0.01; two-tailed), while RPI is no longer significant (Panel A of Table 
7: F = 1.12, p = 0.29; two-tailed).  
Table 7: The Effects of Reward Type and RPI on Average Budget Slack Controlling 
for Unethical [N=166]1  
 
Panel A: ANCOVA2 
 
Source 
Df MS F-stat p-value 
Reward Type 2 68.38 2.40 0.09 
RPI 1 32.23 1.12 0.29 
Reward Type * RPI 2 0.04 0.00 0.99 
Ability 1 249.48 8.70 < 0.01 
Unethical 1 1363.74 47.58 < 0.01 
Residual 158 28.66   
Total 165 37.89   
 
Panel B: Planned Contrasts3 
    
Comparison Contrast t-stat p-value 
1. H3: RPI Absent vs. RPI 
Present 
-0.89 1.06 0.15 
 
1 See Appendix F for variable definitions. Repeated ANCOVA analysis of 166 participants’ Average 
Budget Slack for rounds 2 and 3. 
2 p-values are two-tailed.  
3 Planned comparisons use the mean-squared error term from the ANOVA in panel A to calculate p-values 
(Peecher 1996). p-value is one-tailed based on the directional prediction. 
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5.4 The Combined Mediated Effects of Reward Type and RPI on Budget Slack 
This section examines whether Desire and Unethical continue to mediate the 
effects of Reward Type and RPI on Budget Slack when both factors are considered 
simultaneously in the analysis. Desire and Unethical are uncorrelated with one another 
(not tabulated: r = -0.07, p = 0.34; two-tailed). Further, Desire does not differ by RPI 
condition (Table 4; M(RPI absent) = 0.0 vs. M(RPI present) = 0.0,  t = 0.80, p = 0.43; 
two-tailed) and Unethical does not differ by Reward Type condition (Table 4: M(cash) = 
4.6 vs. M(tangible) = 4.8 vs. M(points) = 4.6; t < 0.53, p > 0.60; two-tailed). Thus, Desire 
and Unethical appear to be unique constructs. However, previous tests in section 5.1 and 
5.2 of the mediating effect of Desire and Unethical are conducted separately for each 
construct. Table 8 reflects a more conservative test of mediation with the inclusion of 
both Desire and Unethical in the same ANCOVA examining the effects of RPI and 
Reward Type on Budget Slack. Consistent with Panel A of Table 6 and Panel A of Table 
7, both Desire and Unethical (respectively) are significant predictors of Average Budget 
Slack (Panel A of Table 8: respectively, F = 3.50, p = 0.06 and F = 45.65, p < 0.01; two-
tailed). Further, the effects of Reward Type (Contrasts 2 and 3, Panel B of Table 8: 
respectively, t =1.40, p = 0.10, one-tailed; t = 1.48, p = 0.14, two-tailed) and RPI 
(Contrast 4, Panel B of Table 8: t = 1.02, p = 0.16; one-tailed) are no longer significant. 
Thus, evidence of the mediating effects of Desire and Unethical persist when both 
measures are included in the same model. 
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Table 8: The Effects of Reward Type and RPI on Average Budget Slack Controlling 
for Desire and Unethical [N=166]1  
 
Panel A: ANCOVA2 
 
Source Df MS F-stat p-value 
Reward Type 2 38.56 1.37 0.26 
RPI 1 29.15 1.04 0.31 
Reward Type * RPI 2 0.52 0.02 0.98 
Ability 1 252.30 8.94 < 0.01 
Desire 1 98.65 3.50 0.06 
Unethical 1 1288.05 45.65 < 0.01 
Residual 157 28.22   
Total 165 37.89   
 
Panel B: Planned Contrasts3 
    
Comparison Contrast t-stat p-value 
1. H1: Tangible vs. Cash -0.10 0.10 0.92 
2. H2: Tangible vs. Points 1.45 1.40 0.09 
3. RQ1: Points vs. Cash -1.55 1.48 0.14 
4. H3: RPI Absent vs. 
RPI Present 
-0.85 1.02 0.16 
5. H4a: (Tangible - Cash) 
when RPI Absent < 
(Tangible - Cash) 
when RPI Present 
4.23 0.75 0.23 
6. H4b: (Tangible - 
Points) when RPI 
Absent < (Tangible – 
Points) when RPI 
Present 
7.62 1.37 0.09 
7. RQ2: (Points - Cash) 
when RPI Absent < 
(Points - Cash) when 
RPI Present 
7.99 1.35 0.18 
 
1 See Appendix F for variable definitions. ANCOVA analysis of 166 participants’ Average Budget Slack for 
rounds 2 and 3. 
2 p-values are two-tailed.  
3 p-values are one-tailed with the exception of Contrast 3 and 7 because of their non-directional prediction. 
Contrasts 5-7 use a {-3 1 -2 4} contrast based on main effects predicted in hypothesis 1 and 2, and on the 
findings in research question 1. The contrast order reflects {Reward Type 1/RPI Absent, Reward Type 
1/RPI Present, Reward Type 2/RPI Absent, Reward Type 2/RPI Present}.  
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5.5 The Interactive Effect of Reward Type and RPI on Budget Slack 
Hypothesis 4 and research question 2 consider the interactive effects of Reward 
Type and RPI on Budget Slack. Theory suggests that the overarching descriptive norm 
contained within RPI will encourage more dishonesty for those pursuing reward types 
that already allow people to rationalize lying. As shown in Panel A of Table 3, the 
interaction between Reward Type and RPI is insignificant (F = 0.05, p = 0.95; two-
tailed). However, given that there are three levels of Reward Type and that the specific 
nature of certain aspects of the Reward Type x RPI interaction is hypothesized, planned 
contrasts represent the appropriate test rather than an ANOVA (Buckless and Ravenscroft 
1990; Keppel 1991).66 
Hypothesis 4a predicts that RPI will lead to more budget slack for individuals 
pursuing tangible rewards than for those pursuing cash rewards. Given the main effect 
prediction in hypothesis 1, I use the following contrast coding to test hypothesis 4a: 
Cash/RPI Absent (-3), Cash/RPI Present (1), Tangible/RPI Absent (-2), and Tangible/RPI 
Present (4). Consistent with hypothesis 4a and the graphed means in Panel A of Figure 3, 
there is a significant ordinal interaction between Reward Type (Cash vs. Tangible) and 
RPI such that the presence of RPI increased slack more for those pursuing tangible 
rewards than pursuing cash rewards (Contrast 5, Panel B of Table 3: t = 1.46, p = 0.07; 
one-tailed). Hypothesis 4b predicts that provision of RPI will lead to a greater increase in 
Budget Slack for individuals pursuing tangible rewards than for those pursuing points 
                                                     
66 “Using the main and interaction effects of ANOVA to explain the pattern of relationships (interactions) 
among cell means is appropriate only when the pattern hypothesized is testable by the conventional 
ANOVA (i.e., disordinal relationship) and no variable has more than two levels (Buckless and Ravenscroft 
1990, p. 934).” 
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rewards. Given the main effect prediction in hypothesis 2, I use the following contrast 
coding to test hypothesis 4b: Points/RPI Absent (-3), Points/RPI Present (+1), 
Tangible/RPI Absent (-2), and Tangible/RPI Present (+4). Consistent with hypothesis 4b 
and the graphed means in Panel A of Figure 3, there is a significant ordinal interaction 
between Reward Type (Points vs. Tangible) and RPI such that the presence of RPI 
increased slack more for those pursuing tangible rewards than points rewards (Contrast 6, 
Panel B of Table 3: F = 2.02, p = 0.02; one-tailed). 
Figure 3: Graphical Representations of Results 
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Figure 3 (Continued): 
Panel B: The Effects of Reward Type and RPI on Performance2 
 
1 See Appendix F for variable definitions; Means reflect Average Budget Slack for rounds 2 and 3 (N=166) 
and are adjusted for participants’ ability. See Panel B of Table 1 for Descriptive results.  
2 See Appendix F for variable definitions; Means reflect Average Performance for rounds 2 and 3 (N=166) 
and are adjusted for participants’ ability. See Panel C of Table 1 for Descriptive results. 
 
Finally, research question 2 asks whether Reward Type (Cash vs. Points) interacts 
with RPI to affect Budget Slack. Given the results for research question 1, I use the 
following contrast coding to evaluate research question 2: Points/RPI Absent (-3), 
Points/RPI Present (+1), Cash/RPI Absent (-2), and Cash/RPI Present (+4). Results for 
Contrast 7 in Panel B of Table 3 show a significant ordinal interaction between Reward 
Type (Cash vs. Points) and RPI such that the presence of RPI increased slack more for 
those pursuing cash rewards than pursuing points rewards (t = 1.89, p = 0.06; two-tailed). 
Overall, these results are consistent with theory regarding the interactive effects of 
descriptive norms provided by RPI and the personal norms made salient by Reward 
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Type.67 Specifically, these results suggest that peoples’ salient personal norms bias their 
interpretations of the descriptive norms contained within RPI. That is, peoples’ 
interpretation of whether others are behaving dishonestly depends on their personal 
beliefs (made salient by reward type) that dishonesty is an acceptable way to earn 
rewards.68 
5.6 The Mediating Effects of Budget Slack on Performance 
Hypothesis 5 predicts that Budget Slack will mediate the interactive effects of 
Reward Type and RPI on Performance. Sections 5.1 to 5.4 provide evidence of the 
interactive effects of Reward Type and RPI on Budget Slack.69 The next step in testing for 
mediation is showing that Budget Slack is associated with Performance. Results from an 
OLS regression reported in Panel A of Table 9, show that Average Budget Slack is not 
associated with Performance (t = -0.14; p = 0.44; one-tailed) when controlling for the 
positive effects of Ability (𝛽 = 0.75, t = 13.78, p < 0.01; one-tailed). Without a direct 
relationship with Performance, Budget Slack cannot mediate the interactive effects of 
Reward Type and RPI. Therefore, I do not find support for hypothesis 5.70 
                                                     
67 I conducted separate ANCOVAs to test hypotheses 4a, 4b, and research question 2 (i.e., three 
ANCOVAs excluding one of the reward type conditions). Although the untabulated results show the 
interaction term in each of these ANCOVA models is insignificant (F < 0.09, p > 0.76), the nature of the 
predicted interaction (see contrast code) is not reflected by the ANCOVA interaction. 
68 The global contrast that reflects hypotheses 1 to 4 [contrast code (Reward Type, RPI): -3 4 -2 7 -5 -1] is 
significant (not tabulated; t = 2.40; p < 0.01; one-tailed).  
69 Baron and Kenny (1986) argue that the first step in testing for mediation should be testing for an overall 
(total) association between the predictor and the criterion variables in order to establish an effect to be 
mediated. However, a number of researchers, including David Kenny, argue that establishing a total effect 
is not required before proceeding with tests of mediation (e.g., Hayes 2009; Kenny 2013; Mackinnon et al. 
2000; Shrout and Bolger 2002). 
70 If Average Budget Slack and Average Performance also include data from round 1 (i.e., average across 
all three rounds), Average Budget Slack still has an insignificant effect on Average Performance (not 
tabulated: p = 0.13, one-tailed). 
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Table 9: The Effect of Budget Slack on Performance [N=166] 1  
Panel A: Regression of Average Performance on Average Budget Slack and Ability 
 
 Unstandardized Standard 
Error 
t-stat p-value 
Budget Slack 0.00 0.03 -0.14 0.44 
Ability 0.75 0.05 13.78 < 0.01 
     
R2 = 0.54     
 
Panel B: Regression of Round 1 Performance on Round 1 Budget Slack and Ability 
 
 Unstandardized Standard 
Error 
t-stat p-value 
Budget Slack -0.05 0.03 1.78 0.04 
Ability 0.71 0.05 13.01 < 0.01 
     
R2 = 0.51 
 
Panel C: Regression of Round 2 Performance on Round 2 Budget Slack and Ability 
 
 Unstandardized Standard 
Error 
t-stat p-value 
Budget Slack -0.01 0.03 0.47 0.32 
Ability 0.77 0.06 11.99 < 0.01 
     
R2 = 0.47 
 
Panel D: Regression of Round 3 Performance on Round 3 Budget Slack and Ability 
 
 Unstandardized Standard 
Error 
t-stat p-value 
Budget Slack 0.01 0.03 0.23 0.82 
Ability 0.72 0.06 12.77 < 0.01 
     
R2 = 0.50 
 
1 See Appendix F for variable definitions; p-values expressed one-tailed because of directional prediction. 
 
To further understand the relationship between Budget Slack and Performance, I 
conduct a separate regression analysis for each round of the experiment with the results 
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reported in Panels B to D of Table 9. In round 1, as expected, Budget Slack has a negative 
effect on Performance (Panel B of Table 9: β = -0.05, t = 1.78, p = 0.04; one-tailed). 
However, this negative effect does not persist in rounds 2 and 3 (Panels C and D: t ≤ 
0.23, p ≥ 0.32; one-tailed). One explanation for these results, consistent with goal theory, 
is that participants quickly developed personal goals in my task setting (i.e., after round 
1), and it is those personal goals rather than an easy budget (i.e., one that contains a high 
level of slack) that motivated effort (Latham and Locke 2002). For instance, on average, 
participants understated their Ability by 38% in round 1 and by 52% in the average of 
rounds 2 and 3;71 this increase from round 1 to rounds 2 and 3 is significant (not 
tabulated: t = 3.06, p < 0.01; two-tailed). Thus, by round 2, participants’ budgets likely 
have limited motivational effects, which results in Budget Slack not being significantly 
associated with Performance. 
5.7 The Direct Effects of Reward Type on Performance 
Research Question 3 considers the direct effects of Reward Type on Performance. 
Panel A of Table 10 provides the results of a repeated measure ANCOVA, with Reward 
Type and RPI as independent variables, Performance (for each of the last two production 
rounds) as the dependent variable, and Ability as a control. I exclude Budget Slack as a 
control from the ANCOVA because, as shown in Section 5.6, Budget Slack is not a 
mediator in this setting.72 Results show that Round has no significant within-subject 
                                                     
71 Calculated as (Ability – Budget)/Ability. Evans et al. (2001) refer to this variable as percentage slack. 
72 Budget Slack is insignificant if included in the Table 10 or Table 11 ANCOVA models (not tablulated: F 
< 0.69, p > 0.40; two-tailed). Further, the inclusion of Budget Slack does not change any inferences with 
regards to Research Question 3, Hypothesis 6, or supplemental analysis.  
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effects (Panel A of Table 10: ≤ 0.65, p ≥ 0.42; two-tailed). Because Round does not 
interact with any of the between-subject factors, I use participants’ Average Performance 
over rounds 2 and 3 to test Hypothesis 6 and Research Question 3 (a-c) regarding 
Performance.73 
Table 10: The Effects of Reward Type and RPI on Performance [N=166]1 
 
Panel A: Repeated Measures ANCOVA (n=332) 
     
Source df MS F-stat p-value 
Between-Subjects Effects     
Reward Type 2 7.78 1.03 0.35 
RPI 1 90.83 12.00 < 0.01 
Reward Type * RPI 2 7.45 0.98 0.37 
Ability 1 1605.06 212.12 < 0.01 
Residual 159 7.57   
     
Within-Subjects Effects     
Round 1 1.35 0.65 0.42 
Reward Type * Round 2 0.04 0.02 0.99 
RPI * Round 1 0.38 0.18 0.67 
Reward Type * RPI * 
Round 
2 1.32 0.64 0.52 
Ability * Round 1 1.26 0.60 0.43 
Residual 159 2.08   
Total 331 1605.07   
     
1 See Appendix F for variable definitions. Repeated ANCOVA analysis of 166 participants’ Average 
Performance for rounds 2 and 3 resulted in 332 observations; p-values are two-tailed. 
 
Panel A of Table 11 reports ANCOVA results with Reward Type and RPI as 
independent variables, Average Performance (over the last two production rounds) as the 
dependent variable, and Ability as a covariate. I observe that those higher in Ability out 
                                                     
73 If Average Budget Slack and Average Performance also include data from round 1 (i.e., average across 
all three rounds), there is no significant difference in Average Performance between Reward Type 
conditions (not tabulated: t < 1.10; p > 0.27), but there is a difference in Average Performance between RPI 
conditions (F = 11.26; p < 0.01). 
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perform those lower in Ability (Panel A of Table 11: F = 212.12, p < 0.01; two-tailed). 
Next, I test research question 3 and hypothesis 6 regarding the direct effects of Reward 
Type and RPI on Performance. 
Table 11: The Effects of Reward Type and RPI on Average Performance  [N=166]1  
 
Panel A: ANCOVA2 
     
Source df MS F-stat p-value 
Reward Type 2 3.90 1.03 0.36 
RPI 1 45.41 12.00 < 0.01 
Reward Type * RPI 2 3.72 0.98 0.38 
Ability 1 802.53 212.12 < 0.01 
Residual 159 3.78   
Total 165 8.75   
 
Panel B: Planned Contrasts3 
    
Comparison Contrast t-stat p-value 
1. RQ3a: Tangible vs. Cash -0.53 1.43 0.15 
2. RQ3b: Tangible vs. Points -0.29 0.77 0.44 
3. RQ3c: Points vs. Cash -0.24 0.66 0.51 
4. H6: RPI Absent vs. RPI Present 1.05 3.46 < 0.01 
5. Supplemental: (Cash - Tangible) 
when RPI Absent < (Cash - 
Tangible) when RPI Present 
5.74 3.54 < 0.01 
6. Supplemental: (Points - 
Tangible) when RPI Absent < 
(Points - Tangible) when RPI 
Present 
3.32 2.39 0.02 
7. Supplemental: (Cash - Points) 
when RPI Absent < (Cash - 
Points) when RPI Present 
5.40 3.16 < 0.01 
 
1 See Appendix F for variable definitions. ANCOVA analysis of 166 participants’ Average Performance for 
rounds 2 and 3. Budget Slack is not controlled for in the ANCOVA because, as shown in Table 9, Budget 
Slack has no effect on Average Performance.  
2 p-values are two-tailed.  
3 Because of their non-directional prediction, all contrasts (with the exception of contrast 4) are reported 
with p-values as two-tailed. Contrasts 5-7 use a {-2 3 -2 1} The contrast reflects order reflects Reward Type 
1 (RPI Absent), Type 1 (RPI Present), Type 2 (RPI Absent), and Type 2 (RPI Present). See Panel A of 
Figure 3 for graphical representation of covariate adjusted means.  
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Because there are three levels of Reward Type, planned contrasts, without 
reference to the non-significant ANOVA F-test (Panel A of Table 10; F = 0.20, p = 0.20; 
two-tailed) are used to test Research Question 3 (Buckless and Ravenscroft 1990; Keppel 
1991). As shown in Panel B of Table 11, there are no significant performance differences 
between any of the reward conditions (Contrasts 1-3, Panel B of Table 10: t ≤ 1.43, p ≥ 
0.15; two-tailed).74 Thus, Reward Type does not have any direct effects on Performance. 
5.8 The Direct Effects of RPI on Performance  
Hypothesis 6 predicts that the presence of RPI will lead to greater performance 
than the absence of RPI. As shown in Panel A of Table 11, there is a significant main 
effect of RPI on Performance (F = 12.00, p < 0.01; two-tailed). Those in the RPI absent 
condition complete on average 19.3 orders compared to 20.3 for those in the RPI present 
condition (Panel C of Table 1). Thus, I find support for Hypothesis 6 that RPI motivates 
greater effort.75 
5.9 Supplemental Analysis: Interactive Effects of Reward Type and RPI on 
Performance 
The graphical summary of Performance shown in Panel B of Figure 3 suggest 
that RPI improves performance more for those in the cash condition than it does for those 
in either the tangible or points conditions. To test for these apparent interaction effects, I 
                                                     
74 Desire is uncorrelated with performance (not tabulated: r = -0.04, p = 0.59; two-tailed). Further, Distinct 
is uncorrelated with performance (not tabulated: r = -0.09, p = 0.22; two-tailed). Neither factor is 
significant if included as a covariate in the Table 11 ANCOVA (not tabulated: F < 0.02, p > 0.87; two-
tailed). 
75 Unethical is uncorrelated with performance (not tabulated: r = 0.07, p = 0.34; two-tailed) and is not 
significant if included as a covariate in the Table 11 ANCOVA (not tabulated: F = 0.08, p = 0.77; two-
tailed). 
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conduct post hoc contrasts in Panel B of Table 11. First, using the following contrast: 
Cash/RPI Absent (-2), Cash/RPI Present (+3), Tangible/RPI Absent (-2), and 
Tangible/RPI Present (+1) I find evidence of a significant ordinal interaction between 
Reward Type (Cash vs. Tangible) and RPI (Contrast 5: t = 3.54, p < 0.01; two-tailed). 
Second, using the following contrast: Cash/RPI Absent (-2), Cash/RPI Present (+3), 
Points/RPI Absent (-2), and Points/RPI Present (+1) I find evidence of a significant 
ordinal interaction between Reward Type (Cash vs. Points) and RPI (Contrast 6: t = 2.39, 
p = 0.02; two-tailed). Thus, results support the observation in Figure 3 that providing RPI 
to those pursuing cash improved performance more than it did for those pursuing either 
tangible or points rewards.76 In fact, those in the cash/RPI present condition outperformed 
all others conditions (not tabulated; t > 1.65, p < 0.10; two-tailed). 
5.10 Conclusion 
This chapter provides results for my six hypotheses and three research questions. 
Hypotheses 1 to 4 and research questions 1 and 2 consider the effects of Reward Type 
and RPI on Budget Slack. Consistent with hypothesis 2 and in answer to research 
question 1, I find that redeemable points lead to lower Budget Slack than either tangible 
rewards or cash rewards, respectively. Consistent with hypothesis 3, I find that the 
absence of RPI leads to lower Budget Slack than the presence of RPI.  Also, I find 
support for hypothesis 4 in that the presence of RPI leads to a greater increase in slack for 
                                                     
76 Figure 3 also suggests that RPI improved performance more for those in the points condition than it did 
for those in the tangible condition. To assess this, I conduct the following contrast: Points/RPI Absent (-2), 
Points/RPI Present (+3), Tangible/RPI Absent (-2), and Tangible/RPI Present (+1). I find evidence of a 
significant ordinal interaction between Reward Type (Points vs. Tangible) and RPI (Panel B of Table 11: t 
= 3.16, p < 0.01; two-tailed). 
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those pursuing tangible rewards than for those pursuing either cash or points rewards. In 
answering research question 2, I find that the presence of RPI leads to a greater increase 
in slack for those pursuing cash rewards than for those pursuing points rewards. 
However, contrary to hypothesis 1, I do not find that those pursuing tangible rewards 
create more Budget Slack than those pursuing cash. 
Hypotheses 5 and 6, research question 3, and the supplemental analysis consider 
the effects of Reward Type and RPI on Performance. In terms of its direct effect on 
Performance, and in support of hypothesis 6, the presence of RPI leads to greater 
Performance than the absence of RPI. Further, supplemental analysis suggests that RPI 
leads to greater improvement in performance for those pursuing cash than for those 
pursuing either tangible or points rewards. In fact, those pursuing cash and provided RPI 
outperformed participants in all other conditions. However, contrary to hypothesis 5, I do 
not find that Reward Type and RPI have an indirect effect on Performance via Budget 
Slack. Further, in response to research question 3, I do not find Reward Type has any 
direct effects on Performance.  
Figure 4 provides a summary of the results as they relate to hypotheses and 
research questions. The next chapter discusses the implication these results may have on 
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Figure 4: Summary of Results1 
 
H1 (DV: Budget Slack): Cash Rewards < Tangible Rewards (main effect) – Not 
supported 
 
H2 (DV: Budget Slack): Tangible Rewards > Point Rewards (main effect) – Supported 
 
RQ1 (DV: Budget Slack): Cash Rewards vs. Point Rewards (main effect) – Cash leads to 
greater slack 
 
H3 (DV: Budget Slack):  Presence of RPI > Absence of RPI (main effect) – Supported 
 
H4a (DV: Budget Slack): Increase in slack with the Presence of RPI for Tangible > Cash 
(interaction) – Supported 
 
H4b (DV: Budget Slack): Increase in slack with Presence of RPI for Tangible > Points 
(interaction) – Supported 
 
RQ2 (DV: Budget Slack): Increase in slack with Presence of RPI for Cash vs. Points 
(interaction) – Cash leads to a greater increase in slack 
 
H5 (Mediation): Budget Slack mediates the Effects of Reward Type and RPI on 
Performance (mediation) – Not supported 
 
RQ3 (DV: Performance): Marginal evidence that cash rewards lead to greater 
performance than tangible rewards 
 
H6 (DV: Performance): Presence of RPI > Absence of RPI (main effect) – Supported 
 
Supplemental (DV: Performance): RPI increases performance more for those 
pursuing cash than either tangible or points rewards; cash rewards and the 
presence of RPI leads to best performance.  
 
1 See Appendix F for variable definitions. 
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Chapter 6: Conclusion 
6.1 Introduction 
In Section 6.2 of this chapter, I discuss the results of hypotheses and research 
question testing. In Section 6.3, I discuss limitations of this study and I identify 
opportunities for future research. Finally, I conclude in Section 6.4. 
6.2 Discussion of Hypotheses Testing and Research Question Results 
This study considers the interactive effects of Reward Type (cash, tangible, or 
redeemable points) and RPI on Budget Slack and Performance. Regarding Budget Slack, 
I find that the provision of redeemable points leads to lower levels of Desire than cash or 
tangible rewards. Theory suggests that those higher in Desire are likely to maintain less 
salient personal norms for honesty.  Thus, individuals eligible for points-based rewards 
create less Budget Slack than those eligible for either cash or tangible rewards. I also find 
evidence that RPI affects budgeting behaviour by encouraging people to view budget 
slack as more acceptable (less unethical); it appears RPI provided participants with 
“social proof” that dishonest reporting is acceptable. So, participants who receive RPI 
create more Budget Slack than those who do not. Last, I find that the descriptive norms 
provided by RPI increases slack creation more for those pursuing reward types that allow 
people to rationalize their dishonest reporting. Specifically, the provision of RPI leads to 
a greater increase in slack for those pursuing tangible rewards than those pursuing cash, 
and for those pursuing cash than for those pursuing points.  
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I do not find that Reward Type or RPI have indirect effects on Performance via 
Budget Slack. It appears in my study that participants set personal goals, and it was those 
goals that motivated effort and performance. However, I do find that RPI has a significant 
direct effect on Performance as well as significant direct RPI x Reward Type interactive 
effects. Specifically, the provision of RPI motivates greater performance than the absence 
of RPI. Further, supplemental analysis suggests that RPI improves performance more for 
those pursuing cash than for those pursuing either tangible rewards or points rewards. In 
fact, those pursuing cash and receiving RPI outperform all other conditions. 
6.3 Limitations and Opportunities for Future Research 
Like all studies, mine is subject to limitations that provide opportunities for future 
research. My application of economic and psychology theory generalizes only to the 
extent that my experimental setting captures important elements of the budgeting process 
observed in practice. By necessity, some of my design choices abstracted from practice. 
First, participants unilaterally set their budgets without input or approval from 
‘superiors’, despite budget negotiation being common in practice (Anthony and 
Govindarajan 2006; Fisher et al. 2000, 2006) and despite preliminary evidence that 
superiors are able to detect and adjust for budget slack (Fisher et al. 2013). Future 
research could consider whether the presence of RPI impacts superiors’ detection of 
budget slack and their likelihood of adjusting employee budgets accordingly.  
Second, participants were rewarded using a slack-inducing, budget-linear 
incentive contract whereby they were paid a salary of $0. Although this contract was an 
intentional design choice and consistent with how Rankin et al. (2008) study honesty in 
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reporting, it encourages participants to create some slack if they wish to earn anything 
during the production rounds. Thus, the incentive contract may have inflated slack-levels, 
which diminishes the likelihood that slack reflects personal goals that could influence 
effort choices. Moreover, the piece-rate reward provided for performance in excess of the 
budget may have motivated individuals to exert high effort, regardless of the budget 
amount they selected. Future research could offer participants a salary or use an 
alternative incentive contract such as a ‘bang-bang’ contract to avoid issues that may 
have resulted from using an incentive contract that does not provide a salary. 
Third, I operationalized tangible rewards by using gift cards to four locations that 
undergraduate students chose as highly desired. Because participants were fully aware of 
the in-store cash value of each gift card, this operationalization biases against finding 
differences in behavior between those pursuing cash and those pursing tangible rewards. 
Moreover, gift cards may not capture the distinct, physical properties often associated 
with tangible rewards. Future research could operationalize tangible rewards by using 
attractive, physical goods, and create a menu of options for people to choose from as 
observed in practice (e.g., Presslee et al. 2013). Further, it may be that undergraduate 
students lack sufficient cash to cover their basic necessities, so they desire cash more than 
tangible rewards. Future research could re-examine differences in slack creation and 
performance for individuals with higher initial wealth and whether behaviour differs for 
those pursuing cash rewards and those pursuing tangible rewards. 
Fourth, to maintain face validity, I examine only points redeemable for tangible 
rewards rather than points redeemable for cash. However, it may be that points 
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redeemable for tangible rewards versus points redeemable for cash would yield different 
results. This argument could explain why I find that points redeemable for tangible 
rewards lead to less dishonesty relative to direct cash rewards, whereas Mazar et al. 
(2008) finds that points redeemable for cash rewards lead to more dishonesty relative to 
direct cash rewards. Future research could consider whether reward type moderates the 
effects of redeemable points on honesty in reporting. 
Fifth, participants provided with RPI only viewed the budget variance of others 
rather than more detailed information such as others’ budgets and/or their actual 
performance. Future research could consider more precise types of RPI (e.g., both budget 
difficulty and performance) might influence slack creation and performance.  
Last, two results are inconsistent with expectations based on prior research: 1) 
Budget Slack does not influence Performance, and 2) Desire, consisting of reward 
Attractiveness and Affect, is not positively correlated with Performance. Future research 
could examine the circumstances when Budget Slack is more or less likely to have 
negative effects on Performance. For instance, it may be that the positive effect of self-
set budget difficulty on Performance depends on the presence of some environmental 
uncertainty; otherwise, budgets that contain slack are unlikely to reflect personal goals, 
which are the true motivator of effort. In terms of examining the link between the 
attractiveness of various financial rewards and Performance, future research could use a 
more common and complete measure of goal commitment (e.g., Klein et al.’s (2001) a 
five-item measure). It may be that the measure of Attractiveness used in this study was 
insufficient to reflect any associated Performance effects. 
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6.4 Conclusion 
I believe my study makes a valuable contribution to the incentive contracting and 
management control literatures. First, the use of performance based tangible rewards, 
whether distributed directly or indirectly (via points programs), is prevalent in 
organizations (Incentive Federation 2007; Peltier et al. 2005). My findings highlight the 
importance of reward type on employees’ perceptions of the applicable social norms such 
as honesty when it comes to budgeting. Specifically, my findings caution employers 
against rewarding employees directly with budget-based financial rewards (tangible or 
cash) when employees are also permitted extensive participation in the budgeting 
process. If an organization chooses to use tangible rewards in lieu of cash, they may be 
well-advised to provide them using a redeemable points program given that points 
rewards led to the least amount of budget slack in my setting.  
Second, RPI is regularly provided by organizations to improve employee 
coordination and to motivate effort (Mas and Moretti 2009; Nordstrom et al. 1990). My 
study offers evidence that RPI can have negative effects on planning by providing 
employees with a descriptive norm that budget slack is acceptable. However, RPI has a 
positive effect in terms of prompting performance. To the extent that slack has negative 
consequences for organizations (i.e., misallocation of resources, shirking, etc.), 
organizations should weigh these consequences against the performance benefits of 
providing RPI to employees. 
Last, my study is the first that I am aware of to show how the personal norms 
made salient by various types of budget-based rewards can interact with the descriptive 
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norms expressed through the provision of RPI. In fact, reward type and RPI interact to 
affect both budget slack creation and performance. Given that the provision of RPI is 
common organizations may be well-advised to offer budget-based points rewards if 
budget slack is of great concern. However, in most organizations, it seems reasonable to 
assert that performance concerns are greater than budget slack concerns. Therefore, this 
study provides evidence that organization may want to offer budget-based cash rewards 
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Appendix B: Experimental Procedures 
Each participant in this study participated in the following procedures: 
 
1. Participants arrived at the designated on-campus computer lab. 
2. Participants were assigned a computer terminal by the experiment facilitator. 
3. Participants read and electronically agreed with the information letter required by 
the university’s human research ethics policies. 
4. Participants were each assigned a unique user name and password by the 
experiment facilitator. 
5. Participants were informed of the session rules regarding talking, deception, and 
anonymity by the experiment facilitator. 
6. Participants logged onto the concession task. 
7. Participants read information about how to complete orders using the concession 
task.  
8. Participants completed three practice rounds of the task with each round lasting 
two minutes. After each practice round, the program informed participants of the 
number of orders they completed and their earnings.  
9. The computer program randomly assigned participants to one of six conditions. 
10. Participants were provided information about budgeting prior to starting the three 
additional rounds. They were also provided information about their budget-based 
incentives and information specific to their experimental condition. 
11. Participants were asked a series of multiple choice and short answer questions 
about their understanding of the experimental task and their treatment condition. 
12. Participants completed three actual rounds. Prior to each round, they self-set their 
own performance budget. After each round, they were provided feedback about 
budget variance and performance based on their experiment condition. 
13. At the end of the third additional period, participants were asked a series of 
process measures and demographic information. 
14. The program randomly selected one actual round to pay a participant from and 
informed him of his total earnings. 









  96 
Appendix C: Gift Card Locations1 
 
 
The Second Cup Ltd is a specialty coffee café that serves a variety 
of products from simple whole bean coffee to more than 30 





Canada’s largest bookstore, Chapters/Indigo carries a 
wide variety of books, magazines, toys, and games for 





Marble Slab Creamery offers premium ice cream that is made 
fresh daily in each store, with no additives or preservatives. In 
addition to ice cream treats, they also offer delicious milkshakes 







Cineplex Odeon provides Canada’s leading movie theater 
experience. Gift cards to Cineplex can be used to purchase 









1 These 4 locations were selected based on a survey of 64 undergraduate students. The survey measured 
students’ hedonic responses to the possibility of receiving a $10 gift card to a variety of different locations. 
The top three locations were Second Cup, Chapters, and Cineplex. Further, students were asked an open-
ended question about whether there were locations that were not identified but that they would be excited to 
receive a $10 gift card from. A number of students identified Marble Slab as one such location.   
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Appendix D: Task and Rewards Understanding Questions 
Task Understanding Questions 
1) I will complete 3 production rounds of the concession task.  
  a) Yes 
b) No   
[Correct answer: a) Yes] 
 
2) Prior to each round, I will be asked to accurately target the maximum number of orders 
I think I can complete in that round.  
  a) Yes 
b) No 
[Correct answer: a) Yes] 
 
3) I will be paid a reward based on my performance relative to my self-set performance 
target from one randomly selected round.  
  a) Yes 
b) No   
[Correct answer: a) Yes] 
 
4) The length of each production round will be.   
  a) 1 minute 
b) 2 minutes  
  c) 3 minutes  
  d) 5 minutes 
[Correct answer: b) 2 minutes] 
 
5) Concession orders will always contain 3 items. 
a) Yes 
b) No 
[Correct answer: a) Yes] 
 
[RPI Condition Only] 
6) I am assigned to work in a group with 2 other people in this room. 
  a) Yes 
  b) No 
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Appendix D (Continued) 
 
[RPI Condition Only] 
7) Similar to me, the other 2 members of my group will set an individual target each 
round and will be paid a reward based on their individual performance relative to their 
self-set performance target from one randomly selected round. 
  a) Yes 
  b) No 
[Correct answer: a) Yes] 
 
[RPI Condition Only] 
8) The other 2 members of my group will be asked to fill the same 3-item orders in same 
sequence as me. 
  a) Yes 
  b) No 
[Correct answer: a) Yes] 
 
Reward Understanding Questions 
 
[Conditions 1 and 3: Cash] 




[Correct answer: a) Yes] 
 
[Conditions 2 and 5: Tangible] 




[Correct answer: a) Yes] 
 
[Conditions 3 and 6: Points] 
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Appendix D (Continued) 
 
[Condition 3 and 6: Points] 
2) At what rate are points redeemable for a balance on a gift card? 
a) 1 point = $0.50 added to the gift card balance 
b) 1 point = $1 added to the gift card balance 
c) 1 point = $1.50 added to the gift card balance 
d) 1 point = $2 added to the gift card balance 
[Correct answer: b) 1 point = $1 added to the gift card balance] 
 
[Conditions 4: Cash/RPI] 
3a) At the end of each round, all members of my group (including myself) will receive 
information about the cash rewards earned by everyone else in the group.   
a) Yes 
b) No 
[Correct answer: a) Yes] 
 
[Conditions 5: Tangible/RPI] 
3b) At the end of each round, all members of my group (including myself) will receive 
information about the card rewards earned by everyone else in the group.   
a) Yes 
b) No 
[Correct answer: a) Yes] 
 
[Conditions 6: Points/RPI] 
3c) At the end of each round, all members of my group (including myself) will receive 
information about the points rewards earned by everyone else in the group.   
a) Yes 
b) No 
[Correct answer: a) Yes] 
 
[After each answer, if the answer is correct, show the following message: 
“CORRECT!” 
If the answer is incorrect, show the following message: 
“INCORRECT”. Highlight the correct answer with “The answer is __”. Participants must 
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Appendix E: Post-Experiment Questionnaire 
Questions about the Task 
 
Please rate your degree of agreement with the following statements: 
 
1) I like the reward I could earn because I will spend it on things that I want rather than 
on necessities. [want] 
 
         
 1 2 3 4 5 6 7  
      Strongly                        Neither                       Strongly 
       Disagree   Agree or Disagree         Agree 
2) I consider the reward I could earn to be attractive. [attractive] 
 
         
 1 2 3 4 5 6 7  
      Strongly                        Neither                       Strongly 
       Disagree   Agree or Disagree         Agree 
3) I consider the reward I could earn to be separate from my other sources of cash. 
[separate] 
 
         
 1 2 3 4 5 6 7  
      Strongly                        Neither                       Strongly 
       Disagree   Agree or Disagree         Agree 
4) Thinking about the reward I could earn makes me feel happy [affect] 
 
         
 1 2 3 4 5 6 7  
      Strongly                        Neither                       Strongly 
       Disagree   Agree or Disagree         Agree 
5) Most people who care about me would approve of the targets I set in this task. 
[injunctive] 
 
         
 1 2 3 4 5 6 7  
      Strongly                        Neither                       Strongly 
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Appendix E (Continued) 
 
6) I consider the reward I could earn to be a gift or an act of kindness. [gift] 
 
         
 1 2 3 4 5 6 7  
      Strongly                        Neither                       Strongly 
        Disagree   Agree or Disagree         Agree 
7) It was important that I returned the generosity I received with regards to my 
potential rewards by accurately setting my performance target. [reciprocity] 
 
         
 1 2 3 4 5 6 7  
      Strongly                        Neither                       Strongly 
       Disagree   Agree or Disagree         Agree 
[Conditions 3 and 6: Points Condition]  
8) When setting my budget, I thought of 1 point as being worth much less than $1. 
[value] 
 
         
 1 2 3 4 5 6 7  
      Strongly                        Neither                       Strongly 
       Disagree   Agree or Disagree         Agree 
 [Conditions 2, 3, 5, and 6: Tangible and Points Condition] 
9) If I had a choice, I would rather receive cash as my reward for performance above 
my self-set performance target. [rather] 
 
         
 1 2 3 4 5 6 7  
      Strongly                        Neither                       Strongly 
       Disagree   Agree or Disagree         Agree 
[Conditions 4, 5, and 6: RPI condition only] 
10) I care about the overall impression the other two members of my group have of me. 
[care] 
 
         
 1 2 3 4 5 6 7  
      Strongly                        Neither                       Strongly 
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Appendix E (Continued) 
 
[Conditions 4, 5, and 6: RPI condition only] 
11) It is more likely that the other two members of my group earned their rewards by 
understating their target rather than by working hard. [understate] 
 
         
 1 2 3 4 5 6 7  
      Strongly                        Neither                       Strongly 
       Disagree   Agree or Disagree         Agree 
 12) In this task, it is unethical for someone to set a target significantly below his or her 
known performance capability. [unethical] 
         
 1 2 3 4 5 6 7  
      Strongly                        Neither                       Strongly 
       Disagree   Agree or Disagree         Agree 
 
Questions about the Task Continued 
 
Please answer the following additional questions: 
 
1) How justifiable is it for other participants in this task to set their targets below their 
maximum capabilities to earn additional rewards? [justifiable] 
 
         
     Completely                    Neutral                      Completely 
     Unjustified                                                         Justified 
2) Is setting your performance target in this task more of an ethical decision or a 
financial decision? [frame] 
 
         
        Ethical                    Equally Ethical                 Financial 
      Decision                      and Financial                  Decision 
 
3) If you had a $10 gift card to your choice of 1 of 4 locations (Second Cup, Marble Slab, 
Cineplex Odeon, or Chapters), what is the least amount of cash you would be willing to 
accept in exchange for your gift card?     $ ____________. 
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Appendix E (Continued) 
 
Questions about you 
 
Please rate your degree of agreement with the following statements regarding how you 
generally make decisions: 
 
1) I often consult other people to help choose the best alternative when making a decision. 
[influence1] 
         
 1 2 3 4 5 6 7  
      Strongly                        Neither                       Strongly 
       Disagree   Agree or Disagree         Agree 
2) It is important that others like the decisions I make. [influence2] 
         
 1 2 3 4 5 6 7  
      Strongly                        Neither                       Strongly 
       Disagree   Agree or Disagree         Agree 
3) When making a decision, I generally choose the alternative that I think will be approved 
of by others. [influence3] 
         
 1 2 3 4 5 6 7  
      Strongly                        Neither                       Strongly 
       Disagree   Agree or Disagree         Agree 
 4) I feel a sense of belonging whenever I am with my classmates. [belong] 
         
 1 2 3 4 5 6 7  
      Strongly                        Neither                       Strongly 
       Disagree   Agree or Disagree         Agree 
 5) As a whole, I like my other classmates in this room. [like] 
         
 1 2 3 4 5 6 7  
      Strongly                        Neither                       Strongly 
       Disagree   Agree or Disagree         Agree 
6) It’s okay to steal to take care of your family’s needs [disengage1] 
         
 1 2 3 4 5 6 7  
      Strongly                        Neither                       Strongly 
       Disagree   Agree or Disagree         Agree 
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7) Stealing some money is not too serious compared to stealing a lot of money [disengage2] 
         
 1 2 3 4 5 6 7  
      Strongly                        Neither                       Strongly 
       Disagree   Agree or Disagree         Agree 
8) Compared to other illegal things people do, taking some things from a store without 
paying for them is not very serious. [disengage3] 
         
 1 2 3 4 5 6 7  
      Strongly                        Neither                       Strongly 
       Disagree   Agree or Disagree         Agree 
9) I regularly think about the ethical implications of my decisions [attentive] 
         
 1 2 3 4 5 6 7  
      Strongly                        Neither                       Strongly 
       Disagree   Agree or Disagree         Agree 
10) It is important to me that I am honest in everything I say and do [identity] 
         
 1 2 3 4 5 6 7  
      Strongly                        Neither                       Strongly 
       Disagree   Agree or Disagree         Agree 
 
Finally, we ask for your opinion on a particular social issue, and we ask you to respond 
to two demographic questions. Your responses are confidential and anonymous. 
However, you may decline to answer these questions by leaving them blank: 
 
1) Is it a more serious crime to steal a gift card worth $10 to your choice of 1 of 4 locations 
(Second Cup, Marble Slab, Cineplex Odeon, or Chapters) or to steal $10 cash? [steal] 
 
          
          $10                           Equally                           $10  
       Gift Card                     Serious                       Cash 
 
2) What is your gender?  Female [0]  Male [1] [Gender] 
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Ability – Performance in the 3rd Practice round (i.e., prior to treatment of reward type or 
RPI).  
 
Average Budget Slack (i.e., Average Last 2 Slack) – Average budget slack for actual 
rounds 2 and 3. 
 
Average Performance (i.e., Average Last 2 Performance) – Average performance for 
actual rounds 2 and 3. 
 
Budget Slack – The difference between a participant’s ability and his self-set budget.  
 
Desire – The average response to 3 measures: Want, Affect, and Attractive. See appendix 
E for definitions. 
 
Performance – The number of orders accurately completed during a 2-minute 
production round. 
 
Reward Type – Rewards are provided for performance above budget. The three types of 
rewards are: Cash (coded as 0), Tangible (coded as 1), and Points redeemable for tangible 
rewards (coded as 2). Tangible rewards are gift cards from one of four places: Second 
Cup, Chapters, Marble Slab, and Cineplex Odeon (see Appendix C for descriptions). 
Points are redeemable for 1 point = $1 on a gift card. Importantly, the value of rewards is 
equivalent in all three conditions.  
  
RPI [Relative Performance Information] – The two RPI conditions are RPI absent 
(coded as 0) and RPI present (coded as 1). When RPI is absent, participants only view 
their own budget variance (i.e., performance minus budget) at the end of each round. 
When RPI is present, they also view the budget variance of two other co-workers after 
each round. 
 
Round – From rounds 2 and 3.  
 
Unethical – Represents level of agreement on a 7-point likert scale to the statement: “In 
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Appendix G: Experiment Instrument (Programming Instructions) 
[Condition 1: Cash/No RPI  
Condition 2: Tangible/No RPI 
Condition 3: Points/No RPI 
Condition 4: Cash/RPI  
Condition 5: Tangible/RPI 
Condition 6: Points/RPI 
 
Screen A [FOR ADMINISTRATOR]  
 
Enter Session Number [session]:  






























List User Names and Passwords 
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Screen 0 [Same for all conditions] 
 
Participation in this Study 
 
You are invited to participate in a research study conducted by Adam Presslee from the 
School of Accounting and Finance at the University of Waterloo. This study will form 
part of Adam Presslee’s PhD dissertation and is conducted under the supervision of 
Professor Alan Webb.  Your participation is critical in learning more about people’s 
performance on a work task when they earn a reward based on their performance relative 
to a performance target. 
Participation in this study is voluntary. You may withdraw your participation at any time 
during the study and you may decline to answer any question asked.  There are no known 
or anticipated risks from participating in this study. If you decide to participate, you will 
complete a series concession orders through a computerized task. You will also be asked 
a few questions about your thoughts about the task and general demographic information, 
such as age and gender. You will receive remuneration based on your performance in the 
task, paid out in 3-5 days of completion, with the value of your remuneration ranging 
between $5 and $30. Please note that any amount that you receive from participating in 
this study is taxable and it is your responsibility to report the amount received for income 
tax purposes. Your participation will take approximately 30 minutes. 
 
To ensure confidentiality and the anonymity of your responses, you have been assigned a 
unique user name and password. The data obtained from this study will be summarized 
and no individual will be identifiable from the summarized results. Furthermore, the web 
site used in this study is programmed to collect responses alone, and will not collect any 
information that could potentially identify you or personally match you with your 
responses. The data, with no personal identifiers, collected from this study will be 
maintained on a password- 
 
protected computer database in a restricted access area of the university. As well, the data 
will be electronically archived after completion of the study and maintained indefinitely. 
 
I assure you that this study has been reviewed and received ethics clearance through the 
Office of Research Ethics at the University of Waterloo. However, the final decision to 
participate is yours. If you have any comments or concerns resulting from your 
participation in this study, please feel free to contact Dr. Maureen Nummelin, Director, 
Office of Research Ethics, at 1-519-888-4567 ext. 36005 or by email at 
maureen.nummelin@uwaterloo.ca. Should you have any questions about the study or if 
you would like to receive a copy of the results of this study, please contact Adam 
Presslee (capressl@uwaterloo.ca) or Professor Alan Webb (a2webb@uwaterloo.ca). 
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Consent to Participate 
 
With full knowledge of the previous information and of my own free will:  
 
[insert check box or radio button] "I agree to participate." 
 
[insert check box or radio button] "I do not wish to participate (please close your web 
browser now)." 
 




1.  NO TALKING WITHIN OR BETWEEN SESSIONS 
Help us maintain control over the study by refraining from comments or other 
communication with your fellow participants in this session, or with other students who 
might participate in future sessions.  There is no need to communicate with other 
participants during this study. If you have any questions, just raise your hand and we will 
assist you. 
 
2.  NO DECEPTION ON OUR PART 
We promise to carry out the study in the manner described in these instructions, with no 
deception.  We will pay you any remuneration you earn from this study within 3-5 days 
(to allow for collection of your remuneration), in the exact way as described in the study.  
 
3. CONFIDENTIALITY AND ANNONYMITY 
We assure you that any information obtained in connection with this study will be kept 
confidential. Further, your participation and all of your responses will be completely 
anonymous.  
 
In this study, please proceed through instructions and each screen sequentially. Once you 
have finished a paragraph or screen, continue to the next paragraph or screen by clicking 
Next. Do not go back to previous screens unless there is a Previous button on screen that 
allows you to do so. 
 
To begin, log in with your assigned user name and password.  
 
User name:  
Password:  
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This task requires you to correctly fill orders at a virtual concession stand over several 
rounds. In each round, you will be given a series of orders with each order containing 3 
food items. 
 
Potential food items are popcorn, candy, drink, and ice cream. Each food item can 
range in size between small, medium, and large.  
 
For example, an order could be: Small candy, Large popcorn, Medium drink.  An 
example of how this order will appear on 
screen is provided on the screen below: 
 
To select an item, move your concession 
clerk (wearing the white hat) in front of 
the appropriate item using the <- and -> 
arrows on your keypad.  
 
Once in front of an item, type the letter 
‘s’ (for small), ‘m’ (for medium) or ‘l’ 
(for large) to add the item to your tray. 
Once an item has been added, your clerk 
will automatically return to the middle of 
the counter. 
 
If your filled order is incorrect, you may 
try again. If your filled order is correct, 
you will be given a new 3-item order.  
 
Each round will last 2 minutes, and a progress bar will show you how much time is 
remaining in your round. Further, a counter will show you in real-time the number of 
correct orders you have filled during the round. 
 
IMPORTANT: 






12/ 02/ 12 4:20 PMStudy





Pract ice Round 1
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To familiarize you with filling orders, you will now complete 3 practice rounds.  
 
In these practice rounds, you will earn $0.05 for each order you correctly fill.  
 
Each practice round will last 2 minutes. 
 





Screen 4  [Same for all conditions] 
 
First Practice Round 
 
INSERT CONCESSION STAND TASK (e.g., in Appendix A) 
 
[If an order is incorrect, show the following pop-up message. The number of correct 


















The order is incorrect. 
You have X attempts remaining 
before your orders for this round 
is reset. 
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Screen 5 [Same for all conditions] 
 
End of Your First Practice Round  
 
You completed XX orders during this 2 minute practice round. 
 
As a result, you earned $YY. 
 
[XX is the total number of correct orders completed; YY = $0.05*XX] 
 




Screen 6 [Same for all conditions] 
 
Second Practice Round 
 
[Insert the same detail as screen 4] 
 
Screen 7 [Same for all conditions] 
 
End of Your Second Practice Round 
 
You completed XX orders during this 2 minute practice round. 
 
As a result, you earned $YY. 
 
[XX is the total number of correct orders completed; YY = $0.05*XX]  
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Screen 8 [Same for all conditions] 
 
Third Practice Round 
 
[Insert the same detail as screen 4] 
 
Screen 9 [Same for all conditions] 
 
End of Your Third Practice Round 
 
You completed XX orders during this 2 minute practice round. 
 
As a result, you earned $YY. 
 
[XX is the total number of correct orders completed; YY = $0.05*XX] 
  




Screen 10 [Same for all conditions] 
 
Practice Rounds Complete 
 
The following table shows the number of 3-item orders you completed in each 2 minute 
practice round you completed: 
 
 Practice Round 1  XX order(s)  
 Practice Round 2  XX order(s)  
 Practice Round 3  XX order(s)  
 
In total, you earned $BB from your practice round performance. 
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[Conditions 1, 2, and 3: No RPI] 
 
Now that you are familiar with how to fill orders, you are ready to proceed. 
 
You will now complete 3 rounds of the concession task, with each round lasting 2 
minutes.  
 
Prior to each round, you will be asked to set a performance target equal to the 
maximum number of orders you think you can complete in that round 2 minute round.  
 
Each round, you also have an opportunity to earn a reward based on your performance 
relative to your self-set performance target (calculation of reward will be described 
shortly).  
 
At the end of each round, you will be informed of your performance relative to your 
self-set performance target (i.e., number of orders above (below) target) and the 
amount of reward that you earned as a result.  
 
Once all rounds are completed, you will be paid your practice round earnings plus the 
reward that you earned in one randomly selected round. 
 
IMPORTANT:  
Similar to your practice rounds, rounds will last 2 minutes and orders will always contain 
3 items ranging in size from Small, to Medium, to Large.  
 





[Conditions 4, 5, and 6: RPI] 
 
Now that you are familiar with how to fill orders, you are ready to proceed. 
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Over the next 3 rounds, you will work in a group with 2 other people in this room. 
These two other people are userXXX and userXXX [insert the user names of the two 
other members of the group].  
 
Prior to each round, you will be asked to set a performance target equal to the 
maximum number of orders you think you can complete in that round 2 minute round. 
Similarly, userXXX and userXXX will set their individual performance target each 
round. 
 
Each round, you also have an opportunity to earn a reward based on your performance 
relative to your self-set performance target (calculation of reward will be described 
shortly). Similarly, each round, userXXX and userXXX have an opportunity to earn a 
reward for their individual performance relative to their individual performance target.  
 
At the end of each round, all members of your group will be informed of all other 
member’s performance relative to their individual self-set performance target (i.e., 
number of orders above (below) target) and the amount of rewards earned by all other 
member’s as a result of their performance.  
 
Once all rounds are completed, all members of your group will be paid their individual 




Similar to your practice rounds, rounds will last 2 minutes and orders will always contain 
3 items ranging in size from Small, to Medium, to Large. Also, all members of your 
group will be asked to fill the same 3-item customer orders, in the same sequence, as you. 
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Screen 12 [Same across conditions] 
 
Setting Quiz 
1) I will complete 3 production rounds of the concession task:  
  a) Yes 
b) No   
[Correct answer: a) Yes] 
 
2) Prior to each round, I will be asked to accurately target the maximum number of orders 
I think I can complete in that round:  
  a) Yes 
b) No 
[Correct answer: a) Yes] 
 
3) I will be paid a reward based on my performance relative to my self-set performance 
target from one randomly selected round.  
  a) Yes 
b) No   
[Correct answer: a) Yes] 
 
4) The length of each production round will be:   
  a) 1 minute 
b) 2 minutes  
  c) 3 minutes  
  d) 5 minutes 
[Correct answer: b) 2 minutes] 
 
5) Concession orders will always contain 3 items: 
a) Yes 
b) No 
[Correct answer: a) Yes] 
 
[RPI Condition Only] 
6) I am assigned to work in a group with 2 other people in this room: 
  a) Yes 
  b) No 
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[RPI Condition Only] 
7) Similar to me, the other 2 members of my group will set an individual target each 
round and will be paid a reward based on their individual performance relative to their 
self-set performance target from one randomly selected round: 
  a) Yes 
  b) No 
[Correct answer: a) Yes] 
 
[RPI Condition Only] 
8) The other 2 members of my group will be asked to fill the same 3-item orders in same 
sequence as me: 
  a) Yes 
  b) No 
[Correct answer: a) Yes] 
 
[After each answer, if the answer is correct, show the following message: 
“CORRECT!” 
 
If the answer is incorrect, show the following message: 
“INCORRECT” and highlight the correct answer with “The answer is __”. Have the 
participant answer the question again until they get it correct. Do not let them proceed to 
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[Condition 1: Cash/No RPI] 
 
As previously mentioned, you can earn a reward based on your actual performance 
relative to your self-set performance target.  
 
Specifically, you will earn a cash reward of $1 for each order you correctly complete 
above your self-set performance target.  
 
Performance to Target Reward Earned 
Performance Below or Equal to Target No cash 
Performance Above Target  $1 per order above  
 




 [Condition 2: Tangible/No RPI] 
 
As previously mentioned, you can earn a reward based on your actual performance 
relative to your self-set performance target.  
 
Specifically, you will earn a gift card reward to 1 of 4 locations (Second Cup, Chapters, 
Cineplex, or Marble Slab) of your choosing. Your card balance will contain an 
additional $1 for each order above your self-set performance target. 
 
Performance to Target Reward Earned 
Performance Below or Equal to Target No card  
Performance Above Target  Card with a balance of $1 
per order above 
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[Condition 3: Points/No RPI] 
 
As previously mentioned, you can earn a reward based on your actual performance 
relative to your self-set performance target.  
 
Specifically, you will earn points rewards, redeemable for a gift card to 1 of 4 locations 
(Second Cup, Chapters, Cineplex, and Marble Slab) of your choosing. You will earn 1 
point for each order completed above your self-set performance target. 
 
Performance to Target Reward Earned 
Performance Below or Equal to Target No points 
Performance Above Target  1 point per order above  
 
IMPORTANT: 
Points are redeemable for a gift card at a rate of 1 point = $1 added to the gift card 
balance. 
 





[Condition 4: Cash/RPI] 
 
As previously mentioned, you can earn a reward based on your actual performance 
relative to your self-set performance target.  
 
Specifically, you will earn a cash reward of $1 for each order you correctly complete 
above your self-set performance target.  
 
Performance to Target Reward Earned 
Performance Below or Equal to Target No cash 
Performance Above Target  $1 per order above  
 
IMPORTANT: 
The other two members of your group have the opportunity to earn a similar cash reward. 
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[Condition 5: Tangible/RPI] 
 
As previously mentioned, you can earn a reward based on your actual performance 
relative to your self-set performance target.  
 
Specifically, you will earn a gift card reward to 1 of 4 locations (Second Cup, Chapters, 
Cineplex, or Marble Slab) of your choosing. Your card balance will contain an 
additional $1 for each order above your self-set performance target. 
 
Performance to Target Reward Earned 
Performance Below or Equal to Target No card  
Performance Above Target   Card with a balance of $1 
per order above  
 
IMPORTANT: 
The other two members of your group will have a similar opportunity as you to earn a 
card reward. 
 




[Condition 6: Points/RPI] 
 
As previously mentioned, you can earn a reward based on your actual performance 
relative to your self-set performance target.  
 
Specifically, you will earn points reward, redeemable for a gift card to 1 of 4 locations 
(Second Cup, Chapters, Cineplex, and Marble Slab) of your choosing. You will earn 1 
point for each order completed above your self-set performance target. 
Appendix G (Continued) 
 
Performance to Target Reward Earned 
Performance Below or Equal to Target No points 
Performance Above Target  1 point per order above  
 
IMPORTANT: 
Points are redeemable for a gift card at a rate of 1 point = $1 added to the gift card 
balance. Also, the other two members of your group will have a similar opportunity as 
you to earn points redeemable for a gift card. 
Next 
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Screen 13b [Only Tangible and Points Conditions] 
 
Reward Details Continued 
 
[Conditions 2 and 5: Tangible Conditions] 
 
You can choose your card reward from 1 of the following 4 locations: 
 
INSERT CHOICES (see Appendix B) 
 




 [Conditions 3 and 6: Points Condition] 
 
Reward Details Continued 
 
At the end of the study, the points rewards you earn are redeemable for a gift card of 
your choice from 1 of the following 4 locations: 
 
INSERT CHOICES (see Appendix B) 
 
IMPORTANT:  
Points are redeemable for a gift card at a rate of 1 point = $1 added to the gift card 
balance. 
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[Condition 1: Cash/No RPI] 
 
Performance to Target Reward Earned 
Performance Below or Equal to Target No cash 
Performance Above Target  $1 per order above  
 
For example, if you target that you can complete 25 orders and you actually complete 20 
orders, you will fail to meet your target by 5 orders.  
 
As a result, you will not earn a cash reward for that round.   
 
An example of the information you will receive following a round where you missed 
your target by 5 orders is:  
 
 Round 1 
 
Performance to Target 
 
Reward Earned  
 
 
5 orders below 
 
No Cash   
 
[Please show amounts below target in red] 
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[Condition 2: Tangible/No RPI] 
 
Performance to Target Reward Earned 
Performance Below or Equal to Target No card  
Performance Above Target  Card with a balance of $1 per 
order above 
 
For example, if you target that you can complete 25 orders and you actually complete 20 
orders, you will fail to meet your target by 5 orders.  
 
As a result, you will not earn a card reward for that round.   
 
An example of the information you will receive following a round where you missed 
your target by 5 orders is:  
 
 Round 1 
 
Performance to Target 
 
Reward Earned  
 
 
5 orders below 
 
No Card Reward 
 
[Please show amounts below target in red] 
 





[Condition 3: Points/No RPI] 
 
Performance to Target Reward Earned 
Performance Below or Equal to Target No points 
Performance Above Target  1 point per order above  
 
For example, if you target that you can complete 25 orders and you actually complete 20 
orders, you will fail to meet your target by 5 orders.  
 
As a result, you will not earn any points reward for that round.   
 
Test Me! 
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An example of the information you will receive following a round where you missed 
your target by 5 orders is:  
 
 Round 1 
 
Performance to Target 
 
Reward Earned  
 
 
5 orders below 
 
No Points  
 
[Please show amounts below target in red] 
 




[Condition 4: Cash/RPI] 
 
Performance to Target Reward Earned 
Performance Below or Equal to Target No cash reward 
Performance Above Target  $1 per order above  
 
For example, if you target that you can complete 25 orders and you actually complete 20 
orders, you will fail to meet your target by 5 orders.  
 
As a result, you will not earn a cash reward for that round.   
 
An example of the information you will receive following a round where you missed 
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[Please show amounts below target in red] 
 




[Condition 5: Tangible/RPI] 
 
Performance to Target Reward Earned 
Performance Below or Equal to Target No card  
Performance Above Target  Card with a balance of $1 per 
order above  
 
For example, if you target that you can complete 25 orders and you actually complete 20 
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As a result, you will not earn a card reward for that round.   
 
An example of the information you will receive following a round where you missed 








































[Please show amounts below target in red] 
 




[Condition 6: Points/RPI] 
 
Performance to Target Reward Earned 
Performance Below or Equal to Target No points 
Performance Above Target  1 point per order above  
 
For example, if you target that you can complete 25 orders and you actually complete 20 
orders, you will fail to meet your target by 5 orders.  
Test Me! 
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As a result, you will not earn any points reward for that round.   
 
An example of the information you will receive following a round where you missed 










































[Please show amounts below target in red] 
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Screen 15 [Differences across conditions] 
 
Reward Quiz 
[Conditions 1 and 3: Cash] 




[Correct answer: a) Yes] 
 
[Conditions 2 and 5: Tangible] 
 




[Correct answer: a) Yes] 
 
[Conditions 3 and 6: Points] 




[Correct answer: a) Yes] 
 
[Condition 3 and 6: Points] 
2) At what rate are points redeemable for a balance on a gift card: 
a) 1 point = $0.50 added to the gift card balance 
b) 1 point = $1 added to the gift card balance 
c) 1 point = $1.50 added to the gift card balance 
d) 1 point = $2 added to the gift card balance 
[Correct answer: b) 1 point = $1 added to the gift card balance] 
 
[Conditions 4: Cash/RPI] 
3a) At the end of each round, all members of my group (including myself) will receive 
information about the cash rewards earned by everyone else in the group.   
a) Yes 
b) No 
[Correct answer: a) Yes] 
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[Conditions 5: Tangible/RPI] 
3b) At the end of each round, all members of my group (including myself) will receive 
information about the card rewards earned by everyone else in the group.   
a) Yes 
b) No 
[Correct answer: a) Yes] 
 
[Conditions 6: Points/RPI] 
3c) At the end of each round, all members of my group (including myself) will receive 
information about the points rewards earned by everyone else in the group.   
a) Yes 
b) No 
[Correct answer: a) Yes] 
 
[After each answer, if the answer is correct, show the following message: 
“CORRECT!” 
If the answer is incorrect, show the following message: 
“INCORRECT” and highlight the correct answer with “The answer is __”. Have the 
participant answer the question again until they get it correct. Do not let them proceed to 





Screen 16 [Differences across Reward Type]  
 
Reward Quiz Continued … 
 
[Conditions 1 and 4: Cash] 
Again, here are the details regarding how you earn a cash reward. 
 
Performance to Target Reward Earned 
Performance Below or Equal to Target No cash 
Performance Above Target  $1 per order above 
target 
 





Continue the test 
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Question: 
You targeted 20 orders and completed 22 orders. This means you completed 2 orders 
above target for that round. Your cash reward will be:            
 







        
 
[Conditions 2 and 5: Tangible] 
Again, here are the details regarding how you earn a card reward.  
 
Performance to Target Reward Earned 
Performance Below or Equal to Target No card  
Performance Above Target  Card with a balance of $1 per 
order above  
 
Before you proceed, you must get two questions correct:  
 
Question: 
You targeted 20 orders and completed 22 orders. This means you completed 2 orders 










[The two correctly answered questions must be one each of the following two types:  a) 
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[Conditions 3 and 6: Points] 
Again, here are the details regarding how you earn points reward: 
 
Performance to Target Reward Earned 
Performance Below or Equal to Target No points 
Performance Above Target  1 point per order above  
 
 
Before you proceed, you must get two questions correct:  
 
You targeted 20 orders and completed 22 orders. This means you completed 2 orders 









 [The two correctly answered questions must be one each of the following two types:  a) 
did not perform enough to earn a reward b) performed enough to earn a reward.] 
 
[Conditions 1 and 4: Cash] 
[record the number of attempts required to get 2 answers correct (attempt9)] 
 
a) Did not perform enough to earn a reward: 
 
1. You targeted 24 orders in a round and completed 20 orders. This means you 
completed 4 orders below target for that round. Your cash reward will be: [$0] 
2. You targeted 21 orders in a round and completed 19 orders. This means you 
completed 2 orders below target for that round. Your cash reward will be: [$0] 
3. You targeted 23 orders in a round and completed 18 orders. This means you 
completed 5 orders below target for that round. Your cash reward will be: [$0] 
 
If the answer is correct, show the following message: 
CORRECT! 
If the answer is incorrect, show the following message: 
INCORRECT. 
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[Condition 2 and 5: Tangible] 
a) Did not perform enough to earn a reward: 
1. You targeted 24 orders and completed 20 orders. This means you completed 4 
orders below target for that round. Your card reward will have a balance of: [0] 
2. You targeted 21 orders and completed 19 orders. This means you completed 2 
orders below target for that round. Your card reward will have a balance of: [0] 
3. You targeted 23 orders and completed 18 orders. This means you completed 5 
orders below target for that round. Your card reward will have a balance of: [0] 
 
If the answer is correct, show the following message: 
CORRECT! 
If the answer is incorrect, show the following message: 
INCORRECT. 
The answer is $0] 
 
[Condition 3 and 6: Points] 
a) Did not perform enough to earn a reward: 
1. You targeted 24 orders and completed 20 orders. This means you completed 4 
orders below target for that round. Your points reward will be: [0] 
2. You targeted 21 orders and completed 19 orders. This means you completed 2 
orders below target for that round. Your points reward will be: [0] 
3. You targeted 23 orders and completed 18 orders. This means you completed 5 
orders below target for that round. Your points reward will be: [0] 
 
If the answer is correct, show the following message: 
CORRECT! 
If the answer is incorrect, show the following message: 
INCORRECT. 
The answer is 0 point] 
 
[Condition 1 and 4: Cash] 
a) Performed enough to earn a reward: 
1. You targeted 15 orders in a round and completed 21 orders. This means you 
completed 6 orders above target for that round. Your cash reward will be: [$6] 
2. You targeted 20 orders in a round and completed 25 orders. This means you 
completed 5 orders above target for that round. Your cash reward will be:  [$5] 
3. You targeted 19 orders in a round and completed 24 orders. This means you 
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If the answer is correct, show the following message: 
CORRECT! 
If the answer is incorrect, show the following message: 
INCORRECT. 
The answer is $XX.] 
 
[Condition 2 and 5: Tangible] 
b) Perform enough to earn a reward: 
1. You targeted 15 orders and completed 21 orders. This means you completed 6 
orders above target for that round. Your card reward will have a balance of: [$6] 
2. You targeted 20 orders and completed 25 orders. This means you completed 5 
orders above target for that round. Your card reward will have a balance of: [$5] 
3. You targeted 19 orders and completed 24 orders. This means you completed 5 
orders above target for that round. Your card reward will have a balance of: [$5] 
 
If the answer is correct, show the following message: 
CORRECT! If the answer is incorrect, show the following message: 
INCORRECT. 
The answer is YY points.  
 
[Condition 3 and 6: Points] 
b) Perform enough to earn a reward: 
1. You targeted 15 orders and completed 21 orders. This means you completed 6 
orders above target for that round. Your points reward will be: [6 points]. 
2. You targeted 20 orders and completed 25 orders. This means you completed 5 
orders above target for that round. Your points reward will be: [5 points]. 
3. You targeted 19 orders and completed 24 orders. This means you completed 5 
orders above target for that round. Your points reward will be: [5 points]. 
 
If the answer is correct, show the following message: 
CORRECT! 
If the answer is incorrect, show the following message: 
INCORRECT. 
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Screen 17 [Only Tangible and Points Conditions] 
 
[Condition 2 and 5: Tangible Conditions] 
 
Card Location Selection 
 
Before you start, select the card location you will likely choose at the end of this study as 
your reward from the following 4 locations [Show all locations at once]: 
 
INSERT CHOICES (see Appendix B) 
 
1) I will likely choose my card from [record as giftcert]: 
a) Second Cup 
b) Chapters/Indigo   
c) Marble Slab 
d) Cineplex Odeon 
 
IMPORTANT: You may change the location you chose at the end of the study 
 
[Condition 3 and 6: Points Conditions] 
 
Card Location Selection 
 
Before you start, select the card location you will likely choose at the end of this study to 
redeem your points for from the following 4 locations [Show all locations at once]:  
 
INSERT CHOICES (see Appendix B) 
 
1) I will likely redeem my reward points for a gift card from [record as giftcert1]: 
a) Second Cup 
b) Chapters/Indigo   
c) Marble Slab 
d) Cineplex Odeon 
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Screen 18 [Different for Reward Type] 
 
[Conditions 1 and 4: Cash] 
 
Target for Round 1 [Round 2; Round 3] 
 
You are about to begin your first [second, third] production round. 
 
To help with planning and to determine your potential cash reward for the round, set a 
performance target of the maximum number of orders you think you will correctly 
complete this round: 
 
I target that I will correctly complete                     orders this round. 
 
 
[limit response > 0] 
 




[Conditions 2 and 5: Tangible] 
 
 
Target for Round 1 [Round 2; Round 3] 
 
You are about to begin your first [second, third] production round. 
 
To help with planning and to determine your potential ________ [insert giftcert1] card 
reward for the round, set a performance target of the maximum number of orders you 
think you will correctly complete this round: 
  
 I target that I will correctly complete orders this round. 
 
[limit response > 0] 
 





Begin the round 
Begin the round 
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[Conditions 3 and 6: Points] 
 
Target for Round 1 [Round 2; Round 3] 
 
You are about to begin your first [second, third] production round. 
 
To help with planning and to determine your potential points reward for the round, set a 
performance target of the maximum number of orders you think you will correctly 
complete this round: 
  
 I target that I will correctly complete orders this round. 
 
[limit response > 0] 
 









INSERT CONCESSION STAND TASK (e.g., Appendix A) 
 
 
Screen 19b [Only for RPI conditions] 
 
Waiting for Everyone in Your Group to Finish 
 
Please wait for the results to be tabulated …  
 
This page will automatically refresh 
 
[Once all information needed to determine all participants’ performance please 






Begin the round 
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Screen 20 [different based on condition] 
 
End of Round 1 [Round 2; Round 3] 
  
[Condition 1: Cash/No RPI] 
 
Your target was ZZ orders and you correctly completed XX orders. This means you 
completed VV [VV=XX-ZZ] orders above target this round [or if ZZ>XX than, “This 
means completed VV orders below target this round”].  
 
[if XX > ZZ] Your cash reward for this round is $VV  
 
[if ZZ > XX] You did not earn a cash reward for the round. 
  
[ZZ is bud#; XX is the total number of correct orders for the round; VV is the amount 
above (below) target] 
 






















 [Condition 2: Tangible/No RPI] 
 
Your target was ZZ orders and you correctly completed XX orders. This means you 
completed VV [VV=XX-ZZ] orders above target this round [or if ZZ>XX than, “This 
means completed VV orders below target this round”]. 
 
[if XX > ZZ] Your __________[insert giftcert] card reward for this round contains 
$AA. 
Continue 
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[if ZZ > XX] You did not earn a __________[insert giftcert] card reward this round. 
[ZZ is bud#; XX is the total number of correct orders for the round; VV is the amount 
above (below) target] 
  



















[For Reward Earned: if (VV>0, “____ [insert giftcert] card containing $VV”, “No ___ 




[Condition 3: Points/No RPI] 
 
Your target was ZZ orders and you correctly completed XX orders. This means you 
completed VV [VV=XX-ZZ] orders above target this round [or if ZZ>XX than, “This 
means completed VV orders below target this round”]. 
 
[if XX > ZZ] You earned VV points reward this round contains. 
 
[if ZZ > XX] You did not earn any points reward this round. 
  
[ZZ is bud#; XX is the total number of correct orders for the round; VV is the amount 
above (below) target] 
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[for Reward Earned: if (VV>0, “VV Points”, “No Points”); Please show amounts below 
target in red] 





[RPI CONDITION ONLY: Conditions 4, 5, and 6 
 
NOTE: Two questions are now asked after the 1ST  and 2ND round (NOT 3RD) to those in 
the RPI Condition (Conditions 4, 5, and 6). These questions are asked after the post-
round feedback chart is shown but still are on the same screen. Example: 
 
Use the feedback chart above to answer the following two statements (enter “–“ if below 
target): 
 
UserXXX completed _________ orders above (below) target 
 
User XXX completed _________ orders above (below) target 
 
If they get it correct, they continue to the next round; If incorrect please show the follow 
“INCORRECT. Please use the feedback chart above to respond correctly”] 
 
[Condition 4: Cash/RPI] 
 
Your target was ZZ orders and you correctly completed XX orders. This means you 
completed VV [VV=XX-ZZ] orders above target this round [or if ZZ>XX than, “This 
means completed VV orders below target this round”].  
 
[if XX > ZZ] Your cash reward for this round is $VV  
 
[if ZZ > XX] You did not earn a cash reward for the round. 
  
[ZZ is bud#; XX is the total number of correct orders for the round; VV is the amount 
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Below is a summary of the performance to target and the cash rewards earned by all 







































   
 
[for reward earned: if (VV>0, “$VV”, “No Cash”); Please show amounts below target in 
red]  
 
Use the feedback chart above to answer the following two statements (enter “–“ if below 
target): 
 
UserXXX completed _________ orders above (below) target 
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[Condition 5: Tangible/RPI] 
 
Your target was ZZ orders and you correctly completed XX orders. This means you 
completed VV [VV=XX-ZZ] orders above target this round [or if ZZ>XX than, “This 
means completed VV orders below target this round”]. 
 
[if XX > ZZ] Your __________[insert giftcert] card reward for this round contains 
$AA. 
 
[if ZZ > XX] You did not earn a __________[insert giftcert] card reward this round. 
  
[ZZ is bud#; XX is the total number of correct orders for the round (record as “perf1); 
VV is the amount above (below) target and is recorded as “reward1”] 
 
Below is a summary of the performance to target and the card rewards earned by all 
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[for reward earned: if (VV>0, “____ [insert giftcert] card containing $VV”, “No ___ 
[insert giftcert] Card”); Please show amounts below target in red] 
 
Use the feedback chart above to answer the following two statements (enter “–“ if below 
target): 
 
UserXXX completed _________ orders above (below) target 
 






[Condition 6: Points/RPI] 
 
Your target was ZZ orders and you correctly completed XX orders. This means you 
completed VV [VV=XX-ZZ] orders above target this round [or if ZZ>XX than, “This 
means completed VV orders below target this round”]. 
 
[if XX > ZZ] You earned VV points reward this round contains. 
 
[if ZZ > XX] You did not earn any points reward this round. 
  
[ZZ is bud#; XX is the total number of correct orders for the round (record as “perf1); 
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Below is a summary of the performance to target and the points rewards earned by all 






























   






   
 
[for reward earned: if (VV>0, “VV Points”, “No Points”); Please show amounts below 
target in red] 
 
Use the feedback chart above to answer the following two statements (enter “–“ if below 
target): 
 
UserXXX completed _________ orders above (below) target 
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[Repeat Screens 18-20 for Round 2 and for Round 3. The table that tracks performance 
should retain the information from prior rounds. At the end of round 3, proceed to Screen 
21 after participants click the continue button.] 
 
Screen 21 (same across all conditions) 
 
End of Production 
 
You have completed all production rounds.  
 





Screen 22 [Different across conditions] 
 
Questions about the Task 
[Conditions 1 and 4: Cash] 
You had the opportunity to earn a cash reward for performing above your self-set 
performance target. 
 
[Conditions 2 and 5: Tangible] 
You had the opportunity to earn a _______[giftcert] card reward for performing above 
your self-set performance target. 
 
[Conditions 3 and 6: Points] 
You had the opportunity to earn points reward, redeemable for a gift card, for 




Please rate your degree of agreement with the following statements: 
 
1) I like the reward I could earn because I will spend it on things 
that I want rather than necessities. [want] 
 
         
 1 2 3 4 5 6 7  
      Strongly                        Neither                       Strongly 
       Disagree   Agree or Disagree         Agree 
Continue  
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2) I consider the reward I could earn as attractive. [attractive] 
 
         
 1 2 3 4 5 6 7  
      Strongly                        Neither                       Strongly 
       Disagree   Agree or Disagree         Agree 
3) I consider the reward I could earn as separate from my other 
sources of cash. [separate] 
 
         
 1 2 3 4 5 6 7  
      Strongly                        Neither                       Strongly 
       Disagree   Agree or Disagree         Agree 
4) Thinking about the reward I could earn made me feel happy 
[affect] 
 
         
 1 2 3 4 5 6 7  
      Strongly                        Neither                       Strongly 
       Disagree   Agree or Disagree         Agree 
5) Most people who care about me would approve of the targets I 
set in this task. [injunctive] 
 
         
 1 2 3 4 5 6 7  
      Strongly                        Neither                       Strongly 
       Disagree   Agree or Disagree         Agree 
6) I consider the reward I could earn as a gift or as an act of 
kindness. [gift] 
 
         
 1 2 3 4 5 6 7  
      Strongly                        Neither                       Strongly 
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7) It was important that I returned the generosity I received with 
regards to my potential rewards by accurately setting my 
performance target. [reciprocity] 
 
         
 1 2 3 4 5 6 7  
      Strongly                        Neither                       Strongly 
       Disagree   Agree or Disagree         Agree 
[Conditions 3 and 6: Points Condition]  
8) When setting my budget, I thought of 1 point as being worth 
much less than $1. [value] 
 
         
 1 2 3 4 5 6 7  
      Strongly                        Neither                       Strongly 
       Disagree   Agree or Disagree         Agree 
 [Conditions 2, 3, 5, and 6: Tangible and Points Condition] 
9) If I had a choice, I would rather receive cash as my reward for 
performance above my self-set performance target. [rather] 
 
         
 1 2 3 4 5 6 7  
      Strongly                        Neither                       Strongly 
       Disagree   Agree or Disagree         Agree 
[Conditions 4, 5, and 6: RPI condition only] 
10) I care about the overall impression the other two members of 
my group have of me. [care] 
 
         
 1 2 3 4 5 6 7  
      Strongly                        Neither                       Strongly 
       Disagree   Agree or Disagree         Agree 
[Conditions 4, 5, and 6: RPI condition only] 
11) It is more likely that the other two members of my group 
earned their rewards by understating their target rather than by 
working hard. [understate] 
 
         
 1 2 3 4 5 6 7  
      Strongly                        Neither                       Strongly 
       Disagree   Agree or Disagree         Agree 
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 12) In this task, it is unethical for someone to set a target 
significantly below his or her known performance capability? 
[sensitivity] 
         
 1 2 3 4 5 6 7  
      Strongly                        Neither                       Strongly 
       Disagree   Agree or Disagree         Agree 
 
Screen 23 [Different across conditions] 
 
Questions about the Task Continued 
 
 
Please answer the following additional questions: 
 
1) How justifiable is it for other participants in this task to set 
their targets below their maximum capabilities to earn additional 
rewards? [justifiable] 
 
         
     Completely                    Neutral                      Completely 
     Unjustified                                                         Justified 
2) Is setting your performance target in this task more of an 
ethical decision or a financial decision? [frame] 
 
         
        Ethical                    Equally Ethical                 Financial 
      Decision                      and Financial                  Decision 
 
3) If you had a $10 gift card to your choice of 1 of 4 locations (Second Cup, Marble Slab, 
Cineplex Odeon, or Chapters), what is the least amount of cash you would be willing to 
accept in exchange for your gift card? [leastamount] [Amount must be > 0] 
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Screen 24 [Same across all conditions] 
 
Questions About You 
 
Please rate your degree of agreement with the following statements regarding how you 
generally make decisions: 
 
1) I often consult other people to help choose the best alternative when making a decision. 
[influence1] 
         
 1 2 3 4 5 6 7  
      Strongly                        Neither                       Strongly 
       Disagree   Agree or Disagree         Agree 
2) It is important that others like the decisions I make. [influence2] 
         
 1 2 3 4 5 6 7  
      Strongly                        Neither                       Strongly 
       Disagree   Agree or Disagree         Agree 
3) When making a decision, I generally choose the alternative that I think will be approved 
by others. [influence3] 
         
 1 2 3 4 5 6 7  
      Strongly                        Neither                       Strongly 
       Disagree   Agree or Disagree         Agree 
 4) I feel a sense of belonging whenever I am with my classmates. [belong] 
         
 1 2 3 4 5 6 7  
      Strongly                        Neither                       Strongly 
       Disagree   Agree or Disagree         Agree 
 5) As a whole, I like my other classmates in this room. [like] 
         
 1 2 3 4 5 6 7  
      Strongly                        Neither                       Strongly 
       Disagree   Agree or Disagree         Agree 
6) It’s okay to steal to take care of your family’s needs [disengage1] 
         
 1 2 3 4 5 6 7  
      Strongly                        Neither                       Strongly 
       Disagree   Agree or Disagree         Agree 
 
  148 
Appendix G (Continued) 
 
7) Stealing some money is not too serious compared to stealing a lot of money [disengage2] 
         
 1 2 3 4 5 6 7  
      Strongly                        Neither                       Strongly 
       Disagree   Agree or Disagree         Agree 
8) Compared to other illegal things people do, taking some things from a store without 
paying for them is not very serious. [disengage3] 
         
 1 2 3 4 5 6 7  
      Strongly                        Neither                       Strongly 
       Disagree   Agree or Disagree         Agree 
9) I regularly think about the ethical implications of my decisions [attentive] 
         
 1 2 3 4 5 6 7  
      Strongly                        Neither                       Strongly 
       Disagree   Agree or Disagree         Agree 
10) It is important to me that I am honest in everything I say and do [identity] 
         
 1 2 3 4 5 6 7  
      Strongly                        Neither                       Strongly 
       Disagree   Agree or Disagree         Agree 
 
Screen 24 [Same across all conditions] 
 
Questions About You (Continued) 
 
Finally, we ask for your opinion on a particular social issue and we ask you to respond to 
two demographic questions. Your responses are confidential and annonomous. However, 
you may decline to answer these questions by leaving them blank: 
 
1) Is it a more serious crime to steal a gift card worth $10 to your choice of 1 of 4 locations 
(Second Cup, Marble Slab, Cineplex Odeon, or Chapters) or to steal $10 cash? [steal] 
 
          
          $10                           Equally                           $10  
       Gift Card                     Serious                       Cash 
 
2) What is your gender?  Female [0]  Male [1] [Gender] 
 
3) What is your age?  [Age] 
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[please require participants to answer each question] 
 




[Conditions 1 and 4: Cash] 
 
You have completed the study.  
 
You earned $BB from completing 3 practice rounds. [$BB = totalpracticepay] 
 
Round X [1,2, or 3] has been randomly selected as the round your reward will be paid 
out.  You earned a cash reward of $CC in round X [please track X as ‘rewardpayout’].  
 
[$DD = sum of reward#; Record as totalreward; Record totalamount = BB+DD] 
 
Please raise your hand and the administrator will provide you instructions on how 
to collect your reward. 
 
[Conditions 2 and 5: Tangible] 
 
You have completed the study.  
 
You earned $BB from completing 3 practice rounds. [$BB = totalpracticepay] 
 
Round X [1,2, or 3] has been randomly selected as the round your reward will be paid 
out.  You earned a gift card worth $CC in round X [please track X as ‘rewardpayout’].  
 
[$DD = sum of reward#; Record as totalreward; Record totalamount = BB+DD] 
 
1) I would like to receive my reward on a card towards [record as giftcert2]: 
a) Second Cup 
b) Chapters/Indigo   
c) Marble Slab 
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[Conditions 3 and 6: Points] 
 
You have completed the study.  
 
You earned $BB from completing 3 practice rounds. [$BB = totalpracticepay] 
 
Round X [1,2, or 3] has been randomly selected as the round your reward will be paid 
out.  You earned CC points in round X [please track X as ‘rewardpayout’].  
 
[$DD = sum of reward#; Record as totalreward; Record totalamount = BB+DD] 
 
Points are redeemable for a gift card with a balance of 1 point equals an additional $1 on 
your gift card.  
 
1) I would like to redeem my points reward for a gift card towards [record as giftcert2]: 
a) Second Cup 
b) Chapters/Indigo   
c) Marble Slab 





Screen 25b [Conditions 2, 3, 5, and 6: tangible and points] 
 
In total, you earned $BB from completing 3 practice rounds. [$BB = totalpracticepay] 
 
Round X [1,2, or 3] has been randomly selected as the round your reward will be paid 
out.  You earned a gift card worth $CC towards ________ [giftcert2]  
 
Please raise your hand and the administrator will provide you instructions on how 
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